The Coase theorem has occupied a prominent place in economic discourse for the last half-century. The debate over the theorem and the uses to which it has been put are important moments in the history of modern economics, and the analysis of them by the historians of economics sheds light on certain of the tensions in contemporary historiography. This article discusses several aspects of the intellectual history of the Coase theorem, arguing that the study of this history illustrates the necessity of a pluralistic approach, and that attempts to write history from a singular historiographic perspective leave us with histories that are both misleading and incomplete.

The USDA Graduate School was founded in 1921 to provide statistical and economic training to the employees of the Department of Agriculture. The school did not grant degrees, but its graduate courses were accepted for credit by a significant number of universities.

In subsequent years, the activities of the school grew rapidly to provide training in many different subject areas for employees from almost all federal departments. The training in statistics provided by the school was often highly advanced (instructors included Howard Tolley and, later, Edwards Deming), while the economics taught displayed an eclectic mix of standard and institutional economics. Mordecai Ezekiel taught both economics and statistics at the school, and had himself received his statistical training there. Statistics instruction in 1936 and 1937 included seminar series from R.A. Fisher and J. Neyman, and courses on the probability approach to sampling involving Lester Frankel and William Hurwitz became important after 1939. The instruction in economics was noticeably institutionalist in the period of the New Deal. Towards the end of the period considered here, the instruction in economics became narrower and more focused on agricultural economics.

The activities of the school provide a basis for understanding some of the sources of the relative statistical sophistication of agricultural economists and of the statistical work done in government in the interwar period. It is noteworthy than within the USDA Graduate School, and in contrast to the Cowles Commission, statistical sophistication coexisted with an approach to economics that was not predominantly neoclassical. It also provides a light on the place of institutional economics in the training of government economists through the same time span.

Development economics in its early years created the image of a fierce fight between advocates of contrasting theories or approaches—“balanced growth” vs. “unbalanced growth,” or “program loans” vs. “project loans.” This view has the merit of highlighting such conflicts in great detail; yet, it fails to take into account the reality of development economics as it was practiced in the field. This paper reassesses these old conflicts by complementing the traditional focus on theoretical debates with an emphasis on the practice of development economics.

A particularly interesting example is the debate between Albert Hirschman, one of the fathers of the “unbalanced growth” approach, and Lauchlin Currie, among the advocates of “balanced growth,” on how to foster iron and steel production in Colombia in the 1950s. An analysis of the positions held by these two economists shows that they were, in fact, much less antithetical than is usually held, and, indeed, were in some fundamental aspects surprisingly similar.

Debates among development economists during the 1950s thus must be explained—at least partially—as the natural dynamics of an emerging discipline that took shape when different groups tried to achieve supremacy—or at least legitimacy—through the creation of mutually delegitimizing systemic theories.

Benjamin Graham’s amateur proposal for a commodity reserve currency (1937, 1944) has attracted the attention of professional economists and policy makers, but usually for their own prior purposes and designs. This paper places the proposal in the context of Graham’s own time and the intellectual resources available to him, with a view to elucidating both Graham’s own sense of the proposal and the reasons the proposal earned the reception it did.

This essay serves as the introduction to the authors’ translation of Karl Knies’ essay “Die nationaloekonomische Lehre vom Werth” (1855). Knies is one of the acknowledged founders of the Older German Historical School, and yet in recent years several writers have described his 1855 essay as seminal in the evolution of marginal utility analysis. The authors examine how Knies develops his nascent theory of marginal reasoning in his essay, arguing that rather than cling to his earlier historicist programmatic, Knies attempts to discover general laws; however, not by strict causal analysis but by a typical ‘German art’ of taxonomy and classification that resembles juridical argumentations. This results in an ambiguous text, which influenced several marginalist pioneers who studied under Knies at Heidelberg (including Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Friedrich von Wieser, and John Bates Clark), as well as several members of the Younger German Historical School (including Gustav von Schmoller).

