On 1May 2016,GreenpeaceNetherlands released 248 pages of TTIP negotiating texts stemming from previous negotiating rounds. Although it is not the first (and will not be the last) leak since the inception of the negotiation in 2013, this is the first to reveal the US negotiating position regarding 13 out of the 24 TTIP chapters.

As such, the TTIP leaks provide an unprecedented opportunity to not only analyse the contrasting positions of the EU and US on several issues in the ongoing negotiations, but also to test the veracity of the competing narratives devised by opponents and proponents of the agreement. To what extent do their respective storylines find support in the actual texts?

Supporters of TTIP have proposed fact-checking as an antidote against them is information around TTIP. Yet, having been predominantly advocated and provided for by the EU Commission rather than by the media, institutional fact-checking failed to counter the massive misinformation characterizing the public and political discourse surrounding the negotiations. Unfortunately, when it comes to public perception, the line between pedagogy and propaganda is fuzzy.

“[M]any observers agree that the Commission has been ‘leaking like a sieve’”.

Leaks have become a major element of European Union politics. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) leak in early May 2016 is neither the first of its kind nor will it be the last. Transparency by leaks – or “transleakancy” as the series of publications of confidential TTIP negotiation documents has already been coined – is one element of the political game that different interest groups, governmental and non–governmental, play on both sides of the Atlantic. And yet, leaked EU documents have been shared in wider policy-networks all along, independent of whether they have received media attention or not. The difference is that leaks similar to those that we see on TTIP have reached a new level of importance. Here, themere fact of their existence makes them newsworthy. The impact of these leaks on public debates is seen as amajor risk for negotiators.

“When EU Heads of States and Governments unanimously gave the European Commission a mandate to negotiate the EU–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership on 17 June 2013, they understood that these talks would become the leitmotiv of a new era in EU trade policy. However, few people would have guessed that it would primarily be because of transparency.”

The public demands for more transparent EU negotiations have significantly increased, especially with regard to the EU–US negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. For many pundits transparency in negotiations comes as a surprise, as the candid statement by the Commissioner's Malmström cabinet member illustrates, since traditionally EU negotiations almost exclusively take place behind closed doors and with almost no public disclosure of documents. Scholars have also noted how ‘remarkable’ the TTIP negotiations are for the fact that the negotiating directives were publically released, which was not a common practice before, leading someMembers of European Parliament to initiate adjudication for public disclosure of documents.

So the damage is done: both emperors go naked, and this at a particularly sensitive stage of the negotiations. Worse, the hegemons sit on an applecart already so full that only a “TTIP light” seems to save it from toppling, albeit at a price of losing its most precious apple: regulatory coherence, no wand forever!

But wait! We may already have given up hope for transatlantic agreements on financial cooperation and data protection. Hormone beef and biotech seeds, if not feed, also look rather far away from good and risk–free regulatory solutions. And carmakers in Asia and South America may have chuckled with relief when the efforts of US and EU manufacturers of automobiles failed to define a fully harmonised, standardised and mutually recognised “TTIP Car” – after which they would have had little if any leeway for their own motors, emission limits, windscreens and safety standards.

This is where the leaks may have opened a welcome window of opportunity for third countries, blinded as they apparently all are by the prospects of trade liberalisation racing ahead with megaregional steps too big for them to buy in with any hope for negotiating power.

Disputes over food safety standards –what in the language of trade policy are called sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) – have been at the heart of many transatlantic trade rows between the US and the EU. Examples include the EU bans on the import of hormone–treated beef, on pork treated with growth–promoting additives, or on poultry washed in antimicrobial rinses to reduce the amount of microbes on meat. As a result, the potential impact of the ongoing negotiations to reach a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) free trade agreement between the US and EU on EU food standards has, rightly, attracted a lot of attention and no little anxiety. Opposition to “Chlorhühnchen” has become the rallying–call for anti–TTIP activists in many countries. NGOs argue that “TTIP will sacrifice food safety for faster trade”. Critics highlight possible procedural rules requiring transparency of decision–making and early warning mechanisms which would give interested parties (including of course business firms and lobby groups) the opportunity to comment on planned rule–making which it is argued are likely to lead to ‘regulatory chill’.

The leaked TTIP documents reveal that the EU and US are discussing the introduction of a detailed set of procedural requirements for the adoption of regulatory measures. Default provisions are set forth in the chapter on regulatory cooperation, applicable to goods and services. More specific provisions are being negotiated in the chapters on technical barriers to trade and on sanitary and phytosanitary measures. If they conflict with the regulatory cooperation chapter, they prevail.

