The author argues that while State consent does contribute to international law’s legitimacy, it does not do so by providing a justification for it. States are not bound to obey international law because they have chosen to submit to its authority. Rather, international law provides them with a reason for action, and indeed they have a moral duty to obey it, if and only if they will do better at realizing justice if they act as the law directs them to act than if they act on their own judgment. As a means for crafting international law, State consent is, according to the author, valuable insofar as it yields international legal norms that satisfy this condition. He argues, that in a few cases, it may also constitute an intrinsically valuable expression of trust in the international political community or an international institution that exercises political authority.

In this chapter I address three questions regarding civil disobedience by states. First, is state civil disobedience (henceforth, SCD) even possible, or do scholars, officials, activists, and members of the general public commit a category error when they apply the concept of civil disobedience to the actions of states? I argue for the former, while acknowledging that SCD differs in certain fundamental respects from more familiar examples of civil disobedience. Second, assuming SCD is possible, what conditions must it satisfy to be morally justifiable? Here I contend that considerations often thought to be relevant to the justifiability of civil disobedience in a domestic context, such as fidelity to the ideal of the rule of law, may frequently fail to be relevant to the justifiability of SCD. Third, are there any plausible examples of states engaging in (morally justifiable) civil disobedience? Though a number of theorists purport to have identified such cases, I argue that their conclusions rest on either a mistaken conception of civil disobedience or a failure to recognize that the illegal conduct in question does not satisfy all of the conditions necessary for an act to count as an instance of (morally justifiable) SCD. I conclude with two observations regarding theoretical reflection on SCD, and some speculation on why we are unlikely to observe any instances of it in the near future.

Following some preliminary remarks on the concept of secession and its status in international law, this chapter examines competing answers to two questions that any theory of state secession must address.First, what sort of actor enjoys a prima facie moral right to secede, and in virtue of what features or considerations does that actor do so?Second, on what particular territory is an actor with a right to secede permitted to exercise that right?It then evaluates arguments for and against several international legal norms that might be adopted to regulate unilateral secession, drawing on both moral theories of secession and empirically informed conjectures regarding the incentives those norms might create for various international and domestic actors.

This chapter offers an explication and partial defense of Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy of international law.It begins with an overview of Dworkin’s objections to legal positivism and the account of law Dworkin offers in its place, commonly referred to as (legal) interpretivism.A reconstruction of Dworkin’s analysis of international law follows, which in addition to being of interest in its own right usefully illustrates Dworkin’s interpretivist account of law and his reasons for thinking it superior to the one defended by legal positivists.The chapter concludes with rebuttals to a series of objections that have been raised to Dworkin’s analysis of international law.The defense is only partial, however, since it presumes Dworkin’s interpretivist account of law.

This chapter investigates the conceptual question “what is a human right?” and the normative question “in virtue of what considerations does A enjoy a human right to X?” by examining the recent debate between two schools of legal and political philosophers.Orthodox theorists argue that human rights are a moral right possessed by all human being simply in virtue of their humanity.In contrast, political-practice theorists argue that human rights are constitutive elements of an ongoing attempt to reconceive state sovereignty and the international political order to which it is integral.This political undertaking, which includes the creation, application, and enforcement of international human rights law, provides the proper object of a philosophy of human rights.The bulk of this chapter is devoted to a critical examination of attempts by political-practice theorists to demonstrate the limited relevance of orthodox accounts of human rights to morally justifying international human rights practice (again, including international human rights law).It concludes with a brief consideration of the role that appeals to objective moral principles should play within that practice.

This chapter describes the three purposes the book serves.The first is to introduce readers to certain core questions in the philosophy of law, by way of engagement with international legal skepticism.The book’s second aim is to acquaint readers with recent work by legal and political philosophers on conceptual and moral questions specific to particular domains of international law.These include the nature of human rights, and of a crime against humanity, as well as the moral justifiability of certain core features of the law of war, international trade law, and international law’s stance on unilateral secession.Finally, the book aims to advance the debate on many of the topics it discusses.Examples include novel readings of both H.L.A. Hart’s and Ronald Dworkin’s reflections on international law, as well as new arguments regarding the existence of an international rule of law, the possible bases of a moral duty to obey international law, and the moral grounds of universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity.A brief chapter-by-chapter outline is also included.

