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Summary

THE SLOW PROCESS OF APPOINTMENT

In his Cambridge lecture (2007), Stephen York, drawing upon his experience of English and international arbitration, suggested that steps should be taken to ensure prompt appointment of arbitrators. It is common for the selection process by party-appointment to take several months. This is a source of delay and expense. The position is unsatisfactory.

SOLE ARBITRATORS

In English arbitration law, the default size of the tribunal number is one arbitrator: ‘If there is not agreement as to the number of arbitrators, the tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator.’

The singleton arbitrator remains common in England (and the LCIA Rules reflect this). This arrangement was favoured by a majority of respondents to consultation on the 1996 Bill. The ICC Rules (2012) also state that, in the absence of contrary agreement, an arbitration agreement will be taken to involve appointment of a sole arbitrator (under those Rules), although this presumption can be rebutted if the ICC thinks that on the facts a three-member panel might be ‘appropriate’.

There are arguments in favour of using sole arbitrators. Such an arrangement is cheaper. It also works well if there are more than two parties. Another benefit is that the sole arbitrator is less inclined to strike a crude compromise between rival submissions and positions. But a three-arbitrator panel is divided by the wing-members’ opposite leanings.

However, there is the disadvantage that the sole arbitrator might be imposed on the parties by an institutional arbitration system if the parties have not nominated the arbitrator, or by the court (12.13).

The burden of making a decision in a heavy case can be considerable, and the sole decision-maker might not always be on top form, even if the individual's general reputation is strong. There is safety in numbers.

Furthermore, a three arbitrator panel allows each side to select their appointee, the third member being quite insulated from unilateral choice. The party-appointee system can foster (i) a sense that each party has a ‘judge of its choice’; (ii) and a further sense of ‘investment in the arbitration’; and (iii) that (certainly in an international context) the parties’ appointees can help resolve linguistic and cultural differences, and avoid misperceptions. But there can be fissures and inefficiencies created by having more than one arbitrator.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

ABSENCE OF ENGLISH LEGISLATION ON CONFIDENTIALITY

This topic was not covered by the Arbitration Act 1996 (England and Wales) because the Departmental Advisory Committee (1996) regarded the subject as too fluid for consolidation. That report stated that recognition of exceptions to confidentiality would need to be worked out by the courts on a case-by-case basis. As we shall see, there is no clearly delineated set of exceptions. This topic continues to be molten. Indeed, the exceptions have been described as ‘manifestly legion and unsettled in part’.

COMPARATIVE SOURCES

The judgments in Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd (2008) contain rich citation of the English case law, and foreign courts’ decisions, as well as the relevant rules adopted by leading arbitration bodies8 on the question of ‘privacy of hearings–9 ‘confidentiality of documentation’, ‘confidentiality of awards’, and literature discussing these rules.

Since the Michael Wilson case (2008), there has been some development of this topic in Scotland: an important judicial decision (Gray Construction Limited v. Harley Haddow LLP (2012), on which 8.20 ff below), and legislation (the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010), containing a codification of the whole topic. Of course, Scots law remains separate from English law, so that these Scottish materials are merely of comparative interest. Nevertheless, the analysis of various exceptions to confidentiality is attractive, and the pre-2010 Act decision in Gray Construction Limited v. Harley Haddow LLP (2012) is a convincing illustration.

As the (English) Departmental Advisory Committee (1996) noted, Australian decisions have been perceived in England as troublingly ungenerous in their protection of arbitral confidentiality: England and Australia have here parted company.

IMPLIED TERM ANALYSIS

The (English) Court of Appeal's decision in Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd (2008) confirms that an obligation of confidentiality arises as a matter of law (on the basis of an ‘implied term in law’) in arbitration references conducted in accordance with English law. This implied term has been recognised for some time. For example, the Court of Appeal in Ali Shipping Corporation v. Shipyard Trogir (1999) had said that this term is ‘an essential corollary of the privacy of arbitration proceedings’. (For a Scottish decision adopting the same analysis, see Gray Construction Limited v. Harley Haddow LLP (2012), on which 8.20 ff below).

