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Using recent advances in historical national accounts and scholarship of the region, this chapter depicts the economic development of eastern Europe from the times of the Habsburg monarchy and the Russian Empire before World War I through the turbulent interwar years, with the onset of the communist regime and socialist experiment in Russia, the spread of the centrally planned economic system and communist rule in the post-World War II decades, its collapse in the late 1980s and then a decade of transition to market economies. The chapter assesses the region’s economic performance in each of these periods. Even though the path of eastern Europe since the late nineteenth century has been one marked by a series of significant shocks, there were also significant continuities, so that the socialist ‘experiment’ did not result in the significant break with the past that its architects had envisaged.
Ernst Mach and William James were personal friends and intellectual allies. Might there have been an American pragmatist influence on Logical Positivism via James’s influence on Mach? I explore the relationship between these two friends, arguing that, if anything, Mach’s instrumentalism about science actually influenced James more than James’s pragmatism influenced Mach. What is more, empirical and not philosophical issues dominated their intellectual exchanges, and I examine the three topics about which they most frequently engaged one another: the role of the semicircular canals in the perception of bodily orientation, the question of whether there is a distinctive 'feeling of effort' (Innervationsgefühl), and the nature of visual spatial perception. The debate over the Innervationsgefühl is particularly interesting because James apparently convinced Mach to reverse his position on the matter. In short, we remember Mach as a master experimentalist and James as a philosophical populariser, so it is a surprise to learn that the main philosophical influence apparently flowed from Mach to James, while the main influence when it comes to matters of empirical interest actually flowed the other way.
Efforts to address the major health, environmental, and social threats that can be found across the globe rely on changes in human behavior. Yet identifying effective and efficient ways to change behavior remains a vexing challenge. To meet this need, investigators need to design and evaluate behavioral intervention strategies in a manner that affords the creation of evidence-based guidelines that specify not only whether interventions work but also how and under what conditions. In this chapter, the design and testing of interventions are situated within the experimental medicine approach. This approach leverages the strength of the experimental method to test how behavior change intervention strategies work and to identify the conditions under which they operate effectively. Moreover, it organizes how investigators specify the questions that underlie the study of behavior change interventions and requires them to articulate precisely what intervention strategy they are using, how they think the strategy operates, and the outcomes it generates. Through the systematic use of this approach, evidence will emerge that addresses practitioners’ prevailing concerns directly – what intervention strategy is the most effective and efficient way to address the problem at hand. This chapter provides an overview of how to implement the experimental medicine approach, describes its key features, and addresses the importance of precision and, finally, considers this approach within a broader set of initiatives that have emerged to support a programmatic approach to the design, evaluation, and implementation of behavior change interventions.
We study the fragmentation of a liquid drop that is hit by a laser pulse. The drop expands into a thin sheet that breaks by the radial expulsion of ligaments from its rim and the nucleation and growth of holes on the sheet. By combining experimental data from two liquid systems with vastly different time and length scales, we show how the early-time laser–matter interaction affects the late-time fragmentation. We identify two Rayleigh–Taylor instabilities of different origins as the prime cause of the fragmentation and derive scaling laws for the characteristic breakup time and wavenumber. The final web of ligaments results from a subtle interplay between these instabilities and deterministic modulations of the local sheet thickness, which originate from the drop deformation dynamics and spatial variations in the laser-beam profile.
This article offers the first multivariate regression study of international migration in early modern Europe. Using unique eighteenth-century data about maritime workers, we created a data set of migration flows among European countries to examine the role of factors related to geography, population, language, the market, and chain migration in explaining the migration of these workers across countries. We show that among all factors considered in our multivariate analysis, the geographical characteristics of the destination countries, size of port towns, and past migrations are among the most robust and quantitatively the most important factors influencing cross-country migration flows.