This article analyses the regulatory cooperation chapter insofar as it pertains to trade in goods but to the exclusion of SPS matters and anything provided in the TBT chapter itself. The questions this article examines are to what extent the TTIP proposals expand upon the obligations the two parties have already taken on under WTO law and to what extent the resulting regulatory coordination is consistent withWTO law. It will be shown that the US proposals on procedure may constrain substantive regulatory discretion beyond what applies under the GATT and TBT Agreement of the WTO. It will alsobe shown that the needs to conduct trade impact assessments and a detailed explanation of the necessity of measures anticipate a legal challenge to necessity and will provide information of much use to complainants in meeting their burden of proof.

The May 2016 leak of draft texts produced within the context of the on–going Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations has provided an interesting insight into the positions of the EU and US with regard to different dimensions of regulatory cooperation, with some chapters being complete or near completion (as other articles in this mini–symposium discuss), and others still in a more rudimentary format. One such field of regulation, covered in the leaked ‘Tactical State of Play’ document, covers geographical indicators (hereafter GIs). However, this coverage is very brief, stating that ‘discussions focused on the preparation of an intersessional discussion prior to the next round’. GIs, marks identifying the geographical origin, and by extension (so the argument goes) quality of goods, have continued to be a source of consternation in international trade regulation, with states unable to see eye–to–eye on how they should be protected, if at all.

Opponents of the transatlantic trade and investment partnership treaty (TTIP) fear that the EUmight lose the capacity to protect public health as it deems appropriate. The freedomto regulate would be jeopardized because TTIP would bind the EU to the United States’ regulatory interests, which are expressly or implicitly assumed to live up to a ‘lower’ standard than those in the EU. The ‘TTIP–leaks’ provide a good opportunity to examine the potential impact of the agreement on EU public health regulation. This brief contribution uses as its starting point the document “Tactical State of Play of the TTIP negotiations” (hereafter “Tactical Document”) of March 2016, and focuses on pharmaceuticals and medical devices. In light of the statements in this document, we query what would change for the EU consumer, and what would be the impact on the EU regulators’ role in protecting public health.

The leak of confidential documents on 2 May 2016 by GreenpeaceNetherlands allows some preliminary conclusions on both the scope and success of the negotiations so far. As regards the pharmaceuticalmarket, the current state of affairs combines the promise of steps forward with the prospect of concerning standstills. This short opinion follows key points emerging from the leaked documents n.9 (“RegulatoryCooperation”) andn.16 (“TacticalState ofPlay”) that are directly relevant to the pharmaceutical market. The themes that will be briefly discussed are, first, the regulatory cooperation mechanisms emerging fromdoc. n.9 in comparison to current cooperation processes in pharmaceutical regulation. The leaked papers suggest positive and commendable (yet far from conclusive) developments towards amore transparent and regulated framework for cooperation, while perpetuating concerns regarding fundamental policy choices and prevalence ofmercantile imperatives over competing public interests.

Financial regulation is an issue where differences between the EU and US are highly sensitive. Indeed, EU and US apply in a different manner the financial standards adopted at international level by the Basel Committee and have different systems of financial supervision.

Due to these significant differences between the two systems, it is very difficult for the EU and US to reach an agreement on common financial standards within the TTIP negotiations. Actually, as the differences in regulation between the two systems are an obstacle to the access of the financial operators of each Party to the market of the other Party, the absence of common standards in this sector could nullify the efficacy of norms of market access that will be probably contained within the TTIP.

Moreover, in a risk regulation perspective, considering the weight that the US and EU financial relationship have on the global system and taking account of the effect of destabilization that could be generated by the divergent requirements imposed to the credit institutions on the two sides of the Atlantic, the lack of common financial standards between the EU and US could have a great impact on global financial stability.

The impact of TTIPleaks on the negotiations of and debate about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has been more limited than its name and announcement would lead us to expect. This is, first, because the leaked ‘consolidated documents’ only show the European Union's (EU) and United States’ (US) positions on a number of negotiating areas but does not unveil concessions made by either side in the pursuit of a compromise. Therefore, it contains little surprising information for observers of the negotiations. But a second reason for the lack of uproar is that for only about half of the expected chapters in TTIP a text has been leaked, either because there is no consolidated text yet for the other issues in the negotiations or because Greenpreace did not get hold of it. One of the chapters lacking in the TTIPleaks is on ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’. This is an interesting issue area because the advocates often argue that this chapter will help ensure that TTIP upholds and strengthens social and environmental standards.

This special issue assembles five articles ensuing from a conference on “The Man and the Machine: When Systems Take Decisions Autonomously”, which took place on June 26 and 27, 2015, at the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland.

The aim of the conference was to explore the broader implications of artificial intelligence, machine learning and autonomous robots and vehicles. Alphabet's Deep Mind is just one example about Whom we know, at least a little, and who, we are told, will be good. Autonomous vehicles are also about to enter the market and our phones have begun to verbalize at us. Private drones are being regulated by the US Federal Aviation Administration. The five papers in this special issue address some of the legal issues the broader development raises.