The article discusses Knut Wicksell’s interpretation of the American crisis of 1907, which he presented in a piece published in Swedish in 1908. Wicksell advanced, probably for the first time in the literature, a clear distinction between the “solvency” and “liquidity” of banks, and discussed its implications for the interpretation of crises. Moreover, he called attention to a third desirable attribute of a bank: “flexibility”; that is, the ability to satisfy credit demand at an adequate rate of interest. Wicksell linked that with his better known concept of the cumulative process and the stabilization policy associated with it.

Free trade and protectionist doctrines have long had ambiguous relationships to bilateral trade deals, known throughout the nineteenth century as “reciprocity” arrangements. Henry C. Carey, “the Ajax of Protection” in the nineteenth-century United States, embodies the ambiguity from one side of the controversy. Carey’s early adulthood in the mid- to late 1820s was a time when the forerunners of the Whig Party pursued reciprocity at least partly as a means of fostering protection. In the 1830s, Carey, too, endorsed reciprocity—because he stood for free trade and believed reciprocity would promote it. In the 1840s and 1850s Carey changed his mind, decided that protection was the real “road to perfect freedom of trade,” and for that reason opposed reciprocity with Canada. In the 1870s he remained a protectionist but reconciled his doctrine with reciprocity. This article attempts to explain the changes in the disposition toward reciprocity of America’s foremost protectionist thinker from the Second Party System to the generation after the Civil War.

Fr. John A. Ryan (1869–1945) was one of the early advocates of minimum wage laws in the United States. The thesis of this paper is that in three respects Fr. Ryan stood apart from other advocates of the minimum wage. First, during the period of his work, economics was developing on the basis of the positivist conception of science. Fr. Ryan’s case for the minimum wage combined economics with “non-scientific” theology and philosophy. Second, most religiously motivated American reformers were Protestants, and their advocacy was grounded in the Protestant Social Gospel movement. This was different from Fr. Ryan’s grounding in the social encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI, which themselves were grounded in the Catholic Church’s constant teaching that man is made in the image of God. Third, many reformers were motivated not at all by religion, but by the utilitarian calculus that had become the foundation of the social sciences. Although Fr. Ryan made utilitarian judgments in his analysis, he was not an ethical utilitarian.

The basic principles of Robbins's Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science are still present in most textbooks in economics. We thus face a combined problem of historical and contemporary nature. Robbins's assertion concerning the ethics–economics relationship has two main difficulties. Firstly, the presumption of means–ends analysis, which is oblivious of the ends people seek to promote, is not as neutral as it appears. Robbins chooses to ignore the ends by focusing on cost minimization. This implicitly (though not inherently) suggests another end—wealth, or means, maximization—which by no means can be considered as ethically neutral. Secondly, there is an implicit assumption that whatever the ends people seek to promote, there will always be a coordinated outcome to their actions. As competitive prices are the means to achieve waste minimization (through proper pricing by opportunity costs), the assumed coordination must be that of general equilibrium and, thus, cooperative-based coordination must be excluded.

The aim of this paper is to explain the process of diversification of normative economics by presenting the work of two authors—Tibor Scitovsky (1910–2002) and Amartya Sen (1933–). While these two authors first contributed to traditional welfare analysis from within, they were subsequently involved in the development of two different, and even opposed, programs: the economics of happiness; and the capability approach. They focused on different concepts of well-being: the “joy” of satisfied consumers for Scitovsky; and the “capabilities” of deprived individuals for Sen. In imposing new theoretical frameworks and applications, as well as new concepts of well-being, which are measureable, the capability approach and the economics of happiness represent two major attempts to renew normative economic analysis.

This essay argues that beneath the superficial linearity of the history of neoclassical price index theory lie important conceptual ruptures that are linked to the ordinal revolution, including a radical transformation in the core objective for cost-of-living indexes. Revealing these ruptures produces a more accurate history of both the development of neoclassical price index theory and its reception. Furthermore, we can recognize how transformations in this theory have made cost-of-living indexes more coherent with existing traditions of empirical macroeconomics even as they may have reduced the indexes’ suitability for other functions, notably adjusting income payments.

