Introduction

Because human rights are a matter of life and death, a theory of universal human rights for cross-cultural and intra-cultural criticism needs to be sustained when ideal conditions are lacking. Philosophical questions of global injustice and human rights have been pursued as questions of ideal or non-ideal theory. I argue that they should be pursued as a form of non-ideal theory.

Ideal theory is the project of determining the nature and aims of the “perfectly just,” “well-ordered” society in which “Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions.” Rawls is describing ideal theorizing about a society which he understands to be roughly similar to a contemporary state. But the same expectations of institutional justice and individual behavior would be expected of ideal theory globally.

However, are the expectations of ideal theory appropriate for theories of global justice and human rights? I argue no. Because these injustices are a function of a historical legacy that causes as well as characterizes the problems of global injustice including human rights violations and because this historical legacy likewise delimits solutions that might be in the offing, non-ideal theory is a better tool for theorizing about human rights. Non-ideal theorizing offers mechanisms for considering how to move from unjust arrangements to more just arrangements, not just for theorizing about what just arrangements might look like.