Christian nationalist ideology was among the strongest predictors of Americans voting for Trump in 2016 and remained a strong predictor of intent to vote for him prior to the 2020 election. This study uses national data to examine whether Christian nationalism could potentially convert the previously-unconverted to supporting Trump or, conversely, prevent apostatizing from Trump. Among Americans who did not vote for Trump in 2016, Christian nationalism increased the likelihood that they intended to vote for Trump in 2020, but only those who earlier did not vote at all or voted third party. Conversely, among Americans who did vote for Trump in 2016, Christian nationalism reduced the likelihood that they planned on voting for a Democratic or third party candidate. Christian nationalism thus potentially inclined Americans who previously did not vote for Trump in 2016 to vote his way in 2020 and inoculated previous Trump-voters from considering other candidates in 2020.

What impact do cues from religious elites have on followers, particularly when religious communities are internally divided? Could religious elites promote internal consensus, or would their cues stoke further internal polarization? This article utilizes the release of Pope Francis's encyclical on the environment, Laudato Si', to explore these questions. A unique survey experiment, conducted on a nationally representative sample of Catholic voters in the United States in late 2015, tests the impact of Francis' message relative to a similar message from unidentified environmental elites. In keeping with other studies of Laudato's impact in the United States, findings reveal real, but nuanced, effects from Francis' environmental cue. The Francis cue did impact conservatives and high religiosity Catholics, but these effects were not distinct from those on other Catholics in the sample, suggesting limitations in promoting consensus. Instead, responses to a Francis cue varied sharply depending on pre-existing views of Francis' leadership.

Media coverage of Muslims has been repeatedly shown to be negative, and attitudes toward Muslims in American society are typically more negative than attitudes toward other social groups. Does the tone of media coverage directly affect public attitudes? This relationship is not well established with respect to Muslims, nor as a proposition about social groups in general. We use an online between-subjects experiment to examine whether exposure to articles of quantifiably different valences about Muslims or Catholics affects reported attitudes toward each of those groups. We find clear support for this proposition. Our additional tests demonstrate that this effect persists but is attenuated when money is at stake. We also identify anxiety as a key mediator between exposure to articles of different valences and attitudes about each group. Our findings suggest that articles of a particular tone can influence views of social groups.

How do racial group attitudes shape the political preferences of Black and white evangelicals? Scholarship has documented the relationship between religion and race in shaping political behavior and attitudes. However, less is known about how in-group and out-group racial attitudes operate within religious populations. Using samples of Black and white evangelicals from the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies, we explore the role of racial identity centrality and racial resentment in determining evangelicals' political preferences. While the role of Black and white identity among evangelicals is minimal, we find strong and consistent conservatizing effects for racial resentment. Together these findings suggest that the evangelical racial divide is not driven by Black evangelicals' attachment to their racial identity, but that racial resentment may drive white evangelicals to more conservative political preferences.

Christianity is in long-term decline in the United Kingdom, with decreasing levels of affiliation, practice, belief, and social authority. At the same time, however, Britain's churches and the faith they represent remain deeply embedded within culture and society. This paper offers the most comprehensive analysis to date of how the “sector” of UK Christian interest groups—that is, organizations with a Christian character that seek to influence government policy—operates within this changing socio-religious context. Based on survey and interview data, it examines the extent of Christian interest group activity in the UK, before assessing their issue agendas, lobbying strategies, and influence. The results indicate that the activities of Christian interest groups have been affected by decline, but also by Christianity's continued strengths within society. These findings provide a basis for deeper investigation of Christianity's political influence in the UK, and will also have implications beyond this case.

To what extent is it possible for American Jews to maintain a deep emotional connection to Israel while criticizing the actions of the Israeli government? This long-debated question echoes earlier investigations of different forms of patriotism toward one's home country. Drawing on two 2019 surveys of American Jews, we find that, like Americans in general, Jewish liberals and conservatives express different forms of patriotism toward both Israel and America. Jewish conservatives tend to oppose criticism of Israel and America for any reason, while Jewish liberals view criticism as an important part of “caring” about both countries. Both forms of patriotism are positively associated with stronger emotional connections to the relevant country. These results suggest that emotional connection to Israel represents a form of social identification with Israel and that lower levels of connection to Israel among some American Jews are driven more by apathy than active criticism or hostility.

Donald Trump's campaign slogan to “Make America Great Again” captivated the imagination of millions of Americans by contextualizing disparate sources of social resentment as emblematic of a broader story of American decline. Employing a “traditionalist civil religious jeremiad,” Trump called for a reassertion of American exceptionalism, and extolled a romanticized golden age predating transformative social changes (e.g., sexuality, gender roles, racial equality). As such, his rhetoric legitimized the defense of white male privilege as a vital component of this restoration. While this use of civil religious themes emboldened those who harbor prejudicial views, it alienated others who interpret such rhetoric as an assault on the soul of the nation. Relying on a unique module within the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we demonstrate that adherence to the tenets of American civil religion significantly exacerbated the effects of symbolic racism and modern sexism on support for Trump.

