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The 1960s-era, Nashville nonviolent civil rights movement—with its iconic lunch counter sit-ins—was not only an exemplary local movement that dismantled Jim Crow in downtown public accommodations. It was by design the chief vehicle for the intergenerational mentoring and training of activists that led to a dialogical diffusion of nonviolence praxis throughout the Southern civil rights movement of this period. In this article, we empirically derive from oral-history interviews with activists and archival sources a new “intergenerational model of movement mobilization” and assess its contextual and bridge-leading sustaining factors. After reviewing the literatures on dialogical diffusion and bridge building in social movements, we describe the model and its sustaining conditions—historical, demographic, and spatial conditions—and conclude by presenting a research agenda on the sustainability and generalizability of the Nashville model.
Depression can impair the immunogenicity of vaccine administration in adults. Whereas many vaccinations are administered in childhood, it is not known whether adolescent or adult onset depression is associated with impairments in the maintenance of protection of childhood vaccines. This study tested the hypothesis that individuals with adolescent or adult onset mood disorders would display compromised immunity to measles, a target of childhood vaccination.
IgG antibodies to measles were quantified using a solid phase immunoassay in volunteers with bipolar disorder (BD, n = 64, mean age of onset = 16.6 ± 5.6), currently depressed individuals with major depressive disorder (cMDD, n = 85, mean age of onset = 17.9 ± 7.0), remitted individuals with a history of MDD (rMDD, n = 82, mean age of onset = 19.2 ± 8.6), and non-depressed comparison controls (HC, n = 202), all born after the introduction of the measles vaccine in the USA in 1963.
Relative to HC, both the cMDD group (p = 0.021, adjusted odds ratios (OR) = 0.47, confidence interval (CI) = 0.24–0.90), and the rMDD group (p = 0.038, adjusted OR = 0.50, CI = 0.26–0.97) were less likely to test seropositive for measles. Compared with unmedicated MDD participants, currently medicated MDD participants had a longer lifetime duration of illness and were less likely to test seropositive for measles.
Individuals with adolescent or adult onset MDD are less likely to test seropositive for measles. Because lower IgG titers are associated with increased risk of measles infection, MDD may increase the risk and severity of infection possibly because of impaired maintenance of vaccine-related protection from measles.
Protein- and peptide-based structural biopolymers are abundant building blocks of biological systems. Either in their natural forms, such as collagen, silk, and fibronectin, or as related synthetic materials, they can be used in various technologies. An emerging area is that of biomimetic materials inspired by protein-based biopolymers, which are made up of small molecules rather than macromolecules and can therefore be described as supramolecular polymers. These materials are very useful in biomedical applications because of their ability to imitate the extracellular matrix in both architecture and the capacity to signal cells. This article describes important features of the natural extracellular matrix and highlights how these features are being incorporated into biomaterials composed of biopolymers and supramolecular polymers. We particularly focus on the structures, properties, and functions of collagen, fibronectin, and silk, and the supramolecular polymers inspired by them as biomaterials for regenerative medicine.
Zirconium is of interest in the development of high-density diffusion barriers in nuclear reactor applications because of its low thermal neutron absorption cross section and good thermal and mechanical properties. It is used in these applications to protect the low enriched fuel from interacting directly with the cladding material to prevent swelling and cracking of the fuel. In this work, we investigated the use of plasma spraying as a method to produce high quality, dense Zr barrier coatings over large surface areas. A thin sheet of 21Cr-6Ni-9Mn stainless steel (SS) was used as the substrate material. Both sides of the SS sheet were coated, one side at a time. A transfer arc (TA) current between a torch and the substrate was used to vary the substrate temperature to explore the effect of temperature and time on the film grain size, interface quality, and film porosity. The films were characterized using light optical microscopy (LOM), scanning probe microscopy (SPM) and Kelvin probe force microscopy (KPFM) and EDS-SEM Although the film quality did improved with temperature, at the elevated substrate temperatures used in this study, metal atoms from the substrate diffused into and, at the highest temperature and longest time, through the Zr coatings.
