What follows is an attempt to explore the nature of moral discourse as at applies to nation-states and to relate this discussion to some of the policies and purposes of, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. It should be noted that I have not introduced the "moral element" into the NATO debate; moral claims have been made for and by the organization itself during the course of its development.

A first assumption about moral discourse, as the term is used here, is that the assessment of the moral element in a policy or an institution is a critical task, not an apologetic one. A second assumption follows from the practice of "public diplomacy": It is morally dubious to engage in the deception of oneself or of one's constituents where goals are concerned.

Almost unnoticed by the policy-makers of the rest of the world, a new South Africa has emerged. Despite the attempts to ostracize and isolate South Africa, this country of twenty million blacks Riled by four million whites has industrialized its economy, consolidated its control over African rebellion at home, and launched an expansionist program in Africa that may well be the primary source of conflict on the African continent in the next decade.

The key to Marcuse's thought is his thesis that effective social criticism depends upon a philosophy of two-dimensionality-that is to say, philosophy conceived primarily as a criticism of what is. Alasdair Maclntyre rightly points out that Marcuse thinks the central concern of philosophy should be "with the structure of what can be thought and therefore confronts actuality with possibility." His is a driving passion to correct. And the basic distinction that runs through all of Marcuses works and defines the dual dimension which generates serious thought is the distinction between things as they are and things as they might be.