The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

INTRODUCTION

Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas (born 1931) is a Malaysian thinker who is world-renowned in the academic world and in the field of arts and culture. He received his higher education at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, and later at McGill University in Montreal as well as the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. His early writings mainly revolved around Sufism, and his most monumental work is The Mysticism of Hamzah Fansuri (1970). His other influential works include The Origin of the Malay Sha’ir (1968), The Correct Date of the Terengganu Inscription (1972), and Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview of Islam (1995). He is also known for his eye for design and his skill in calligraphy, having founded and designed the building of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) in Kuala Lumpur, which was officially opened in 1991.

It is common knowledge that the institute receives large funding from the Malaysian government and enjoys political support from the former president of the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM), and former deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim. As Chandra Muzaffar (1987, p. 54) noted, “the person who had the greatest influence upon Anwar Ibrahim in his ABIM years was Syed Naquib Al-Attas, then Professor of Malay Literature at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM).” This was further highlighted by Mona Abaza (1999, p. 189) in her article “Intellectuals, Power and Islam in Malaysia: S.N. Al-Attas or the Beacon on the Crest of a Hill”, where she referred to Al-Attas as Anwar's “intellectual mentor”. According to Komaruddin Sassi (2020, pp. 53–54) who wrote his doctoral thesis on Al-Attas, it was Anwar who appointed him as the first occupant of the Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali Chair of Islamic Thought at ISTAC.

Beyond Anwar, Al-Attas had a wide impact on student movements and education in Malaysia in the 1970s, especially within the context of Islamic revivalism at the time. As Abaza put it, “his impact on the student movement of the seventies is substantial in reviving Islamic culture and rationalizing Sufism. If the early Al-Attas interpreted Hamzah Fansuri as a reformer and a rebellious Sufi thinker, ISTAC incorporated traits of ‘refeudalization’ and the institutionalization of an Islam of power” (Abaza 1999, p. 216).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The concept of the Islamization of knowledge was introduced by Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas in the late 1970s. It aimed to detach knowledge from Western culture and civilization in order to replace it with Islamic concepts, frameworks and values.

• • The Islamization of knowledge was to occur in the fields of education and culture, manifesting in changes to the syllabus in institutions of higher learning and niche areas of interest in selected research institutes. In the field of culture, however, it resulted in an unintended consequence of Malay literature being heavily characterized by Islamic elements.

• • Over the years, proponents of the Islamization of knowledge in Malaysia have moved beyond the fields of education and culture. They have entered the mainstream and become part of the state machinery, thus possibly impacting national policies.

• • The concept has also evolved and arguably led to the strengthening of Islamic conservatism among Malaysian intellectual and cultural elites.

• • More specifically, its exclusivist thinking does not augur well for intra- and intercommunal relations in the country.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The rise of religious extremism in public discourses is a cause for concern for government officials and moderate Muslims.

• • While a substantial body of research on violent extremism is available, the issue of non-violent extremism remains neglected by scholars.

• • Although exposure and subscription to non-violent extremism do not automatically lead to violence, it still needs to be curbed because it can fan hatred that in turn can lead to physical violence and repression of human rights. Non-violent extremism also boosts polarization in the community.

• • Given this potential impact, the government needs to pay more attention to the dissemination of non-violent extremist public discourses, especially on social media. It could work together with influential religious organizations which possess immense religious authority and legitimacy.

INTRODUCTION

The dissemination of extreme religious discourse remains a cause for concern among government officials and moderate Muslims in Indonesia. On 3 December 2020, Minister of Religious Affairs Fachrul Razi warned religious teachers across Indonesia that extreme religious ideas could reach students via three “doors”: teachers, the school curriculum, and extracurricular religious activities. He called for teachers to exercise extra vigilance and be more active in guiding students so that they do not fall victim to religious extremists’ agendas via those “doors”. Two weeks later, Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo sat with academics and ulama (Islamic religious scholars) to discuss pressing issues facing the nation. Following the meeting, they issued a statement saying that they would jointly fight against “radical contents in social media”.