The radiation-induced displacement damage in yttrium borate (YBO3) is studied under X-ray, proton, and alpha irradiation. The photoluminescence (PL) was tested before and after irradiation to determine whether damage occurred and whether it could be queried by examining the PL spectrum. Two different dopants (cerium and europium) were used to activate the phosphor because each provides not only a different spectral signature but also a different mechanism for altering the spectrum between the pre- and post-PL measurements. X-rays, being primarily ionizing radiation, did not show any significant change between the pre and post measurements. We expected protons and alphas to damage the crystal structure, evidence of which could be seen in the change in the spectra before and after irradiation. However, we found no change under alpha exposure (3.6 × 1010 particles/cm2) and a significant change after proton exposure (5 × 1015 particles/cm2). While the material appears to be sensitive to protons, we cannot rule out its sensitivity to alphas because the alpha fluence may be too low to show an effect. This result provides strong indication that our materials are being damaged by particle radiation and that the radiation effects can be quantified.
The aim of this study is to investigate whether individuals diagnosed with chronic diseases associated with the metabolic syndrome (MetS) receive favorable quality of care processes in the primary care setting relative to other individuals with and without chronic diseases.
Data from the 2010 Brazos Valley Health Status Assessment (BVHSA) (n = 3964) were analyzed. Individuals diagnosed with chronic diseases that are collectively associated with a diagnosis of MetS, namely obesity, diabetes, high cholesterol, and hypertension, were characterized as a group (ie, analytic sample, n = 168). Clinical guidelines were utilized to identify indicators representing the quality of care processes received by these individuals during visits with their health-care provider.
Measures of quality of care processes were analyzed relative to a comparator group comprising individuals with no chronic diseases and an alternative test group comprising those diagnosed with other chronic diseases (eg, arthritis, depression, and cancer among others) using multinomial and binary logistic regression.
Physician communication of critical issues such as diet, stress, and weight status was statistically more pronounced in the analytic sample relative to the comparator group. However, differences in physician communication about physical activity were not statistically significant relative to the comparator group (OR = 1.26, P = 0.533). Differences in testing of cholesterol (OR = 0.94, P = 0.743) and blood pressure (OR = 1.16, P = 0.619) were also not statistically significant relative to the comparator group. Individuals who may have MetS generally receive favorable quality of care processes from their health-care provider, but opportunities exist to enhance provider communication about physical activity, and to possibly improve frequency of cholesterol and blood pressure testing.
This book is a study of the second-edition version of the 'Transcendental Deduction' (the so-called 'B-Deduction'), which is one of the most important and obscure sections of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. By way of a close analysis of the B-Deduction, Adam Dickerson makes the distinctive claim that the Deduction is crucially concerned with the problem of making intelligible the unity possessed by complex representations - a problem that is the representationalist parallel of the semantic problem of the unity of the proposition. Along the way he discusses most of the key themes in Kant's theory of knowledge, including the nature of thought and representation, the notion of objectivity, and the way in which the mind structures our experience of the world.
In this book I have argued that Kant's central argument in the B-Deduction can be summarised in the form of two premises and a conclusion, as follows.
α. All our cognition must involve a spontaneous synthesis.
β. If our cognition involves a spontaneous synthesis then this synthesis must be governed by the categories.
∴ The categories make our cognition possible.
Or, as Kant himself puts this argument in a letter to J. S. Beck (20 January 1792): ‘Since composition … cannot be given but must be produced, it must rest on the pure spontaneity of the understanding in concepts of objects in general’ (11:315–16). In chapter 2 of this book I sketched out Kant's reasoning for his second premise (β), and in the previous chapter I argued that § 16 of the B-Deduction contains Kant's master argument for his first premise (α). This chapter continues with a reading of the remaining sections of the B-Deduction that contain Kant's main line of argument, namely, §§ 17–20 and § 26.
SECTION 17: SYNTHESIS AND OBJECTS
In § 17 of the B-Deduction, entitled ‘The principle of the synthetic unity of apperception is the supreme principle of all use of the understanding’, Kant discusses some of the further consequences of the conclusions reached in § 16. An examination of § 17 will provide further textual evidence for my interpretation of Kant's discussion in § 16 and, indeed, for my interpretation of the argument of the B-Deduction as a whole.