The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DİTİB) runs more than 900 mosques in Germany and circulates Friday sermons in these mosques. Our analysis provides a nuanced depiction of the link to the homeland by conducting qualitative and quantitative content analyses of 481 sermons from 2011 to 2019. To what extent are relations with Turkey reflected in the sermons? And how is the concept of “home” reflected in those sermons? While homeland-related issues constitute a minority overall, the concept “home” occurs in five different contexts within these sermons: First, sermons directly refer to the homeland and norms connected to it. Second, implicit links are created by discussing events in Turkey. Third, leaving the homeland is described as an integral part of the history of Islam. The last two contexts discuss Germany as a “new home”, and build links to Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) through its foundation.

Risk aversion dampens political participation and heightens religiosity, with concentrated effects among women. Yet, little is known about how intersecting identities moderate these psychological correlates of religiosity and political engagement. In this paper, we theorize that the risk-religion-politics relationship is gendered and racialized. Using a nationally representative survey, we show that political participation is more strongly correlated with risk for Black women than for any other race-gender group. For religiosity, however, we find little evidence that risk is related to religiosity among Black women, while highly correlated with white women's religious engagement. For men—whether Black or white—risk exhibits a modest, positive relationship with their religiosity. Our results speak to the importance of considering intersectionality and race-gender identities in evaluations of religious and political activities in the United States.

The relations of the Evangelical movement and Israel have drawn the attention of many scholars of religion, public opinion, and political science in the last two decades. This study examines the influence of Evangelicals on their country's policy toward Israel. I conduct the first quantitative, cross-national research, investigating the links between the size of the Evangelical population of a country and its support for Israel. Analyzing 198 UN General Assembly votes of 18 Latin American countries from 2009 to 2019, my results show that as the Evangelical population in a country grows, so does its support for Israel. Unpredictably, I also find that a state of armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians does not decrease the support for Israel.

The paper explores the relation between religion and populism in Israel. Jewish identity has been an important marker of citizenship and belonging in Israel since its inception. The founders of the Zionist movement and the dominant elites of early statehood remained dependent upon Jewish religion to demarcate national boundaries and legitimate territorial claims. With the establishment of the state, Jewish identity helped create and legitimate a segmented citizenship regime that secured privilege for Jews. Gradually, and especially in the past two decades, Jewishness became more contested, demarcating not only Jews from non-Jews but also “authentic” Jews from allegedly “cosmopolitan elites,” thus becoming part of populist politics, central to Israeli politics. The complex relation between religion and populism in Israel is demonstrated by the development of two populist parties; an “inclusive” one (Shas) and an “exclusionary” one (Likud). The study of the two parties shows the role of religious identities, tropes, and symbols in boundary-making and political strategies. In Israel, religion functions both as the positive content of the political community (the ethnos––the Jewish people—is conflated with the demos) and the demands for inclusion; and as the marker of a threat (non-Jewish citizens, asylum seekers, and allegedly disloyal secular elites).

We employ regression analysis of 2017 survey data from 4,067 Bangladeshis to exposit the lineaments of individual support for domestic Islamist violence. Our dependent variables derive from measures of public support for the stated goals and violent means of three Bangladeshi Islamist terrorist groups. Our study variables include participation in communal Friday prayer; indexed measures of other pietic practices; preferences for Shari'a and secularism; and gender. We include several well-established control variables. We find that participation in communal Friday prayers significantly correlates with diminished support for militant groups while having no effect upon support for their violent means. In four (of 10) models, we find that respondents who view Shari'a as being coterminous with scriptural literalism and harsh physical punishments are significantly more likely to support the groups' goals. Finally, we find women to be consistently more likely to support the goals and means of the militant groups.

Low political support for religious minority groups in the United States is often explained as a matter of social distance or unfamiliarity between religious traditions. Observable differences between beliefs and behaviors of religious minority groups and the cultural mainstream are thought to demarcate group boundaries. However, little scholarship has examined why some practices become symbolic boundaries that reduce support for religious accommodation in public policy, while nearly identical practices are tolerated. We hypothesize that politics is an important component of the process by which some religious practices are transformed into demarcations between “us” and “them.” We conduct an original survey experiment in which people are exposed to an identical policy demand—women-only swim times at a local public pool—attributed to three different religious denominations (Muslim, Jewish, and Pentecostal). We find that people are less supportive of women-only swim times when the requesting religion is not a part of their partisan coalition.