A free falling, absorbing liquid drop hit by a nanosecond laser pulse experiences a strong recoil pressure kick. As a consequence, the drop propels forward and deforms into a thin sheet which eventually fragments. We study how the drop deformation depends on the pulse shape and drop properties. We first derive the velocity field inside the drop on the time scale of the pressure pulse, when the drop is still spherical. This yields the kinetic energy partition inside the drop, which precisely measures the deformation rate with respect to the propulsion rate, before surface tension comes into play. On the time scale where surface tension is important, the drop has evolved into a thin sheet. Its expansion dynamics is described with a slender-slope model, which uses the impulsive energy partition as an initial condition. Completed with boundary integral simulations, this two-stage model explains the entire drop dynamics and its dependence on the pulse shape: for a given propulsion, a tightly focused pulse results in a thin curved sheet which maximizes the lateral expansion, while a uniform illumination yields a smaller expansion but a flat symmetric sheet, in good agreement with experimental observations.
Between 1270 and 1870 Britain slowly progressed from the periphery of the European economy to centre-stage of an integrated world economy. In the process it escaped from Malthusian constraints and by the eighteenth century had successfully reconciled rising population with rising living standards. This final chapter reflects upon this protracted but profound economic transformation from the perspective of the national income estimates assembled in Part I and analysed in Part II of this book. Because Britain’s economic rise did not unfold in isolation, account is taken of the broader comparative context provided by the national income reconstructions now available for several other Eurasian countries: Spain from 1282, Italy from 1310 and Holland from 1348, plus Japan from 725, China from 980 and India from 1600. All are output-based estimates but have been derived via a range of alternative approaches according to the nature of the available historical evidence. Several make ingenious use of real wage rates and urbanisation ratios (Malanima, 2011; Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, 2013), two economic indicators often used as surrogates for estimates of GDP per head. Only the GDP estimates for Holland, like these for Britain, have been made the hard way, by summing the weighted value-added outputs of the agricultural, industrial and service sectors and then dividing the results by estimates of total population obtained by reconciling time-series and cross-sectional demographic data. Methodologically, the British and Dutch national income estimates are therefore the most directly comparable. Each is free from overdependence upon any single or narrow range of data series and, instead, they encapsulate variations in the wide range of economic indicators, appropriately weighted in line with their importance in overall economic activity, from which they have been reconstructed.
Agriculture was for long the single largest component of the English and British economies, both in terms of its share of employment and the value of its output. The latter was a function of the amount of land under cultivation, the uses to which it was put, the productivities of crops and animals and their respective prices. The main purpose of this chapter is to describe the methods used to derive the areas under arable and grass and, in particular, the total sown acreage. The crops produced and animals stocked are the subjects of the following chapter. Along the way, it will be demonstrated that claims that the peak arable area in the medieval period may have exceeded 20 million acres (Clark, 2007a: 124) are unrealistic, since, on the best available evidence, the combined total under field crops and fallow could not have been more than 12.75 million acres. In the absence of significant food imports, this limited both the population that could be supported and the supply of kilocalories per head needed for survival. It also shaped the production choices made by agricultural producers.
Comprehensive national agricultural statistics were collected annually from 1866 and provide the starting point for calculating the acreages of arable and grass (Anon, 1968; Coppock, 1984). Together with the tithe files, which provide a precise but incomplete guide to the share of land in each county devoted to arable production during the 1830s (Kain, 1986; Overton, 1986), they are used to provide a nineteenth-century benchmark. The chapter proceeds as follows. After a discussion of the potential agricultural area of England in Section 2.2, Section 2.3 reviews the arable acreage by county from the tithe files of the 1830s and from the agricultural statistics of 1871. Section 2.4 then examines changes in land use between 1290 and 1871, while Section 2.5 presents county-level estimates of the arable acreage in 1290. Section 2.6 provides a further cross-check by examining changes in land use between 1086 and 1290. Finally, Section 2.7 provides estimates of land use for a number of benchmark years between 1270 and 1871.
Economic growth can be either extensive or intensive. Extensive growth arises where more output is produced in line with a growing population but living standards remain constant, while intensive growth arises where more output is produced by each person. In the former case, there is no economic development, as the economy simply reproduces itself on a larger scale: in the latter, living standards rise as the economy goes through a process of economic development. To understand the long-run growth of the British economy reaching back to the thirteenth century therefore requires knowledge of the trajectories followed by both population and GDP. Of particular interest is whether periods of intensive growth, distinguished by rising GDP per head, were accompanied by expanding or contracting population. For it is one thing for living standards to rise during a period of population decline, such as that induced by the recurrent plagues of the second half of the fourteenth century, when survivors found themselves able to add the land and capital of those who had perished to their own stocks, but quite another for living standards and population to rise together, particularly given the emphasis of Malthus  on diminishing returns. Indeed, Kuznets (1966: 34–85) identified simultaneous growth of population and income per head (i.e. the concurrence of intensive and extensive growth) as one of the key features that distinguished modern from pre-industrial economic growth.