As noted in the introduction, the B-Deduction is so complex that it is important to have a synoptic view of the reasoning at the heart of Kant's argument before descending into the intricacies of the text. The purpose of this first chapter is to begin providing such a synoptic view, via a discussion of Kant's notion of representation. What I am attempting to do here is to make certain conceptual connections appear as intuitive and compelling as I can. As I hope to show in the later chapters of this book, this will help to make intelligible what may otherwise appear to be a series of bewildering non sequiturs.
The notion of a representation (Vorstellung) is fundamental to Kant's epistemological theory, just as the notion of an idea is fundamental to the theories of his Cartesian and empiricist predecessors. The Critique, after all, is a text centrally concerned with what types of representations we have, how we get them, and what we do with them when we have got them. However, despite the crucial role it plays in his arguments, Kant pays little attention directly to the abstract notion of representation in general – tending to concentrate instead on more specific notions like objectivity, cognition and judgment. There is nothing in the Critique to compare, for example, with the rich material to be found in the writings of Leibniz on notions like expression and isomorphism.
This book is a study of the argument that lies at the heart of Kant's epistemology: the argument of the ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding’. It focuses on the version of that argument given in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (i.e., the so-called ‘B-Deduction’). The main interpretations of this argument that are to be found in the secondary literature read it as hinging on notions such as personal identity, the ‘ownership’ of mental states, or the ontological unity of the mind. I, on the other hand, will argue that in the B-Deduction Kant is crucially concerned with the problem of how the ‘objective reality’ or content of a representation – and, in particular, of a complex representation – becomes accessible to the subject that has the representation. In other words, he is concerned with the representationalist parallel of the semantic question of what it is to understand a complex sign.
In summary, my interpretation of Kant's argument in the B-Deduction is as follows. In order for the subject to have a unified grasp of a complex representation – or, as Kant puts it, for the ‘unity of apperception’ to be possible – an act of ‘spontaneous synthesis’ is required. This is an act of the mind that plays a role in generating the representational content of the subject's experience.
The previous chapter introduced my reading of Kant's notion of representation. The rest of this book gives my reading of the central argument of Kant's Transcendental Deduction in B. In the two chapters following this one (i.e., chapters 3 and 4) my interpretation of this argument will be filled out and defended via a close reading of the main sections of the B-Deduction. The relation of my interpretation to the secondary literature will also be considered in those chapters. In the present chapter, however, I simply attempt to sketch out and explain the main lines of my interpretation, in order to provide the reader with a synoptic view of my reading of this complex argument, before I make the descent into close textual analysis.
In brief, my reading of Kant's argument in the B-Deduction can be summarised as follows. My fundamental claim is that the B-Deduction is primarily an analysis of the concept of cognition. I should note that it would be more precise to say that the B-Deduction is an analysis of the concept of human cognition, considered as a species of discursive cognition in general, which Kant distinguishes from another logically possible form of cognition, the intuitive. However, this is a subtlety which I will defer discussing until a later chapter; in this chapter, I will simply use the terms ‘cognition’ and ‘cognising mind’ as a convenient shorthand for ‘discursive cognition’ and ‘discursive cognising mind’.
The previous chapter presented an overview of my interpretation of Kant's central argument in the B-Deduction. I have suggested that this argument is Kant's attempt to demonstrate the truth of his ‘two-faculty’ model of cognition – the claim that, in addition to receptivity, a category-governed spontaneity is essential to our cognition. My discussion in the previous chapter focused on Kant's reasoning for (β), the claim that if our cognition involves a spontaneous synthesis, then this synthesis must be governed by the categories. In this chapter I turn to examine Kant's reasoning for (α), the claim that all our cognition must involve a spontaneous synthesis. I argue that it is in § 16 of the B-Deduction that one finds what I shall call Kant's ‘master argument’ for this claim.
Kant's discussion in § 16 has been variously interpreted as concerned with the ontological unity of the mind, criteria of personal identity, or conditions for the ‘ownership’ of mental states. I shall argue in this chapter that all of these views are incorrect, and that Kant is in fact concerned with a problem that is the representationalist equivalent of the problem debated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the problem of the ‘unity of judgment’ or the ‘unity of the proposition’. Kant argues that if we are to make sense of the unity possessed by complex representations then we cannot think of representing objects as a purely passive, or receptive, affair, but as one that must also involve some element of spontaneity.