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Strategic voting is thought to underlie Duverger’s Law and lead to two-party outcomes in single-member district plurality (SMDP) systems. We examine the extent of strategic voting in the world’s most populous democracy, India, where frequent exceptions to Duverger’s Law have long puzzled political scientists. Using an original voter survey from the 2017 Uttar Pradesh state election, we find extremely low rates of strategic voting. Why? We show that the vast majority of respondents believe that their preferred party is likely to win in their constituency. For most voters, their partisan preferences overwhelmingly predict their beliefs about which party will win. Their election forecasts correspond to objective electoral outcomes only with respect to parties that they like less.
Cass Sunstein's contention that evolutionary explanations for behavioural economic phenomena are of limited relevance to public policy – and his support for soft paternalism – rests on his view that policymakers ought to be pursuing increases in some overarching social planning conception of welfare. In this reply to Sunstein, I argue that people have differing and multifarious desires in life, with the social planner's conception of welfare being, at best, perhaps only a partial consideration for most people. The phenomena that behavioural economists and psychologists have empirically observed may well facilitate people in the pursuit of their own desires in life. Consequently, paternalistic manipulation or coercion to save people from themselves is questionable in the behavioural public policy space, but government intervention is warranted when one party implicitly or explicitly uses these phenomena to exploit others.
In a previously published article, I reported some tests of prospect theory's reflection effect over outcomes defined by money and life years gained from treatment. Those results suggested qualified support for the reflection effect over money outcomes and strong support over longevity outcomes. This article reruns those tests while accounting for the intensity of individual risk attitudes, and, overall, show consistency with the reflection effect. However, I argue that these results do not necessarily offer support for the explanatory power of prospect theory. Rather, the results may be driven by evolved responses to circumstances that provoke perceptions of scarcity and abundance. Therefore, from an ecological perspective, behavioral patterns such as those that are consistent with the reflection effect, which, by extension, tend to be considered as erroneous or biased by most behavioral economists because they conflict with the postulates of rational choice theory, may not be unreasonable. Recognizing as such is important when considering how behavioral insights ought to inform public policy design and implementation.
The ultimatum and dictator games were developed to help identify the fundamental motivators of human behavior, typically by asking participants to share windfall endowments with other persons. In the ultimatum game, a common observation is that proposers offer, and responders refuse to accept, a much larger share of the endowment than is predicted by rational choice theory. However, in the real world, windfalls are rare: money is usually earned. I report here a small study aimed at testing how participants react to an ultimatum game after they have earned their endowments by either building a Lego model or spending some time sorting out screws by their length. I find that the shares that proposers offer and responders accept are significantly lower than that typically observed with windfall money, an observation that is intensified when the task undertaken to earn the endowment is generally less enjoyable and thus perhaps more effortful (i.e., screw sorting compared to Lego building). I suggest, therefore, that considerations of effort-based desert are often important drivers behind individual decision-making, and that laboratory experiments, if intended to inform public policy design and implementation, ought to mirror the broad characteristics of the realities that people face.
Studying phenotypic and genetic characteristics of age at onset (AAO) and polarity at onset (PAO) in bipolar disorder can provide new insights into disease pathology and facilitate the development of screening tools.
Aims
To examine the genetic architecture of AAO and PAO and their association with bipolar disorder disease characteristics.
Method
Genome-wide association studies (GWASs) and polygenic score (PGS) analyses of AAO (n = 12 977) and PAO (n = 6773) were conducted in patients with bipolar disorder from 34 cohorts and a replication sample (n = 2237). The association of onset with disease characteristics was investigated in two of these cohorts.
Results
Earlier AAO was associated with a higher probability of psychotic symptoms, suicidality, lower educational attainment, not living together and fewer episodes. Depressive onset correlated with suicidality and manic onset correlated with delusions and manic episodes. Systematic differences in AAO between cohorts and continents of origin were observed. This was also reflected in single-nucleotide variant-based heritability estimates, with higher heritabilities for stricter onset definitions. Increased PGS for autism spectrum disorder (β = −0.34 years, s.e. = 0.08), major depression (β = −0.34 years, s.e. = 0.08), schizophrenia (β = −0.39 years, s.e. = 0.08), and educational attainment (β = −0.31 years, s.e. = 0.08) were associated with an earlier AAO. The AAO GWAS identified one significant locus, but this finding did not replicate. Neither GWAS nor PGS analyses yielded significant associations with PAO.
Conclusions
AAO and PAO are associated with indicators of bipolar disorder severity. Individuals with an earlier onset show an increased polygenic liability for a broad spectrum of psychiatric traits. Systematic differences in AAO across cohorts, continents and phenotype definitions introduce significant heterogeneity, affecting analyses.