The first article is on “The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems” and is written by Shawn Bayern.

Nonhuman autonomous systems are not legal persons under current law. The history of organizational law, however, demonstrates that agreements can, with increasing degrees of autonomy, direct the actions of legal persons. Agreements are isomorphic with algorithms; that is, a legally enforceable agreement can give legal effect to the arbitrary discernible states of an algorithm or other process. As a result, autonomous systems may end up being able, at least, to emulate many of the private–law rights of legal persons. This essay demonstrates a technique by which this is possible by means of limited liability companies (LLCs), a very flexible modern type of business organization. The techniques that this essay describes are not just futuristic possibilities; as this essay argues, they are already possible under current law.

Recent advancement in technology in the domain of Autonomous Intelligent Systems (AIS) shall eventually lead to autonomous technology that can perceive, learn, decide and create without any human intervention. Already now there are robots that create better versions of robots and computer programmes that produce other computer programmes. Although the ability to create is a quality that has traditionally been considered a human capacity, the sudden increase in the level of complexity of such systems as well as their learning abilities, shall ultimately render human intervention in the process of creation redundant. This makes the need to address creative agents and the challenges they bring ever more evident. This contribution assesses the output of AIS as Creative Agents and its relation to the EU framework for Intellectual Property.

The article examines the field of legal automation, its advantages and drawbacks, the ways in which legal constraints and safeguards can be embedded into technology and how the law may govern human behaviour through codes, IT architectures, and design. By stressing both benefits and shortcomings of legal automation, the article does not suggest that the latter is something “neutral”. Rather, making legal reasoning and enforcement automatic, so that even a machine can process and understand this information, should be conceived as a set of constraints and affordances that transform, or reshape, the environment of people’s interaction and moreover, the interplay of human and artificial agents, thereby affecting basic pillars of the (rule of) law. The overall aim is to flesh out goals and values that are at stake with choices of technological dependence, delegation and trust, so as to determine the good mix between legal automation and public deliberation.

This article deals with the civil liability issues that arise when self-driving vehicles are admitted to our streets. Firstly, it is explained why strict liability regimes for the vehicle holder, which are in place in several jurisdictions across Europe, are a workable foundation for ensuring compensation of the victim. However, accidents caused by highly automated vehicles will raise the question of the manufacturer's liability for a defective product. Accordingly, this article examines the effects of the circumstance that accidents occurring with self driving cars will no longer be caused by misconduct of the human driver, but often rather by a system malfunction. Thirdly, it is argued that preferably the manufacturer should be the risk bearer and that this shift in liability towards the manufacturer will result in an adequate allocation of liability.

The autonomy robots enjoy is understood in different ways. On the one hand, a technical understanding of autonomy is firmly anchored in the present and concerned with what can be achieved now by means of code and programming; on the other hand, a philosophical understanding of robot autonomy looks into the future and tries to anticipate how robots will evolve in the years to come. The two understandings are at odds at times, occasionally they even clash. However, not one of them is necessarily truer than the other. Each is driven by certain real-life factors; each rests on its own justification. This article discusses these two “views of robot autonomy” in depth and witnesses them at work at two of the most relevant events of robotics in recent times, namely the Darpa Robotics Challenge, which took place in California in June 2015, and the ongoing process to address lethal autonomous weapons in humanitarian Geneva, which is spurred on by a “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots”.

Regulators can avert corporate behaviour that inflicts risks on society, but is nevertheless compliant with the law. Such regulatory interventions beyond the law evoke contentious questions about their objects, legitimacy, methods, and the norms employed. No framework yet exists to analyse these questions in conjunction. Therefore, this paper proposes a typology of the extralegal frontier. The typology is based on a range of discretionary attitudes of regulators towards their enforcement mandate. This range comprises four types of regulators, with an increasingly extensive attitude: Law Enforcer, Legislative Agent, Social Broker, and Public Architect. The typology integrates diffuse scholarly insights into a coherent framework, which offers regulators and their stakeholders a starting point for reflection on interventions beyond the law.

Standing is a particularly controversial aspect of EU law. In the Lisbon Treaty, a third head was added to Art 263(4) with the aim of liberalising standing for private litigants. This article examines the practical effects of those reforms, by reference to three cases – Bricmate, FESI and SolarWorld – where litigants sought to challenge anti–dumping measures directly before the EU courts. It concludes that the interpretation of the third head is highly unsatisfactory, both on its own terms and in light of the purpose of the third head. The EU Courts have deliberately restricted the third head of standing, to the extent of making it sometimes more difficult to satisfy than the second head. The article fleshes out a model in keeping with the purpose and text of the Lisbon reforms, and critically assesses the argument that the relaxation of standing rules would result in an unmanageable increase in the workload of the EU courts.