Summary

TRIAL

Trial is important because it is the beginning of the ‘end-game’ of litigation before the courts. Thereafter, provided the claimant has been successful (or the defendant's counterclaim has been upheld), enforcement proceedings might be brought, for example, to obtain satisfaction of a judgment debt. Enforcement is also possible if judgment in favour of the claimant has been obtained by some other means, for example, by summary process or by ‘default judgment’, or judgment has been obtained because a defence has been dismissed following the defendant's failure to satisfy an ‘unless order’, or a ‘consent judgment’ has been entered.

A final judgment on the merits of the case has a binding effect, as between the parties. The topic of ‘finality’, especially res judicata, is part of this ‘end-game’, therefore. Apart from appeals, for which permission is required, English law is opposed to unnecessary re-litigation of the same issues and claim.

But trial is rare. Many actions end without trial. Indeed most disputants do not bring or become embroiled in formal civil proceedings. Of those who do become parties to court proceedings, most do not experience trial, because the case is either settled or a form of summary judgment or dismissal terminates the case before a final hearing. When these mountains of non-litigated disputes and litigated but untried cases are subtracted from the pile, all that remains is a relatively small percentage of cases where a court has pronounced final judgment on the merits, after hearing witness testimony.

Admittedly, the historical centre-piece of the Common Law civil process has been ‘trial’. In the nineteenth century Common Law courts in England, trial was an oral hearing before a judge and jury. In the United States of America civil trial before juries remains a constitutional right. England has been more pragmatic. In modern times, civil trials in England are almost invariably heard by a judge sitting alone without a jury. Jury trial in England is now confined to serious criminal cases (for example, murder, rape, armed robbery) and civil actions for defamation (even here there is the possibility of trial by judge alone), or misconduct by the police (the torts of defamation, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment).

Summary

PRIVILEGES IN GENERAL

‘Evidential privileges’ in English law confer upon the privilege holder immunity against legal compulsion to supply information, whether at trial or at some other stage of the legal process.

The duty to disclose confidential information, unless it is privileged, is noted in the preceding chapter, at 11.32 ff. As for confidentiality in general, the Court of Appeal has recently reviewed this topic in Imerman v. Tchenguiz (2010: also on that case 14.66 ff), and there are several leading treatises. The main point here is that not all confidential information is privileged. For example, confidential discussion between a person and a priest or religious advisor, or between a patient and doctor, and in many other professional relationships, is undoubtedly subject to legal protection through injunctions and pecuniary relief. But the holder of those types of confidentiality cannot invoke privilege if ordered by the court to give evidence or produce documents relating to this information. In short, privilege is confidentiality admitted to a higher level of legal protection; but not all confidential relations are raised to that level.

DISCLOSURE AND DISPUTED CLAIMS TO PRIVILEGE

The procedure governing a challenge to a claim to privilege was examined by Beatson J in West London Pipeline and Storage Ltd v. Total Oil UK Ltd (2008). This and related cases are examined at 11.40 ff.

LEGAL ADVICE PRIVILEGE

NATURE OF LEGAL ADVICE PRIVILEGE

Undoubtedly the most important of the family of privileges, legal advice privilege operates as an absolute protection because: (i) it cannot be disapplied by exercise of judicial discretion (see the next paragraph); and (ii) unless this privilege is waived by a privilege holder (or his authorised agent), protection endures beyond the immediate occasion or context of the privileged communications. The party cannot be called to give evidence of, or produce any document containing details of, confidential discussion between a client and a lawyer concerning the law and its application. In the United States it is known as ‘attorney–client’ privilege (Upjohn Co v. United States, 1981).

Summary

INTRODUCTION

This fundamental but intricate topic is moving at a brisk pace. It will be some time before the dust settles on changes which are currently before Parliament but which, by the time this work is published, seem destined to have transformed the ‘no win, no fee’ portfolio for English litigants. This shifting position can be summarised in four propositions.

First, at Common Law (20.07 ff) it remains contrary to public policy for a lawyer representing a client (whether a solicitor or a barrister) to have a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, that is, his remuneration (or the level of that payment) is contingent on the outcome of the dispute.

