This article explains how pasteurization—with few outspoken political supporters during this period—first became a primary milk purification strategy in Chicago and why eight years passed between pasteurization’s initial introduction into law and the city’s adoption of full mandatory pasteurization. It expands the current focus on the political agreement to pasteurize to include the organizational processes involved in incorporating pasteurization into both policy and practice. It shows that the decision to pasteurize did not occur at a clearly defined point but instead evolved over time as a consequence of the interplay of political interest groups, state-municipal legal relations, and the merging of different organizational practices. Such an approach considerably complicates and expands existing accounts of how political interests and agreements shaped pasteurization and milk purification policies and practice.

Employing a historical dataset on Detroit in the 1950s, this article uses geographic models to show the political impact of churches and religious populations on presidential voting. Multilevel models separate the relative impact of individual denomination, the effect of congregants in neighborhoods, and the importance of the physical presence of a church. Existing studies of geography and religion examine a few denominations; here a full set of religious denominations is compared on support for Democratic Party voting and “social movement-like” voting for the Progressive Party. Mainline Protestant churches are associated with support for a conservative social agenda. The presence of synagogues and Catholic churches in neighborhoods is positively related to progressive electoral outcomes. Black Protestant churches are positively related to Democratic Party voting but did not alter the Progressive Party vote. The effect of denomination on political behavior and the geographic extent of a church’s influence on surrounding urban communities are shown to be spatially segregated and to depend on the class structure of neighborhoods.

This article explores an East Asian parallel to the “structural transformation” of the European public sphere and civil society by studying private academies and Confucian literati petitions in Chosŏn Korea from 1506 to 1800. During this period, the Confucian literati emerged as the new public and challenged royal authority, engaging in a broad range of public activities through the academies and petitions. Voluntaristic and nongovernmental connections of private academies reveal aspects of a nascent civil society, whereas the rational-critical nature of petitioning indicates the formation of the public sphere in Chosŏn Korea. This analysis demonstrates a close historical association between the evolution of private academies and the development of petitions. This historical interplay confirms Jürgen Habermas's thesis that the public sphere arises from civil society.

Results of an original analysis of Cherokee town placement and population c. 1721 are presented. Period and contemporary information were analyzed using local statistics to produce multivalued, mappable characterizations of the intensity of the processes of town placement and population. The analysis focuses on the scale and the space in which these processes took place among the Cherokee in order to open the way for examining the legacy of human-induced environmental change in southern Appalachia.

The wealth of probated decedents from late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century Ontario is analyzed for evidence of the impact of religious affiliation on the level of wealth and rate of wealth accumulation. After controlling for age, birthplace, occupation, gender, urbanization, and other factors, the results suggest that relative to Anglicans, the wealth of Methodists and Roman Catholics was significantly lower. Moreover, when religious denomination and birthplace are interacted, Canadian-born Anglicans emerge as the dominant wealth group, while the English-born of any denomination and Methodists of any birthplace seem to fare the worst. When wealthage profiles are examined by denomination, Baptists have the steepest profiles, followed by Anglicans and Presbyterians. The data do support the hypothesis that religious affiliation, particularly when interacted with birthplace, has an impact on wealth, though the exact nature of the mechanism is unclear.