The UNESCO Courier of November 1977 carried an article in which Karel Vasak, the Director of the Organization's Division of Human Rights and Peace, called for the recognition of a ‘third generation’ of human rights: solidarity rights. The idea of solidarity rights was not new, but Vasak was the first to attempt to provide these rights with a conceptually valid place in the whole catalogue of human rights. For this purpose, he chose an attractive and, at first sight, an appealing formula. He took as his starting point three basic concepts and three types of revolution. The first revolution was the French Revolution of 1789, with its motto, ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’. In the course of this revolution it was, however, only the so-called freedom rights, the basic civil and political rights, which were actually realised. It was thanks to the Mexican and, in particular, the Russian Revolutions that a second generation of Human Rights gradually achieved universal recognition; these were the so-called equality rights: economic, social and cultural. We are currently experiencing a third revolution: the emancipation of colonized and dominated peoples, linked to total interdependence. One world or no world.

On 26 April 1988, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘the ICJ’ or ‘the Court’) delivered its Advisory Opinion on the Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 (hereinafter ‘the PLO Mission case’). Although it might be argued that in this case the Court was not really called upon to deliberate or pronounce upon significantly fundamental issues of international law, the Opinion does raise a number of issues that may in time come to be regarded as landmark planks in the growing body of the Court's jurisprudence. But not all aspects of the Opinion can be cast in a positive light, at least from the point of view of some legal commentators. On the contrary, there are certain aspects of the decision which may arguably be characterized as a blot on the Court's jurisprudence. I propose to address two of these: the ICJ's approach to the interpretation of the provisions of the UN Headquarters Agreement which were at the centre of the dispute between the United Nations and the United States, and the question of prudential discretion as exercised by the Court in this particular case. But first, a discussion of the background facts.

This article is premised on my belief that the use of force and violence should not be unlimited, even in times of war. Despite countless examples of apparently lawless wartime behavior, the fact that international wars are subject to limits is fairly well-accepted. The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials evidence the consequences of having exceeded acceptable limits of violence and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 represent an extensive codification of those limits for international war. Most States are parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and many of the provisions of those treaties are recognized as customary international law.

On 1 January 1958 the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) entered into force. The objectives of this Treaty are: the harmonious development of economic activities throughout the Community, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to the Community. These objectives are to be achieved by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of the Member States. This should ultimately result in the realisation of a common market, characterised by the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Since the territory of the Contracting States is regarded as forming a single entity, the common market will have the characteristics of a vast domestic market.