Muhammad Bukhari Muslim of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN Jakarta) argues that in comparison to the moderate ulama, Indonesia's conservative figures and groups have the upper hand in promoting their extreme religious views. They appear more convincing and possess better social media skills as compared to the moderate ulama, and therefore, have better access to Muslims who are increasingly turning to social media to study Islam. Alexander Arifianto (2020, p. 11) explains that new information and technologies (such as social media)—which are spurred by various government regimes that had been promoting freedom of expression since 1998—have opened up access for conservative ulama to disseminate their views. These conservative views have challenged and eroded the religious authority of moderate ulama from mainstream Muslim organizations.

The first part of this article looks at non-violent extremism discourses that appear on the social media accounts of the eleven most popular preachers in Indonesia. Social media have increasingly played an important role in shaping people's minds. A 2017 national survey jointly carried out by Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah and UNDP Indonesia, shows that social media was the most popular site for university and school students studying Islam, followed by religious texts, television, and offline religious events such as Majelis Taklim (Saputra 2018, p. 31). The survey found that exposure to content on social media boosts religious extremism among students rather than enlightens them.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

Introduction

This chapter attempts to delineate the politicization of religious and cultural authority in Ternate and Yogyakarta. It narrates the contestation and co-existence of two religious and cultural authorities in these cities, namely the Islamic Sultanate on the one hand, and Islamic movements on the other. The sultanate institution in both Ternate and Yogyakarta dated back to the pre-colonial era. Meanwhile, the rise of Islamism has been a key feature in both cities after the fall of the New Order in 1998. The two royal institutions have played a crucial role during the democratic transition in 1998 and beyond. The Keraton of Yogyakarta played a pivotal role in promoting the reformasi movement while at the same time preventing violence and riots during the critical power transition period. On the other hand, the Keraton of Ternate had been one of the warring parties during the communal conflict in North Moluccas in 1999–2001.

Within the existing scholarly debates, the re-emergence of the Sultanate and Islamism is widely portrayed as a representation of identity politics that emerged from the democratization process in post-authoritarian Indonesia (Assyaukanie 2009; Hilmy 2010; Klinken 2007b; Machmudi 2008; Mujani 2007; Platzdasch 2009; Salim 2008). This is reflected in the studies of the Sultanate both in Ternate and Yogyakarta. In Ternate, major studies explain how the decentralization process brought the resurgence of “tradition” in the political arena of Ternate and North Moluccas (Bubandt 2004; Klinken 2007a; Duncan 2009; Smith 2009).

In this wave of “politics of tradition”, the Sultanate and Islamism are located as conflicting forces. This conclusion was drawn based on the rivalry between the Sultanate of Ternate and Islamist forces during the communal conflict, as well as during the power struggle for resources in the early years after the country underwent decentralization (Duncan 2005, p. 68; Klinken 2007a, pp. 109–23). Meanwhile, the Keraton of Yogyakarta is associated with cultural authority that represents Javanese high culture—“Javanese Islam”—and the symbol of pluralism (Woodward 2010). Gerry van Klinken (2007b) rightly pointed out that the re-emergence of Sultanate across the country after the collapse of Suharto's New Order regime in 1998 has become a model of neotraditionalist leadership and a symbol of cultural pluralism.

Introduction

Mesjid Kebon Jeruk, an old mosque situated in West Jakarta, Indonesia, is always alive with religious activities. Every Thursday, about 2,000 men will gather at the mosque built by a Chinese woman in 1817, following lectures by an ustadz (religious teacher). Dressed in kurtas— long-sleeved and hip length shirt traditionally worn by men in India, for which they are easily identifiable—and putting on white hajj caps, they are also dressed in robes, a long and loose shirt commonly worn by the Arabs. Most will have their beards lengthened and moustache shaved. They are followers of Tablighi Jamaat, or Tablighis, literally “a group for preachers”, who come from Jakarta, West Java, East Java and the other regions in Indonesia. The Tablighis usually carry large bags of clothing and other supplies with them.