Secondly, conditional fee agreements (20.25 ff) were introduced in 1990, and were partially implemented in 1995, and then fully implemented in 1998. But the system ran into trouble when the success fee and ATE (‘after-the-event’ legal expenses insurance) elements of this system became recoverable by the victorious party against the defeated party (the latter being the ‘paying party’). This precipitated a wave of costs litigation by aggrieved paying parties, who disputed the scale of these sums in individual cases.

Thirdly, English law was highly hesitant (20.11) to take the further step of introducing, at any rate within ordinary civil litigation, the USA system of contingency fee remuneration: that is, the successful party's lawyer is remunerated only if he wins, but his payment is a percentage of the ‘damages pay-out’ (either as a result of a successful settlement or judgment).

Fourthly, English law, as a result of recent legislation (20.13), will enable litigants (on advice by their lawyers) to choose whether to fund the litigation by using the conditional fee agreement system or the contingency fee agreement style of remuneration (20.13 ff).

We should begin by examining the Common Law background. It will then be possible to consider the contingency fee system, and finally the conditional fee agreement regime.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

England has no separate ‘manual’ or ‘code’ dealing specifically with complex litigation.

Complex litigation might be defined as proceedings which involve an unusual level of difficulty and preparation by reason of: (i) the case's facts, including questions of a technical or specialist nature; (ii) the law applicable to the dispute; (iii) the number of issues within the overall dispute; (iv) the number of parties participating in the action, especially if they are separately represented, or there are significant variations between individual claims or defences (multiparty litigation (22.01 ff) is the most obvious type of complex litigation); (v) the variety of procedural steps taken during the evolution of the case, including one or more levels of appeal from those decisions; (vi) uncertainty concerning the applicable jurisdiction; (vii) overlaps between jurisdictions; or, finally, (viii) attempts to re-litigate the same, similar, or overlapping matters.

As the former Master of the Rolls, Sir Anthony Clarke (now Lord Clarke) has commented whatever its origins might be, one knows ‘complexity’ when one sees it. A leading American study of complex litigation fastens upon (i) legal and factual difficulty; (ii) large number of parties; and (iii) (with admirable candour) the authors add: ‘the amount of money or the stakes involved may prompt litigation efforts on such a scale that a case which would otherwise not be complex becomes complex.’

In England, complex litigation normally proceeds to the High Court. It will tend to concern, for example, intellectual property disputes, large fraud cases, judicial review of central and local government decisions, difficulties arising from detailed commercial transactions, insolvency proceedings following the collapse of large financial entities, and mass tort or other multi-party litigation. By contrast, relatively uncomplicated disputes concern small consumer claims, debt collection on undisputed facts, housing disputes, and straightforward claims for compensation where the law is clear and the facts (although disputed) are fairly readily ascertained. An example of exceedingly complex mass tort litigation was the group litigation which came before the Supreme Court in AB v. Ministry of Defence (2012) concerning alleged exposure to radiation during nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s and 1960s. In the event, the case was substantially abortive because the Supreme Court endorsed5 the Court of Appeal's refusal in that case to exercise the discretion to lift the limitation bar under section 33 of the 1980 Act (8.70). The claims were declared to be doomed to fail.

Summary

THE SCHEME OF THE CONVENTION (1958)

The arbitral tribunal cannot administer coercive or physical assistance in securing enforcement of its awards. Instead the successful party must invoke the enforcement powers of the relevant judicial system, whether this be within the jurisdiction where the arbitration had its seat or within a foreign jurisdiction.

National systems provide for enforcement of domestic arbitration awards, but these details are too large and fragmentary to justify separate discussion here. And so attention is confined here to judicial recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958).

Foreign awards are enforceable in over 140 different countries in accordance with the New York Convention (1958). This instrument is the greatest success of modern international commercial arbitration: ‘It has made the greatest single contribution to the internationalisation of international commercial arbitration.’

