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Body Mass Index (BMI) is an informative factor on body fatness which has been associated to higher levels of Perinatal Depression (PD) and complications during pregnancy. We aimed to explore the impact of pre-pregnancy and postnatal BMI on the risk of Perinatal Depression and pregnancy outcomes among women recruited at their third trimester of pregnancy.
We report on findings from a large multi-centre study conducted in the South of Italy and involving 1611 women accessing three urban gynaecological departments from July to November 2020. Pregnant women were assessed at their third trimester of pregnancy (T0) and after the childbirth (T1) ;The Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale (EPDS) has been employed for the screening of PD over time (T0 and T1) as well as other standardized measures for neuroticism, resilience, and quality of life at baseline. BMI (T0 and T1) and other socio-demographic and clinical characteristics have been collected.
Over-weight and obesity (higher levels of BMI) were associated with higher risk of PD (higher scores of EPDS), higher neuroticism and poorer subjective psychological well-being among enrolled women. Also, obesity and over-weight were associated with lower education, higher number of physical comorbidities, medical treatments and complications during pregnancy.
Over-weight and obesity may impact on mental health and pregnancy outcome of women enrolled. Psycho-educational interventions aimed to improve the management of physical and emotional issues may reduce the risk of PD and complications during pregnancy.
Childhood adversity has been associated with hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis dysregulation, which is associated with mental and physical health consequences. However, associations between childhood adversity and cortisol regulation in the current literature vary in magnitude and direction. This multilevel meta-analysis examines the association between childhood adversity and diurnal cortisol measures, as well as potential moderators of these effects (adversity timing and type, study or sample characteristics). A search was conducted in online databases PsycINFO and PubMed for papers written in English. After screening for exclusion criteria (papers examining animals, pregnant women, people receiving hormonal treatment, people with endocrine disorders, cortisol before age 2 months, or cortisol after an intervention), 303 papers were identified for inclusion. In total, 441 effect sizes were extracted from 156 manuscripts representing 104 studies. A significant overall effect was found between childhood adversity and bedtime cortisol, r = 0.047, 95% CI [0.005, 0.089], t = 2.231, p = 0.028. All other overall and moderation effects were not significant. The lack of overall effects may reflect the importance of the timing and nature of childhood adversity to adversity’s impact on cortisol regulation. Thus, we offer concrete recommendations for testing theoretical models linking early adversity and stress physiology.
The epilogue recounts how abolition failed in southern courtrooms, often in areas of private law that did not always – or even often – involve a freedperson. It looks ahead and argues for reparative abolition, which requires that reparations be paid for the harms produced by the aftereffects of slavery and racism and that we scour the American legal system for vestiges of slavery – those that are obvious and those that masquerade as race neutral.
This chapter explores the legality of unions between racially heterodox people. It asks readers to consider miscegenation suits decided in the 1860s and 1870s solely in the context of Reconstruction-era efforts to achieve abolition. Observing the suits from this perspective reveals an important moment of flux in the history of American abolition and reveals the central arguments that would be used to undermine equal citizenship.
This chapter examines a collection of suits decided by the U.S. Supreme Court that together privileged antebellum interpretations of doctrine over the promise of the Reconstruction Amendments, standardized the responses to post-emancipation litigation across state lines, and, ultimately, prevented abolition. The Court adopted the majority views developed at the state level as a blueprint for the edifice of Jim Crow.
This chapter delves more deeply into some issues already explored to explain how the existence of the Confederacy complicated judicial decision-making. Judges considered how the exigencies of war shaped personal disputes, rendered verdicts on contracts executed during the war, and examined the use of Confederate currency in those agreements. In doing so, they intervened in the longstanding debate over the right of secession, considered the lingering effects of the Confederacy’s existence, and contributed to political discussions about who had the legal authority to enact Reconstruction policy and what shape it could take.
Suits related to freedpeople’s marriages – the linchpin of familial legitimacy – put the disabilities of the slave past, rather than newly granted rights, at the center of discussions about freedom and abolition. In each, a domestic conflict exposed the need to consider the previous actions and intentions of freedpeople, and prompted an assessment of how the established laws and customs of domesticity could be applied to those formerly excluded from their protection. Rather than exposing the ways that race and former status determined whether freedpeople were entitled to equal rights, this chapter considers whether former status prevented some rights – including the most fundamental among them – from being enjoyed at all.
The introduction begins an exploration of abolitionist jurisprudence and the judges who practiced it. It explains the difference between emancipation and abolition and the way the book uses and builds on existing abolitionist theory. It maps the books argument: that legacies of slavery survive in private law, which modern abolitionists have missed.
A deeply contentious judicial debate over the enforcement of contracts for the sale or hire of enslaved people erupted as one of legal Reconstruction’s central battles. This chapter explains the doctrinal approaches favored by judges, analyzes their underlying legal rationales, and explores the consequences of choosing one rationale over the others. It argues that a fundamental disagreement about the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment caused the judicial discord. The outcome of that disgreement – the enforcement of contracts – permanently weakened the power and potential of the Thirteenth Amendment.
This chapter begins an extended exploration of how judges conceptualized the emancipated person. It illuminates the pivotal connection between cases that asked judges to resolve disputes that had grown out of slavery (e.g., contracts for the sale of an enslaved person) and those that required them to consider the rights of newly freed people (e.g., the right to testify). It traces judicial deliberations, analyzes the law’s power to “make and unmake persons,” and considers the effects of that power on freedpeople. As property in persons was destroyed, freedpeople emerged – phoenix-like – from the ashes. In this formulation, emancipation revived the formerly “dead” enslaved person, as she emerged from the wreckage of the peculiar institution.
In a series of case studies, this chapter surveys the methods by which judges determined when and how emancipation occurred. By examining opinions at this granular level, it demonstrates that in law as in practice, emancipation happened many times over; reveals the variety of ways that judges believed slave property became free people; and explores the judicial struggle to arrive at such determinations. It ultimately explores judicial interpretations of where the sovereign power to liberate bondspeople resided.
This chapter locates the link between slavery and capitalism in the mundane transactions between and the financial plans of white southerners that were adjudicated following the Civil War. Decisions in these suits helped ensure that the relationship between slavery and American economic development remained undisturbed, and reveal an underappreciated aspect of the incompatibility of liberal capitalism with abolition.
Nothing More than Freedom explores the long and complex legal history of Black freedom in the United States. From the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 until the end of Reconstruction in 1877, supreme courts in former slave states decided approximately 700 lawsuits associated with the struggle for Black freedom and equal citizenship. This litigation – the majority through private law – triggered questions about American liberty and reassessed the nation's legal and political order following the Civil War. Judicial decisions set the terms of debates about racial identity, civil rights, and national belonging, and established that slavery, as a legal institution and social practice, remained actionable in American law well after its ostensible demise. The verdicts determined how unresolved facets of slavery would undercut ongoing efforts for abolition and the realization of equality. Insightful and compelling, this work makes an important intervention in the history of post-Civil War law.