Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court determines, according to its very wording, the ‘applicable law’. It reads as follows:

‘ 1 . The Court shall apply:

(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence ;

(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;

(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.

2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.

3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in Article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status..’

There is no agreed definition of international criminal law, but the term is a useful way of describing those aspects of public international law and domestic law that are concerned with crimes having an international aspect or dimension. It therefore ranges from the important, but generally unexciting, topic of mutual assistance in criminal matters to the more gripping subject of ‘international crimes’. That term is a convenient way to describe those offences that are the concern of every state because they corrode society. Even when the crime is committed on behalf of a state, international law places individual criminal responsibility on those who commit them. Furthermore, international law generally allows states to prosecute international crimes regardless of where they are committed or the nationality of the accused (universal jurisdiction). The acts constituting international crimes are not a new invention but as old as mankind, but, with the notable exception of piracy, it was only in the twentieth century that a concerted international effort was made to confront them. We will look at how the Security Council has tried to deal with international crimes, inevitably in a piecemeal way.

In recent years the European Union (EU) has played an increasing role in criminal law. A number of obligations for EU Member States have been agreed in various forms, ranging from substantive law obligations to procedural obligations and new mechanisms for enforcement, particularly the Europol and Eurojust agencies. These agencies and the novel procedural obligations, particularly in the form of the European arrest warrant, are well known. But is anything new in the EU's approach to substantive criminal law?

In a young man's article appearing in this Yearbook in 1983, the author discussed certain law of the sea and other aspects of ‘direct action’ protests carried out at sea by peace or environmentalist non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Since that article was written, the objects and frequency of such protests have greatly expanded, the legal underpinnings in human rights law of a ‘right of peaceful public protest’ have been further affirmed and clarified and a body of state practice has emerged concerning the limits of and controls that may be placed upon the exercise of that right at sea, and upon the exercise of international rights of navigation or overflight for the purposes of public protest. Since 11 September 2001, moreover, the international community's increased concern with terrorist threats has put in question the compatibility of maritime direct action protests with: (i) the security of each ship subjected to such a protest (‘target ship’); and (ii) the security of the next port of call of a target ship which has been boarded and ‘occupied’ at sea by NGO protesters, whether or not they are still aboard her when she approaches port.

The Netherlands' special relationship with the sea is widely known. For instance due to the prominent role of its merchant and naval fleet in particularly the 17th and 18th centuries or due to Hugo de Groot, one of the founding fathers of modern international law in general and the international law of the sea in particular. In present times the Netherlands no longer ranks among the main players in marine issues. As regards marine capture fisheries, the quantitative involvement of the Netherlands is still fairly sizeable in a European context, but not very significant on a global scale. This does not mean, however, that the involvement of the Netherlands in marine capture fisheries is a purely domestic affair. Fishing vessels flying the Netherlands flag do not just operate within the maritime zones of the Netherlands or other Member States of the European Union (EU) but also on the high seas and within the maritime zones of non-EU Member States. Also, Netherlands companies and individuals have (beneficial) ownership of vessels under foreign flag.