The grounds (which are permissive – ‘may’ – so that the enforcement court is not obliged to deny recognition or refuse enforcement) for the refusal of recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award under Article V are as follows:

(1) Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:

(a) The parties to the arbitration agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made;

(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present its case;

(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognised and enforced;

Summary

European Union authorities are examining the possibility of introducing pan-European measures to regulate the array of private and public extra-curial techniques used in the field of consumer disputes. In this short account it will be sufficient to sketch some of these developments and to refer to further literature.

Government has an interest in fostering these systems because these cases are diverted from the ordinary courts.

Some traders have their own ODR (online dispute resolution) systems, such as Amazon's in-house dispute resolution.

Sometimes there is a trade sector, that is, an industry-wide, privatised funding of independent dispute resolution boards.

Within the UK there are statutory schemes of independent dispute resolution, for example, the Pensions Ombudsman and the Financial Ombudsman (which is binding on the financial bodies).

In the Netherlands there is a sectoral structure within arbitral proceedings, which are all run by a single private trust.

Although many of these systems are concerned with contractual complaints, there is scope to expand into the field of tort complaints and even public issues.

This interesting development involves expansion of (optional) consumer arbitration. This form of arbitration is less formal than traditional arbitration. This type of mechanism overcomes cross-border problems. It can produce cheap and speedy results and relief. Another advantage is that the decision-maker can be expert, the procedure can be stream-lined, documentary (or indeed on-line), and almost self-executing (indeed some trade associations might be the ultimate guarantors of such ‘awards’), without costs being incurred by the consumer, with a mix of mediation and decision-making.

Related cases (systemic default) can be processed through these systems by collective redress. Furthermore, these systems are good at collecting statistics and making these available to the public. Adverse publicity can affect the trading behaviour of the respondent(s).

But a disadvantage is that national systems of online dispute resolution are reluctant to decide points of law. It might be necessary, therefore, to have a referral system so that common and recurrent issues of legal uncertainty can be adjudicated by a national court.

What is the relationship between the courts and consumer dispute resolution? In Sweden there is now very little consumer litigation in the ordinary courts because the privatised system is effective.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

The main subject of the present chapter is the bindingness of decisions inter partes on matters decided by a court (or an arbitral tribunal: on the latter, 17.01 ff, vol II). This is known as estoppel per rem judicatam, or res judicata. This form of estoppel bars successive litigation of the same claim or issues between the same parties. It concerns ‘claim or issue preclusion’. The underpinning maxims are: nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa and interest res publicae ut fi nis litium sit (‘no one should be disturbed twice in the same matter’ and ‘it is in the public interest that lawsuits should have an end’). The res judicata doctrine has various manifestations: cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel, and the doctrine of merger (the need to bring all claims for compensation, arising from the same event, in a single action). Furthermore, the desire to achieve closure in civil proceedings inspired the English courts to recognise an extended principle: the rule in Henderson v. Henderson (1843) requires litigants to bring to the original action all reasonably convenient issues, and not to attempt in successive litigation to raise points which might have been conveniently examined in the earlier case. (In fact ‘estoppel’ is a general doctrine, although there are many variants of estoppel in English law. It prevents a party from acting inconsistently with a representation, whether by words or conduct. This concept has been recognised by the UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts.)

RECOGNITION OF FINALITY AS A HALLOWED PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLE

English trial judges (whether sitting in the High Court or a lower first instance court) will have attended meticulously to the rival submissions and evidence and reached a careful decision. Against this background it is not surprising that the courts have emphasised the principle of finality. Thus in Smith v. Brough (2005) Brooke LJ noted that: ‘it is a fundamental principle of our common law that the outcome of litigation should be final.’

Summary

MEDIATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The three main ‘alternatives’ to civil litigation before the English courts are: (i) party-to-party negotiation leading to settlement: this is the most common way in which a dispute or claim is terminated; (ii) mediation or conciliation: these will be discussed in this chapter; (iii) arbitration (see next chapter for this). Arbitration tends to be a rather formal style of proceeding; commercial arbitration conducted in England can replicate many aspects of High Court commercial litigation, although this tendency is regrettable, has been lamented, and should be resisted.