The aforementioned is the most popular poem of the Tablighis that best describes the calling for the Muslims to go back to mosque. In practice, they go out on small group tours to invite Muslims whom they had visited to conduct the canonical prayer in mosque and to bring the message of the Tablighi Jamaat to the Muslims. This activity is called khuruj (or jaula in Urdu), which according to several scholars (Sikand 2002; Sila 2010 and 2016; and Noor 2012) is both unique and critical to the Tablighi Jamaat. It is unique because khuruj (which is called tashkil in Indonesia and Malaysia) may take days, weeks or even months (Noor 2012). At the end of the tour, participants will report back orally their experiences to the mosque-based group from which they set out. The act of presenting these reports is called karguzari. Sikand (2002) and Noor (2012) have discussed that Tablighi Jamaat became the most widely followed movement and sparked controversy among Muslim scholars. But the two agreed that there is nothing to worry about the Tablighis and their khuruj activities. Similarly, Dekmejian (1985) excluded Tablighi Jamaat from the list of Islamic fundamentalist groups since the books they refer to and the religious activities they perform do not contradict with mainstream Islam.

Introduction

In Indonesia, Islamic religious authority is split into a number of fields. As Burhanudin (2007) notes, the ulama (singular alim) is no longer the only authoritative body in the transformation of Islamic knowledge and discourse. Azra and others also noted this and maintained that there is a variety of religious authority in contemporary Indonesia (Azra et al. 2010). Women have taken part quite significantly in leadership and authority of religion. Judging and preaching are two activisms in which women's involvement in both the leadership and religious authority is very evident. The involvement of women is very clearly shown in Islamic judiciary where familial issues are heard. Meanwhile, in terms of preaching, their involvement began to be very significant when a programme which amalgamates Islamic propagation and entertainment known as “dakwahtaintment” on media has flourished. These women preach various Islamic teaching including Islamic law of family.

In Indonesia, family law has received significant attention from the government. Since Muslims are the majority of the population in Indonesia, applied family law has been adopted mostly from Islamic (family) law. Accommodating a number of local practices, state interest, and Islamic legal doctrines, the Indonesian government tackles familial issues by issuing a number of laws (Nurlaelawati 2010). To understand family law in Indonesia, we should refer to what is so-called Kompilasi Hukum Islam, henceforth called kompilasi, and the Law of Marriage No. 1/1974. The kompilasi is a legal reference provided for judges of Islamic courts and Muslims in general, while the Law of Marriage applies to all citizens of Indonesia and is therefore to be referred to by judges of both Islamic court and civil court.

A number of developments on the administration of the judicial institutions have been made. The development in substantial laws on familial issues has also occurred and a number of legal reforms on family law have been made (Nurlaelawati 2010). This is completed by a number of governmental policies on legal procedural issues (Sumner and Lindsey 2010). A number of programmes that provide better justice for litigants, women litigants in particular, such as circuit court, legal aid and prodeo are launched (Sumner and Lindsey 2010; Nurlaelawati 2016).

The rise of Indonesian religious intellectuals in the post-war period is an interesting sociological phenomenon. For the first time in history, religious intellectuals, be those trained abroad or locally, or those from mainstream education or Islamic ones, are providing leadership in the Muslim religious, cultural and intellectual discourse. Earlier, with the rise of reformist circles at the turn of the twentieth century, the traditional ulama (religious elites) could no longer claim to be the sole guardian and interpreter of Islam. Their authority was challenged by reformist groups, which saw religious traditionalism as a hindrance to the progress of the Muslims. In any intellectual history, inevitably the authority of one group is continuously challenged by another, be it subtle or overt. Indonesian intellectual history, especially in the domain of religious leadership, demonstrates a similar trait. The expansion of the middle class and the increase religiosity of Indonesian society lead to the expansion of Islamic education, including those at the higher level. It is within this socio cultural milieu that religious intellectuals emerged, which is separate from the traditional ulama hierarchy who are still the dominant elite grouping in Indonesian society.

The Indonesian intellectual discourse, like in other Third World countries, is still developing in breadth and depth. The challenge from the religious rightists—including neo-liberal market hegemony—is becoming more intensified and complex. Today there is an ongoing struggle between the various strands of Islamic orientation in Indonesia. This chapter attempts to discuss and evaluate the presence and contributions of Indonesian Muslim religious intellectuals whose position can be made distinct from the ulama/kyai, ustaz, tuan guru and da’i. To what extent can these critical voices make further inroads in challenging, or at least mitigating, and responding to, the rightist's assertions? Would intellectual responses suffice? Why is the presence of such ideas important? Underestimating them would be allowing the absence of critical ideas in the public sphere. Hence the task becomes imperative to nurture and encourage active engagement of ideas, at least in projecting itself as equally authoritative, in the midst of competing ideas.

