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34 results

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  • In Memoriam: Robert L. Powell

  • James D. Fearon, David A. Lake, Anne Meng, Jack Paine
  • Journal: International Organization , First View
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 May 2022, pp. 1-2
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  • In Memoriam: Robert L. Powell

  • JAMES D. FEARON, DAVID A. LAKE, ANNE MENG, JACK PAINE
  • Journal: Political Science Today / Volume 2 / Issue 2 / May 2022
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 June 2022, pp. 18-20
  • Print publication: May 2022
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  • Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma

  • ANNE MENG, JACK PAINE
  • Journal: American Political Science Review / Volume 116 / Issue 4 / November 2022
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 April 2022, pp. 1208-1225
  • Print publication: November 2022

  • Regimes founded in rebellion are, typically, extremely durable. We propose that this stability is founded upon peaceful power sharing between the rebel regime leader and military elites. Amid long and intense fighting, rebel leaders must delegate control to top military commanders because doing so helps them to win battles. After seizing power, power-sharing deals between former combatants are highly credible due to their history of interactions, which mitigates the guardianship dilemma. Elsewhere, a persistent internal security dilemma often undermines power-sharing deals. Using originally collected data on African regimes from 1960 to 2017, we establish that rebel regimes break down seldomly compared with other authoritarian regimes and they experience fewer coups. Regarding the mechanism, rebel regimes more frequently share power with military elites by appointing a Minister of Defense. These Ministers are typically high-ranking members of the rebellion, which reflects the regime’s replacement of the state military with their own.

  • Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation

  • LEONARDO R. ARRIOLA, JED DEVARO, ANNE MENG
  • Journal: American Political Science Review / Volume 115 / Issue 4 / November 2021
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 July 2021, pp. 1358-1372
  • Print publication: November 2021

  • Incumbents in electoral regimes often retain power despite having to regularly compete in multiparty elections. We examine a specific channel through which incumbents can seek to prevent the emergence of a strong opposition that might threaten them in future elections. We present a formal model demonstrating that incumbents can strategically induce opposition fragmentation by appointing some opposition members to ministerial cabinet positions. Opposition politicians who have the opportunity to secure a cabinet position in an incumbent’s government tend to compete for office independently rather than coalescing into broad-based parties or electoral alliances. The model shows that weaker incumbents are more likely to rely on this cooptation strategy. Using original data on presidential elections across African countries during 1990–2016, we show that past cooptation of opposition politicians is associated with a more fragmented opposition field in subsequent elections.

  • 3 - Two Illustrative Cases

  • Anne Meng, University of Virginia
  • Book: Constraining Dictatorship
  • Published online: 18 September 2020
  • Print publication: 20 August 2020, pp 64-92

  • Summary

    I illustrate my theoretical argument through two case studies of Cameroon and the Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire). I show that Ahmadou Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroon, came into power weak, therefore institutionalized his regime in order to buy the support of other elites. This was ultimately stabilizing for Cameroon. By comparison, Felix Houphouet Boigny, the first president of the Ivory Coast, came into power strong and did not institutionalize his regime. This was ultimately destabilizing for the Ivory Coast, and the regime fell soon after his death.

  • 8 - Conclusion

  • Anne Meng, University of Virginia
  • Book: Constraining Dictatorship
  • Published online: 18 September 2020
  • Print publication: 20 August 2020, pp 226-238

  • Summary

    This chapter concludes by summarizing the main findings of the book and offering some thoughts on the findings on future studies of democratic erosion and institutional design.

Constraining Dictatorship
  • From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
  • Anne Meng
  • Published online: 18 September 2020
  • Print publication: 20 August 2020
  • How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, this book studies the emergence of constitutional term limits and succession procedures, as well as elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. Anne Meng argues that institutions credibly constrain leaders only when they change the underlying distribution of power between leaders and elites by providing elites with access to the state. She also shows that initially weak leaders who institutionalize are less likely to face coup attempts and are able to remain in office for longer periods than weak leaders who do not. Drawing on an original time-series dataset of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010, formal theory, and case studies, this book ultimately illustrates how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes.

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