Everyone has to eat, so agriculturalists must produce enough to feed themselves and the rest of the population. This statement is trivially obvious but making it explicit mattered to the early development of economic thinking. Many important economic writers of the period (Petty, Cantillon, Hutcheson, Hume, Steuart, Mirabeau, Smith, and others) used a specific notion of agricultural surplus of the form: x men can feed y, where y > x. A series of questions about the relation between agriculture and the rest of the economy naturally follows. Will the surplus be produced? How does it reach those who consume it? What are the “superfluous hands” (in Hume’s terms) to do? This paper points out this neglected theme in early economics.

We examine various, sometimes divergent, conceptions of capital and its structure in the Austrian tradition from Menger (1871) to Lachmann (1956). We outline Menger’s methodological and philosophical position that recommends investigating the morphology of capital—its shape, form, and structure; it also recommends maintaining some “realisticness” in the treatment of capital in economics. Prominent Austrian contributions are examined and compared along various dimensions: the existence or otherwise of “original” factors of production; time conceptions; analytical domain assumptions; real and money capital doctrines; the causal role of the entrepreneur in creating capital; and the fundamental question of capital aggregation into a stock or fund. We consider the extent to which Menger’s avowed followers and successors diverged from his original vision of capital, subsequent consequences for the development of Austrian capital theory, and implications of Mengerian structural analysis for the study of capital more generally.

This paper examines the use of the medical metaphor in the early theories of crises. It first considers the borrowing of medical terminology and generic references to disease, which, notwithstanding their relatively trivial character, illustrate how crises were originally conceived as disturbances (often of a political nature) to a naturally healthy system. Then it shows how a more specific metaphor, the fever of speculation, shifted the emphasis by treating prosperity as the diseased phase, to which crises are a remedy. The metaphor of the epidemic spreading of the disease introduced the theme of the cumulative character of both upswing and downswing, while the similitude with intermittent fevers accounted for the recurring nature of crises. Finally, the paper examines how the medical reflections on the causality of diseases contributed to the epistemology of crises theory, and reflects on the metaphysical shift accompanying the transition from the theories of crises to the theories of cycles.

This work presents the elements of economic analysis of law that occur in the thought of Gaetano Filangieri. In the pages of La Scienza della Legislazione the Neapolitan writer develops a utilitarian and economic investigation that pays attention to the judgments individuals make over social phenomena at the margin point. A proof of this development can be found in the explanation of the principle of decreasing marginal utility, argued in Head XXXI of Book III, which represents one of the most effective demonstrations that can be found before the end of nineteenth-century literature. The most remarkable fact is that, of all the five parts that compose the Filangierian work, the most rich in economic arguments is dedicated to “Criminal Laws.”

This article will point out this and other innovative results of the Filangerian analysis, and will also offer a reconstruction of the economic theory on crime and punishment presented in La Scienza della Legislazione. Filangieri’s criminal doctrine represents a significant example of the Enlightenment antecedents of “law and economics,” as well as the better known contributions made by Beccaria and Bentham.

When trust is shaken, individuals pull back and the market system contracts. Where trust grows, individual energy and creativity are unleashed and the system grows. In Adam Smith’s vision of humankind’s progress, trust is the central theme.

The Great Recession represents a classic case of a crisis of trust. Looking back to the work of Smith offers insight into the role of citizens and the State in creating an fruitful market environment based on trust, and the challenge of this process, given the human frailty of individuals (unfortunately, we are not angels) and the potential for State power to be captured and abused.

The paper examines assertions that Adam Smith was in some sense a Christian, and examines how much current opinion ignores his biography and the dangerous religious context of eighteenth-century Scotland. Zealots regularly intervened against suspected heresy, which created an atmosphere of intimidation. Adam Smith’s biography shows that he too was intimidated, and avoided scandals that would upset his very religious mother, for whom he felt a special protective bond, and that he hid his private skepticism to ensure that nothing he published would provoke the zealots. A close reading of his Works shows how he amended them consistently as he grew older to modify their religious content, particularly after his mother died in 1784, and up to just before he died in 1790.

This article fills a gap in the literature by examining the only leading classical economist whose influence on Spain has yet to be studied. In particular, it analyzes the influence John Stuart Mill had on nineteenth-century Spain by showing the impact of his multifaceted work both in scientific philosophy and utilitarian philosophy, and in political and economic theory, as well as in the world of feminism.