We provide an overview of research that explains what oral corrective feedback is, how it can be expressed by teachers and peers, and how it may impact the language development process. We define oral corrective feedback as a negative evidence provided in response to learner error in an oral mode. A theoretical rationale for the role of feedback is described, drawing on research from both cognitive-interactionist and sociocultural explanations of second language learning through oral communication. Examples from numerous studies are incorporated to exemplify the range of ways feedback is provided on different types of linguistic errors. Research on the relative effectiveness of different types of feedback is reviewed, as well as empirical inquiry into the role of individual and social factors that can enhance or limit the effectiveness or oral feedback, concluding that oral corrective feedback is an important factor for language learning in instructed settings. We close with recommendations for research-driven teaching practice with respect to oral corrective feedback, cautioning that teachers need to consider learner experiences and expectations of feedback, their pedagogical objectives and approach, as well as learners developmental needs, self-monitoring skills, and ability to provide feedback to one another.

This chapter offers some suggestions on how reciprocity might be used to justify specific policy directions. For instance, so long as salaries remain the predominant form of remuneration for public sector employees, performance incentives – both positive and negative – might be beneficial so long as all parties accept that the chosen indicators of good and bad performance are appropriate and deem the corresponding performance-related compensation/penalties as fair. Moreover, insofar as reciprocity is entwined with reputational concerns, a reputational model of governance that threatens to punish bad absolute performance and that supports the implementation of good practice is recommended. Relatedly, group selection theory implies that providing the conditions for reputational competition across regions in relation to public sector services may incentivise cooperation and more innovation within each region, generating lessons that could be shared across regions. Furthermore, given that people naturally reciprocate, framing messages with this fundamental motivational force is worthy of consideration when trying to secure individual behaviour change.

This chapter reviews the predominant normative direction in the relatively new field of behavioural public policy - i.e. that we ought to be aiming to improve internalities so as to increase utility. The chapter critiques this approach, and highlights where reciprocity sits in a suggested alternative political economy of behavioural public policy. It is postulated that conditions be created to nurture reciprocal behaviours, to help people to flourish in both meeting the already predetermined broadly defined objectives of public sector services and in relation to their meeting their privately held goals, where they may find fulfilment in any way they wish. In any way they wish, that is, so long as they are not imposing harms on others. The second arm of the proposed framework is that any harms that are consequent on behaviourally informed actions are potentially fair game for regulatory control. So, in short, it is proposed that the political economy of behavioural public policy be focused upon promoting flourishing and curtailing harms.

This chapter focusses principally on considering the different forms of reciprocity, driven variously by purported fairness, liking and/or enlightened self-interest. Reciprocity can be direct (i.e. where exchange partners are known to each other), indirect (i.e. where they are not) and negative (i.e. punishment for transgressions), and there is in general a concern both for the intentions of others and for the final distribution of outcomes. Reciprocity can be all of these things because its expression is contextual – the meaning that people attach to the way the context is framed drives behavioural responses, and if care is not taken reciprocity can be crowded out for what many may perceive as our baser instincts. The contextual nature of reciprocity is illustrated in the chapter with reference to a simple economic abstraction known as the ultimatum game. Ultimately, however, in an evolutionary sense perhaps the most fundamental reason for acting reciprocally is that it can bring about benefits and protection to the group, and most people perhaps know innately that what is good for the group is good for them individually, also.

Reciprocity has roots that predate humans, and is something that is fundamental to the animal kingdom. Much of this behaviour is instinctive (i.e. attitudinal) – e.g. cats licking each other – but these actions may have served as the kernel for the development of more complex, deliberative forms of reciprocity. By common consent, however, although there are some examples of non-human primates and even other species arguably demonstrating a deliberative form of reciprocity and although we have much to learn about animal behaviours, a tendency towards more sophisticated forms of reciprocity that rely on memory and a sense of obligation is predominantly human. Indeed, the human talent for deliberative reciprocity and hence cooperation is an important explanation for why humans have been so successful at populating the planet and dominating other species. This urge to act reciprocally lies very deep within the human psyche. For instance, there is some evidence that very young children show tendencies towards deliberative reciprocity, and demonstrate some concern for a person’s reputation, which is crucial for the effective operation of indirect reciprocity.