During the past few decades, Latin American governments’ recurrent attacks against journalists have contributed to the erosion of press freedom in the region and, relatedly, of the quality of democracy. Yet what pushes governments to harass journalists? We argue that governments are more likely to harass journalists when popular support for them drops. Due to the ability of journalists to influence public opinion, governments could perceive the harassment of journalists as a means to punish and silence those individuals who are seen as contributing to their decline in public support or as obstacles to regaining popularity. We test our argument on a sample of Latin American countries observed from 1990 to 2019. We find that declines in governments’ popular support lead to more harassment of journalists. Our research contributes to the debate on the determinants of press freedom and sheds further light on the current decline of democratic quality in Latin America.

The vast majority of sub-Saharan countries have adopted constitutional clauses establishing that elected presidents cannot serve more than two mandates. While an extensive literature has examined why African leaders comply with or else try to manipulate term limits, the policy implications of the latter remain unexplored. Existing studies of other world regions suggest that setting a maximum number of terms presidents can serve tends to make them ‘lame ducks’ during their final mandate. We reconsider this argument, and posit and demonstrate empirically that constitutional limits can actually induce positive effects on second-term presidents' actions compared to their first terms. More specifically, the absence of electoral pressures, the concern for their post-presidential future and legacy-building motivations may lead to improvements in the rule of law, especially regarding the functioning of the judiciary. This article represents the first empirical investigation of the performance of Africa's second-term lame-duck presidents.

This introductory note to the Special Issue ‘Autocracy Strikes Back: Authoritarian Resurgence in the Early 21st Century’ situates this collection of articles in the burgeoning literature on authoritarian resurgence, and illustrates the conceptual terrain on which these articles make their contribution. In this regard, we discuss autocratization, authoritarian resilience, democratic transition failure, and autocracy-to-autocracy transition as processes of regime change representing different ways in which authoritarian resurgence may advance. Relatedly, we clarify how these processes of regime change differ from each other and provide a few basic coordinates to frame their comparative analysis.

The so-called third wave of democratization is over and scholars are increasingly alert to the apparently growing number of regime changes in the opposite direction. However, there is little agreement concerning how many distinct forms these processes can take, and even less systematic cross-regional analysis of the phenomenon, which diminishes our ability to seize its actual import. Accordingly, this article pursues a twofold goal. First, we present a framework for the analysis of the processes opposite to democratization. Specifically, we build on the notion of ‘autocratization’, identify similarities and differences between the various forms it can take, and catalogue how it can happen. Second, we provide new data on post-Cold War cases across the world and use these data to map the prevailing trends. The analysis confirms the increasing empirical relevance of the phenomenon, and reveals the existence of a few geographical and historical patterns in the forms and modes of contemporary autocratization.

The last part of 20th century saw the collapse of a dramatic number of dictatorships. Rather than democracy, several of these transitions brought regimes where limited political competition coexists with persistently authoritarian practices. The diffusion of this form of authoritarianism in the developing world raises several questions about its broader consequences. Most importantly, does political change short of democratization matter for ordinary citizens? Recent research demonstrates that nominally democratic institutions, even in the absence of people empowerment, can result in better living conditions. The paper adds to this debate by formulating and testing new hypotheses. I compare electoral authoritarianism with democracy and full dictatorship, including specific subtypes of the latter, and focus on both policy outputs and outcomes.