As for (i), party-to-party negotiation, leading to settlement, a few remarks will suffice. Settlement is by far the most common way in which civil disputes truly contested on the merits (that is, claims other than straightforward debt enforcement actions, where there is no real defence) are concluded in England. A very high percentage of civil actions do not proceed to trial. Instead most English actions culminate not in judgment on the merits, following examination of witnesses and documents at trial, or consideration of the merits during a summary proceeding (10.79 ff, vol I), but in an agreement of compromise or settlement between the parties. The decline of civil trials in the USA has also attracted comment.

MAIN TYPES OF INTERVENTION BY A NEUTRAL

A third party neutral can intervene in various ways, as a messenger or go-between, as a more active facilitative mediator, as a prescriptive or ‘evaluative’ mediator, or as a decision-maker (whether as a judge or arbitrator). In greater detail, these roles involve the following:

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Experts are needed in the civil process because ‘no judge is omniscient’ and ‘we cannot demand of the judges that they have knowledge of every branch of science, of every art and of the mysteries of every profession.’ This chapter concerns expert witnesses in English court proceedings (and apart from court assessors) rather than background expert advisors to litigants. Advisory consultation with experts is not covered by the CPR regime, that is, where a litigant obtains an opinion from an expert, but that opinion is not for use as evidence in the case (see further below, 13.36). Nor does the CPR system govern experts submitting opinions before, or reporting to, arbitral tribunals (14.32, vol II). Public funding of expert reports in care proceedings was discussed by Sir Nicholas Wall, P, in A Local Authority v. S (2012), where he noted problems posed by budgetary constraints.

The CPR aims to curb the perceived excesses of the party-appointed ‘battle of experts’. The three problems experienced before the CPR system were: first, the tendency for expert witnesses hired by a litigant to lose objectivity and tailor their report to suit that party's case; secondly, the need to control the number of experts involved in a particular case, especially with a view to achieving proportionality between their use and the case's value or importance; thirdly, the need to promote ‘equality of arms’ between rich and poor parties. Under the CPR system the main rule is that no expert evidence can be presented in a case unless the court has granted permission. This control is a facet of the court's case management powers.

Under the CPR, there are three ways in which the ordinary civil courts can receive expert opinion: by a ‘single, joint expert’, party-appointed experts, and court assessors. These will be introduced in turn in the ensuing discussion.

Lord Woolf in the Interim Report (1995) had contemplated a much larger role for expert court-assistants, to be appointed by the court to act as independent experts in a particular case. However, this was resisted on the ground that in the larger cases there should be debate and the parties should retain control of the adversarial debate.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we will consider connections between English civil procedure and Europe. The greatest impact of European law has been the decision (ostensibly compelled by European human rights jurisprudence) to create a new United Kingdom Supreme Court, in order to secure complete separation of functions between the legislature and judicial system, and to ensure that the Lord Chancellor (that is, the Minister of Justice) can no longer sit as a judge. All of this is a reminder that, at any rate juridically, England ‘is no longer an island.’

ARTICLE 6(1) OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

The Human Rights Act 1998, which took effect in October 2000, rendered the European Convention on Human Rights directly applicable in English courts. Article 6(1) of the Convention states:

Right to a Fair Trial: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

That important codification of fundamental principle consists of the following elements: the rights to:

(i) ‘a fair hearing’: this is a wide concept embracing:

Summary

INTRODUCTION

This chapter concerns two topics: first, the system of documentary disclosure; secondly, the main ‘privileged’ exceptions to the party's obligation to disclose relevant documents, legal advice and litigation privileges.

‘Disclosure’ serves four main functions: (i) it can achieve equality of access to information; (ii) it can facilitate settlement of disputes; (iii) it avoids so-called ‘trial by ambush’, that is, the situation when a party is unable to respond properly to a surprise revelation at the final hearing; and (iv) it assists the court in reaching accurate determinations of fact when entering judgment on the merits.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION AFFECTING PRE-ACTION AND NON-PARTY DISCLOSURE

Pre-action disclosure can encourage and enhance settlement, and it can reduce litigation expenses by advancing the stage at which disputants focus upon the essential matters in dispute. The American Law Institute/UNIDROIT Principles state that potential parties, litigants, and the court should each enjoy appropriate ‘access to information’. However, as a matter of principle, there are three counter-constraints: (i) the problem of ‘fishing’, that is, an applicant's ‘roving’ request for evidence to make out a contemplated claim which is wholly speculative; (ii) non-parties’ reasonable expectations in maintaining confidentiality and privacy (whether in respect of their own private information, or to satisfy duties of confidentiality owed to fourth parties); (iii) the danger that judicially administered orders for pre-action disclosure can increase the expense of resolving disputes.