Introduction

Born from the processes of neoliberal globalization and the strengthening opposition to the New Order regime in the late 1990s, the underground rock music movement (gerakan musik rock bawah tanah) in Indonesia emerged as a bastion of progressive politics (Wallach 2005) and the radical Left (Pickles 2001 and 2007; Saefullah 2017a). The movement participants, called “underground youths” (pemuda underground), protested against social and cultural orthodoxies, capitalist economic system, and state authoritarianism. After taking part in toppling General Suharto through democratic mobilizations in the late 1990s, their activism went through a period of decline. This was followed by the emergence of a new subcultural movement that, unlike their predecessors who tended to regard religiosity as a private matter, displays religious piety as necessity and uses right-wing Islamism as a political ideology. The founders called their movement the “Islamic underground” (Underground Islam), the name was chosen to distinguish themselves from the existing underground movement which they considered “too secular” and “too liberal”. Overlooked by scholars of Indonesian Islam, this stream of underground movement played an important role in disseminating conservative and even “radical” narratives of Islam to marginalized youths through ways that were never carried out by mainstream Islamic organizations.

This chapter discusses the Islamic underground movement by examining its key actors and mobilization strategies. It firstly discusses a brief history of the Indonesian underground movement, followed by an examination of the social, political, and economic conditions that have advanced the emergence of the Islamic underground movement. Subsequently, the key actors and mobilization strategies that have supported the growth of the movement will be discussed.

The Leftist Beginnings of the Underground Movement in Indonesia

Underground music only began to be popular amongst Indonesian youths in the mid-1990s. This was due to the rapid globalization that allowed the influx of western popular culture to the country (Sen and Hill 2007; Pickles 2007; Baulch 2007). The word “underground” was used by local youths as an umbrella term for a “variety of imported rock music genres on the loud side of the spectrum” (Wallach 2003), such as punk rock, rap, hardcore, heavy metal, oi, and grindcore. The word itself refers to an alternative space for social and cultural practices, as Dunn asserts, which are beyond the “formal domain of commercial life” (Dunn 2016, p. 90).

Introduction

The proliferation of new Islamic preachers in Indonesia has seriously undermined conventional religious authorities. The media savvy of Abdullah Gymnastiar (popularly known as Aa Gym) serves as an example. Marketing himself to be an Islamic self-help psychology and celebrity guru through his TV channel and publishing company, he has significantly shifted traditional and hierarchical forms of religious authority towards a more familiar and relational kind of authority (Hoesterey 2008, p. 98). He masterfully commanded the media and learnt from secular sources of self-help manuals for Sufi wisdom (Watson 2005, p. 773). Another example is Felix Siauw. Despite coming from a Catholic background with limited understanding of Islamic tradition, he has successfully drawn a large audience of Muslim youth in many occasions both online and offline. Hew (2018, pp. 64–65) found that Felix has more than four million followers on Facebook, two million followers on Twitter, one million followers on Instagram, and 20,000 subscribers on YouTube in 2017. He is one of the leading social media preachers in Indonesia today (Hew 2018, pp. 64–65).

The new media allows the Muslim public to choose which religious authority fits their intellectual capacity and preference. Like various TV channels which are offered by a service provider, customers can choose which programme suits their taste and individual leanings. As a result, they have the freedom to determine which religious agents are qualified and fulfill their social and spiritual needs. Turner (2007, p. 118) argues that in terms of access, the new media is basically democratic. In a democratic atmosphere, Muslims can find suitable religious opinions in accordance with their own preference in which Hosen (2008, p. 164) called “Fatwa Shopping”. When people feel that a religious edict (fatwa) does not fit their wish, they attempt to seek a second opinion. This fact reveals an opening trend of religious authority whose reception shows a surprising diversity in religious life. The democratizing potency of mass media technologies, according to Eickelman and Anderson (1999, p. 2), will have a good effect on strengthening civic pluralism, civil society and a challenge to authoritarian domination in Muslim-majority countries.