Chapter 6 has argued that workers responded to changes in real wage rates by adapting how hard they worked so as to maintain their earnings. Household incomes therefore tracked GDP per head rather than real wage rates and progressively improved over time, doubling between the early fourteenth and late seventeenth centuries and doubling again over the course of the industrial revolution. Higher incomes translated into changing patterns of consumption and the forms these consumption choices took are the subjects of this chapter. Section 7.2 reconstructs the kilocalorie value and composition of diets based on the agricultural-output estimates presented in Chapter 3, augmented by information on imported foodstuffs. Given that populations require an average daily food intake per head of 2,000 kilocalories (Livi-Bacci, 1991: 27) to provide sufficient nourishment for both economic and biological reproduction, these calculations also provide a useful cross-check on the consistency of the agricultural-output and population estimates. Section 7.3 then considers non-food consumption drawing upon early modern evidence of material culture as revealed by probate inventories. Again, these trends need to be consistent with those of industrial output reconstructed in Chapter 4.
Price, habit, fashion and status all shaped the budgetary decisions taken by households. Demand for food was inelastic up to the point where basic subsistence needs had been met, but as incomes rose there were clear trade-offs to be obtained between increasing consumption of cheap sources of kilocalories such as pottage, potatoes and salted herrings on the one hand, or indulging in more expensive refined bread, quality ale and beer, dairy produce and meat, plus the imported luxuries of wine, sugar, tea, cocoa and tobacco, on the other. In effect, higher incomes allowed more households to trade up to a respectability basket of foodstuffs providing a more varied and processed diet but not necessarily more kilocalories. The changing relative prices of arable, livestock and luxury products influenced these consumption decisions, while the relative cheapness or dearness of food determined how much disposable income could be devoted to the increasingly varied and tempting array of non-food consumer goods (Figure 5.02).
Income distribution in England between 1270 and 1870, as elsewhere in Western Europe, was profoundly unequal due to entrenched inequalities in access to the land, capital, education and political power upon which personal wealth depended. Gender, rank and servility and their differential legal rights were determined at birth. Privilege, patronage and position ensured that rent-seeking was rife, while warfare created opportunities for ransom and plunder to the enrichment of those in command and impoverishment of the vanquished. Everywhere, as a result, there were rich men in their castles and poor men at their gates. Moreover, as van Zanden (1995) and Milanovic and others (2007) have demonstrated, the effect of economic growth was to magnify rather than mitigate these inequalities and widen the income gap between those at the top and bottom of the social pyramid.
The rich became richer as average wealth grew because the more wealth there was the greater the opportunities for those with power and privilege to enrich themselves at the expense of the weak and disadvantaged majority. In Holland one legacy of the prosperity achieved during the Dutch Golden Age was a greatly increased inequality of incomes, which was more marked in towns than rural villages and greatest of all in major cities (van Zanden, 1995). In England, similarly, Milanovic and others (2007) claim that inequality rose with average incomes between 1688 and 1801/03, thereby confirming Kuznets’ (1955) observation that income inequality typically increased during the early stages of economic growth and only declined relatively late in the modernisation process. Prior to 1870, therefore, increasing inequality can be treated, like urbanisation, as a characteristic and unavoidable manifestation of economic growth.