PRE-ACTION PROTOCOLS

As mentioned at 4.03 ff, the CPR (1998) system introduced a set of ‘preaction protocols’ which prescribe ‘obligations’ which the prospective parties and their legal representatives must satisfy before commencing formal proceedings. Pre-action protocols are intended to promote efficient exchange of information between the prospective parties, including pre-action disclosure of ‘essential’ documents held by each side. All such disclosure is subject to the restriction that the material can only be used for the purpose of the immediate prospective proceedings.

PRE-ACTION JUDICIAL ORDERS FOR DISCLOSURE

CPR 31.166 contains a general power for the court to make a pre-action documentary disclosure order against any type of prospective defendant.

Before this new rule, statute had confined the scope for pre-action documentary disclosure to proceedings for personal injury and death.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Protective relief concerns judicial orders granted for the purpose of safeguarding the claimant's interests. Such relief takes two main forms: (i) orders for the freezing of the defendant's assets (freezing injunctions, formerly Mareva injunctions); and (ii) orders for the seizure and preservation of evidence (civil search orders, formerly Anton Piller orders). A minor form is the seizure of passports by civil order (21.71 to 21.72).

Injunctions in these procedural contexts are intended to ensure that attempts to vindicate substantive justice are not thwarted by cynical obstructive tactics – most commonly dissipating assets, destroying evidence, or personally absconding from the jurisdiction.

Both freezing relief and civil search orders are more commonly applied before commencement of the main proceedings, and they are nearly always issued ‘without notice’ to the respondent (to use the former terminology, they are awarded ex parte).

The foundation for these orders is the general statutory power to issue injunctions, that is, orders backed by powerful threats. This general power has been a fertile source of judicial creativity. This generic remedy has been adopted to counter many types of misconduct, including wrongs threatening to sap or frustrate the civil process.

FREEZING RELIEF

NATURE OF FREEZING INJUNCTIONS

This is an in personam order (an order addressed personally to the respondent) requiring the respondent to refrain from dealing with his assets.

This relief does not give the applicant any proprietary interest in the defendant's assets. The in personam operation of freezing relief has been noted in numerous cases. The Court of Appeal in Kastner v. Jason (2004) noted this facet of freezing relief, in the context of an arbitration (the court held that, consistent with the operation of freezing relief in court proceedings, an arbitral tribunal could not be regarded as having created a proprietary charge or lien or other proprietary right in respect of assets covered by an anti-dissipation order). It followed that the creditor could not register an effective caution against land which was the subject of the arbitral tribunal's anti-alienation or anti-dissipation order.

The rationale for this English approach is that the creditor should not be entitled to gain priority in the pursuit of the debtor's assets.

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Chapter 12 - The Tribunal's Appointment, Tenure and Immunity

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Chapter 8 - A Confidential Process

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Chapter 14 - Trial and Judgment

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PART VII - THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Contents

Chapter 12 - Privileges

Summary

Chapter 20 - ‘No Win, No Fee’ Systems

Summary

Chapter 23 - Complex Litigation

Summary

Chapter 20 - Enforcement under the New York Convention (1958)

Summary

Table of Statutes

Chapter 21 - Consumer Disputes: Extra-Judicial Resolution

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Chapter 16 - Finality in Court Proceedings

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Chapter 1 - Mediation

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Contents

Chapter 13 - Experts

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Chapter 30 - European Influences upon English Civil Justice

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Chapter 11 - Disclosure

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Frontmatter

Chapter 21 - Protective Relief

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PART II - COMMENCEMENT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS AND PREPARATION FOR TRIAL

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