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4 - A new representation of minorities as victims

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

By
Serge Moscovici  and
Juan A. Pérez
Edited by
Fabrizio Butera  and
John M. Levine
Fabrizio Butera
Affiliation:
Université de Lausanne, Switzerland
John M. Levine
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Summary

A DIALOGUE BETWEEN CHOMSKY AND FOUCAULT

To convey the general meaning of this study, we must first clarify the question it seeks to answer and then delineate the observations that served as its initial impetus. What, then, is the question with which we are concerned? For a short answer, let us go back to the famous 1971 debate between Chomsky and Foucault on the subject of “human nature.” From the very outset, there is a sharp difference of opinion. Foucault asserts that human nature has a social basis and is founded on the drive for dominance and power, while Chomsky stresses its innate character, which is the true basis, the absolute foundation of justice. Here are just a few excerpts from this exchange. Foucault is certain that justice is an instrument of power, “an idea invented and applied in different types of society as an instrument of a certain political and economic power, or as a weapon against this power” (Chomsky & Foucault, 2002, p. 69).

After voicing his disagreement, Chomsky not only reformulates his arguments by including justice as one of man's most deep-seated needs, but also asserts that justice can be ensured by legal means. “In my view,” he states, “it is a bit hasty to characterize our current judicial systems as simple instruments of class oppression; I don't believe that to be the case. While they may incarnate other forms of oppressions, they also incarnate a genuine quest for true concepts of justice, honor, love, goodness, and understanding” (ibid, p. 70).

Type
Chapter
Information
Coping with Minority Status
Responses to Exclusion and Inclusion
 , pp. 82 - 103
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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