This chapter provides annual estimates of output in agriculture, which was the largest sector of the economy during the middle ages, and continued to play an important role throughout the period under consideration. The approach builds on the study of Overton and Campbell (1996), which tracked long-run trends in agricultural output and labour productivity, but was restricted to estimates for a small number of benchmark years. To provide annual estimates, heavy reliance has been made on three datasets assembled for the late-medieval, early modern and modern periods. For the period c.1250 to c.1500, a Medieval Accounts Database has been assembled by Campbell (2000, 2007), drawing upon the archival labours of a number of other historians, including David Farmer, John Langdon and Jan Titow. The information on arable yields and animal stocking densities is taken largely from manorial accounts, but is supplemented by information on the non-manorial sector from tithes. For the period c.1550 to c.1750, an Early Modern Probate Inventories Database has been assembled by Overton, which provides animal stocking densities and indirect estimates of arable yields from the valuation of the assets left by farmers (Overton and others, 2004). From the early eighteenth century, use is made of the Modern Farm Accounts Database assembled by Turner, Beckett and Afton (2001).
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief introduction to the main data sources for the three periods. Estimates of output for the arable sector are then given in Section 3.3, followed by estimates of livestock-sector output in Section 3.4. The arable and livestock outputs are combined in Section 3.5 to provide estimates of overall agricultural output, while Section 3.6 concludes.
In 1270 the agricultural sector dominated economic output, dwarfing the industrial and service sectors. By 1870, notwithstanding an eightfold expansion of agricultural output, this situation had been reversed and industry and services were the fastest-growing and largest sectors. The progress of British industry has been closely scrutinised from 1700 but less so in earlier centuries notwithstanding that the roots of Britain’s industrial rise extend back much earlier than the conventional starting date of the industrial revolution in the mid-eighteenth century. The service sector, which already by the mid-nineteenth century had overtaken industry and emerged as the dominant sector within the economy, has received far less attention and awaits systematic investigation from the bottom up. This unevenness of treatment has required adoption of a range of approaches in order to derive valid estimates of industrial and service-sector output and thereby chart these profound changes in the structure of economic activity and volumes of industrial and service-sector output across the 600 years under investigation.
From 1700 industry is the one economic sector for which annual data have previously been gathered and analysed on a national scale. Full use has therefore been made of these existing estimates. Pioneering work by Hoffmann (1955) inadvertently overstated the growth rate of industrial output during the industrial revolution as a result of the weighting procedures applied to a dataset which covered only 56 per cent of industrial output. As Harley (1982) and Crafts (1985) separately point out, the problem is that a few industries, most notably cotton and iron, grew more rapidly than the rest of manufacturing, and these atypical industries bulk disproportionately large in Hoffmann’s output series. By extrapolating total industrial output from that series he effectively doubled the weights of the most dynamic industries. Harley (1982) and Crafts and others (1989) have overcome this problem by limiting the weights applied to cotton and iron and increasing those applied to other industries, thereby arriving at lower estimates of total industrial output growth.
How does Britain’s experience of long-run economic growth and development, as revealed by the output-based estimation of GDP per head set out in Part I of this book, compare with that of other countries? Maddison’s (2010) historical national income estimates show that by the middle of the nineteenth century Britain had become the most developed economy in the world, with higher output per head than any other country in Europe, Asia or the Americas. A majority of its population lived in towns, agriculture contributed less than a quarter of employment and a fifth of value-added output, after centuries of mercantilism it was trading across the world under the banner of free trade, and the value of that international commerce accounted for a fifth of national income and was rising. Demographic and economic growth were proceeding in tandem and thereby fulfilling one of Kuznets’s (1966) key requirements of modern economic growth. Contrary to Malthus’s gloomiest predictions, the population was not only growing but it was becoming richer. The Great Exhibition of 1851, conceived to make clear to the world Great Britain’s role as industrial leader, could not have been better timed.
Eight centuries earlier, when William of Normandy had cast his covetous eyes upon the Crown of England, the country had been less a land of plenty than a kingdom with plenty of land. Its relatively sparse population of 1.7 million was overwhelmingly rural, towns were small and London alone had more than 10,000 inhabitants, commerce was limited and commercial institutions and infrastructure weakly developed, and exports were chiefly of unprocessed primary products, most notably wool and tin. England may have been resource-rich but its lack of development meant that its GDP per head was only a quarter what it would become in 1850. It was poorer than most of its immediate continental neighbours, significantly poorer than northern and central Italy, at that time Europe’s economic leader, conspicuously poorer than the world’s most successful economy, China under the Northern Song Dynasty (960–1127), and poorer than the core economies of the Roman Empire a millennium earlier under Augustus (Lo Cascio and Malanima, 2009).