Given their strategic position within American society, clergy continue to remain important actors in American politics. This article examines the partisan identifications and electoral behavior of American Protestant clergy in the 2016 presidential election. Although clergy partisanship may be of interest in any election, the 2016 contest, given the milieu of political polarization and the presence of the Trump candidacy, provides an intriguing context for assessing the profession's electoral behavior, particularly among Republican clergy. Based on survey results from over 2,500 clergy drawn from ten Protestant (five mainline and five evangelical) denominations, the study finds that, during the early stages of the 2016 nomination process, only a small percentage of Republican clergy supported Trump and that, despite the high level of political polarization, a sizable segment of Republican clergy resisted partisan pressures and refused to vote for Trump in the general election. The propensity of both independent and Republican clergy to vote for the GOP nominee varied largely with the level of perceived “threats”: to the Christian heritage of the nation, from Islam, and from the process of “globalization.”

This study delves into how non-Shi‘a Lebanese assess Hezbollah and its activities. Having provided empirical evidence that Hezbollah has garnered positive perception in Lebanon, it asks what explains a substantial increase or decrease in favorable attitudes toward Hezbollah among Christians, Sunnis, and Druze? It argues that those who perceive Hezbollah as a resistance organization, as it often describes itself; the political alliance across sectarian groups; as well as insecurity caused by armed groups such as Sunni militant groups and ISIS, all combine to moderate people's views toward Hezbollah. Using an original, nationally representative face-to-face survey in Lebanon in 2015 and employing a multivariate statistical method, it finds that those who hold unfavorable views of the United States, those who support the political alliance of which Hezbollah is part, and those who support the Assad regime in Syria are likely to have a positive perception of Hezbollah and or its activities in the region.

We ask how the theopolitics of a nation-state, and especially its soteriology, engage with traditions that preceded the state and relay messages that contradict this theopolitics. To discuss this question, we address the evolving (re-)interpretation of the Ninth of Av—a ritual commemoration of the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of Jewish (Judean) self-rule in ancient times—by Religious-Zionist commentators. We further compare this interpretation to the Religious-Zionist appropriation of Jerusalem Day, a civic holiday celebrating the establishment of Israeli control over East Jerusalem in the June 1967 war. We argue that the statist imperative of the superiority of nation-statist theopolitics suggests that traditions are co-opted to fit in with its soteriology, with varying degrees of resistance or willing accommodation by carriers of these traditions. This co-opting may result in either the de-politicization of what the statist view would see as religion or the religionization of the state's own civic and so-called secular holidays.

Following two decades of a state-supported patriotic campaign, the Russian Orthodox Church has dramatically increased its presence in the public sphere: in the Armed Forces, in public schools and universities, and even in retirement houses and prisons. The Church's recent activities seem to have no territorial limits: they reach up to the space station “Mir” and the Russian Antarctic Station, as well as the (Russian) Orthodox believers in 62 states. Using a critical discourse analysis of the speeches of top Church leaders as our main methodological tool, our research explores the Church's policies on patriotism and patriotic education, its re-interpretation of historical memory, and the role of the Church in Russian politics. We try to show that while the Church's agenda and approach to politics are idiosyncratic, the Church has become a key actor with an increasingly important political role.

Christian megachurches have been growing in members, organization, and financial resources in the large cities of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and in Singapore. However, they remain as religious minorities facing an asymmetrical balance of political power due to the Islamization of politics, strong state secularism, or the close entanglement of the political elites with majority Catholicism. We propose a framework of minoritarian politics to understand the actions adopted by the churches to defend and advance their interests. While the scholarship on religion and politics tends to focus on churches' direct engagement with political elites and the mobilization of grassroots movements, we argue that the megachurches prefer to minister to the middle by forging outreach networks to accumulate social capital with a broad range of intermediaries. This is not just due to theological conservatism, but also because ministering to the middle has been the effective strategy given the political circumstances.

There is one European state leader from the moderate Christian-democrat center right who has developed a discourse and policies showing his progressive move toward the radical right: Viktor Orbán. Can Christianity be considered from a Laclauian perspective, as a “nodal point” of Orbán's radical right discourse; that is, a key element around which his antagonistic narratives are structured? Based on an analysis of segments of Orbán's speeches between 2014 and 2019 that mention Christianity, the research reveals that this religion is a nodal point for three main reasons: (1) the density of Christian references used to shape a negative and antagonistic discourse, strategically adjusted to his audience; (2) the use of Christianity to ground the three ideological pillars of the radical right (populism, nativism, and authoritarianism); and (3) the mobilization of Christianity to organize a hegemonic struggle against the dominant political force that has defined the meaning of this religion in the European public sphere—the moderate center right.

Building on previous quantitative and qualitative research on cross-country differences and similarities in regulation of religion, this paper employs data for 2000 and 2014 from the third round of the Religion and the State project and uses various cluster analysis techniques to identify country clusters based on the form in which countries regulate religion. The analysis separates between democratic and authoritarian countries. We further study if and how the clustering of the countries changes depending on the employed indicators and the employed cut-off points in defining democracy and autocracy. Overall, the results demonstrate the potential and limits of empirical classifications. In addition to the methodological and descriptive contribution, the results are compared and contrasted with previous work on state-religion relationships.