This chapter investigates H.L.A. Hart’s characterization of law as the union of primary and secondary rules, and its implications for international law’s status as genuine law.While Hart is frequently identified as an international legal skeptic, that conclusion rests on a misreading of his analysis of international law or, in some cases, a misreading of his analysis of law.Hart does not deny that international law is law, only that it constitutes a legal system.Properly understood, this is a claim few of his critics will deny.

This chapter considers the extent to which the (so-called) international legal order provides an example of government in accordance with the rule of law.It begins in the first two sections with a discussion of the elements that comprise that ideal, before turning in the third section to competing accounts of its value; that is, explanations of what makes government in accordance with the rule of law (morally) superior to other forms of rule. The chapter concludes with a somewhat pessimistic assessment of the degree to which the international legal order exhibits fidelity to the ideal of the rule of law.

This chapter examines the legitimacy of international law.It begins with an analysis of the concept of legitimacy, or perhaps more precisely, of legitimate authority.It then considers four possible grounds for international law’s legitimacy: enhancing its subjects’ ability to act as they have most reason to act, the consent of those it claims as subjects, considerations of fair play, and international law’s democratic credentials.The chapter concludes with an examination of reasons why we should care about international law’s legitimacy; indeed, why from a moral point of view increasing the international legal order’s legitimacy might even take priority over making it more just.

This chapter explores philosophical contributions to international criminal law, focusing in particular on analyses of the concept of a crime against humanity and the justifiability of universal jurisdiction over those who commit such a crime.In what sense, if any, are crimes against humanity wrongs done to “humanity?”Does the label "crime against humanity" refer to a distinctive wrong committed by those who perform such acts?If not, what distinguishes crimes against humanity from other types of crime?The first half of this chapter critically examines several competing accounts of the concept of a crime against humanity and the answers they provide to these questions.The remainder of the chapter considers two approaches to justifying the international prosecution of crimes against humanity.The first grounds it in the dangers that such crimes pose to all human beings, while the second appeals to an (emerging) moral or political global community that makes perpetrators of crimes against humanity answerable to courts that act on behalf of all humanity.

This chapter addresses the moral justifiability of some of the international legal rules that govern cross-border trade.The primary focus is on the moral standards that ought to be used to critically evaluate those rules or proposals for their reform.Thus the chapter investigates several moral arguments for free trade, such as the claim that it provides an especially effective mechanism for alleviating poverty, and several arguments in defense of restrictions or conditions on trade, including the moral permissible of partiality to compatriots and the right of those who cooperate to make international trade possible to a fair share of the benefits it yields.The chapter concludes with an examination of the argument that the import and consumption of oil and other natural resources from countries ruled by tyrants constitutes trade in stolen goods, a violation of existing international law.

This chapter considers two arguments for international legal skepticism, both of which appeal to an alleged analytical connection between law and coercive enforcement.The first is the legal philosopher John Austin’s characterization of law as the command of a sovereign, or in H.L.A. Hart’s apt phrase, as orders backed by threats.The second treats the mode of enforcement found in the modern state as a necessary condition for the existence of law.If true, each of these conceptual claims provides a sound basis for international legal skepticism.There are compelling reasons to reject them both, however.

This chapter assess four accounts of the relationship between the morality and the law of war and the implications that each has for the retention or replacement of two key features of the latter: the equality of combatants, and noncombatant or civilian immunity.Michael Walzer defends these features of the law of war on the grounds that they mirror the content of the true morality of war.In contrast, Jeff McMahan, Adil Haque, and David Rodin argue that in its commitment to the equality of combatants and noncombatant immunity, the law of war deviates from the content of the true morality of war.While Rodin argues that the law of war ought to be reformed so as to mirror the (revisionist) morality of war, McMahan and Haque both defend it on the grounds that combatants will generally do better at acting as morality requires if they follow the existing law of war.Finally, Henry Shue and Janina Dill reject the assumption shared by all of the aforementioned theorists that the law of war should aim to minimize the violation of individual rights.Instead, they argue that it should serve the humanitarian goal of reducing the harm war causes.