A concern that people ought to be given what they deserve, in both positive and negative senses, lies deep within the human psyche. Views on the level of reward or punishment that a person deserves for their actions will differ across persons, places, and time, but, I argue in this article, depend substantively upon some combination of intentions and outcomes. Using these characteristics, I propose a taxonomy of actions, ordered from most to least blameworthy, with, for example, it being suggested that for any particular level of harm an intentional yet unrealized harm is more blameworthy than an unintentional yet realized harm (a similar taxonomy can be developed for the positive domain of praiseworthy actions). The taxonomy is focused upon people's actions toward others, but I finish the article with a discussion of desert in relation to people's intentions toward themselves. Ultimately, I contend that the strength and sustainability of public sector services and welfare systems, not to mention our private relationships, rely upon the recognition that desert underpins our notion of justice.
We provide an overview of research that explains what oral corrective feedback is, how it can be expressed by teachers and peers, and how it may impact the language development process. We define oral corrective feedback as a negative evidence provided in response to learner error in an oral mode. A theoretical rationale for the role of feedback is described, drawing on research from both cognitive-interactionist and sociocultural explanations of second language learning through oral communication. Examples from numerous studies are incorporated to exemplify the range of ways feedback is provided on different types of linguistic errors. Research on the relative effectiveness of different types of feedback is reviewed, as well as empirical inquiry into the role of individual and social factors that can enhance or limit the effectiveness or oral feedback, concluding that oral corrective feedback is an important factor for language learning in instructed settings. We close with recommendations for research-driven teaching practice with respect to oral corrective feedback, cautioning that teachers need to consider learner experiences and expectations of feedback, their pedagogical objectives and approach, as well as learners developmental needs, self-monitoring skills, and ability to provide feedback to one another.
This chapter offers some suggestions on how reciprocity might be used to justify specific policy directions. For instance, so long as salaries remain the predominant form of remuneration for public sector employees, performance incentives – both positive and negative – might be beneficial so long as all parties accept that the chosen indicators of good and bad performance are appropriate and deem the corresponding performance-related compensation/penalties as fair. Moreover, insofar as reciprocity is entwined with reputational concerns, a reputational model of governance that threatens to punish bad absolute performance and that supports the implementation of good practice is recommended. Relatedly, group selection theory implies that providing the conditions for reputational competition across regions in relation to public sector services may incentivise cooperation and more innovation within each region, generating lessons that could be shared across regions. Furthermore, given that people naturally reciprocate, framing messages with this fundamental motivational force is worthy of consideration when trying to secure individual behaviour change.
This chapter reviews the predominant normative direction in the relatively new field of behavioural public policy - i.e. that we ought to be aiming to improve internalities so as to increase utility. The chapter critiques this approach, and highlights where reciprocity sits in a suggested alternative political economy of behavioural public policy. It is postulated that conditions be created to nurture reciprocal behaviours, to help people to flourish in both meeting the already predetermined broadly defined objectives of public sector services and in relation to their meeting their privately held goals, where they may find fulfilment in any way they wish. In any way they wish, that is, so long as they are not imposing harms on others. The second arm of the proposed framework is that any harms that are consequent on behaviourally informed actions are potentially fair game for regulatory control. So, in short, it is proposed that the political economy of behavioural public policy be focused upon promoting flourishing and curtailing harms.
This chapter focusses principally on considering the different forms of reciprocity, driven variously by purported fairness, liking and/or enlightened self-interest. Reciprocity can be direct (i.e. where exchange partners are known to each other), indirect (i.e. where they are not) and negative (i.e. punishment for transgressions), and there is in general a concern both for the intentions of others and for the final distribution of outcomes. Reciprocity can be all of these things because its expression is contextual – the meaning that people attach to the way the context is framed drives behavioural responses, and if care is not taken reciprocity can be crowded out for what many may perceive as our baser instincts. The contextual nature of reciprocity is illustrated in the chapter with reference to a simple economic abstraction known as the ultimatum game. Ultimately, however, in an evolutionary sense perhaps the most fundamental reason for acting reciprocally is that it can bring about benefits and protection to the group, and most people perhaps know innately that what is good for the group is good for them individually, also.
Reciprocity has roots that predate humans, and is something that is fundamental to the animal kingdom. Much of this behaviour is instinctive (i.e. attitudinal) – e.g. cats licking each other – but these actions may have served as the kernel for the development of more complex, deliberative forms of reciprocity. By common consent, however, although there are some examples of non-human primates and even other species arguably demonstrating a deliberative form of reciprocity and although we have much to learn about animal behaviours, a tendency towards more sophisticated forms of reciprocity that rely on memory and a sense of obligation is predominantly human. Indeed, the human talent for deliberative reciprocity and hence cooperation is an important explanation for why humans have been so successful at populating the planet and dominating other species. This urge to act reciprocally lies very deep within the human psyche. For instance, there is some evidence that very young children show tendencies towards deliberative reciprocity, and demonstrate some concern for a person’s reputation, which is crucial for the effective operation of indirect reciprocity.