While a duty of preparedness for war is constantly urged upon American statesmen and upon military and naval officers, the fact is too often overlooked that there is also a duty of preparedness resting upon American statesmen, jurists, and legal authors to keep abreast of the times, or even in advance of the times, in connection with rights and duties affected by war. A prominent international lawyer has written that “as the flag of a nation follows the territorial explorations of its subjects, jurisprudence follows the path of science.” This broad statement must be qualified by the admission that jurisprudence only follows at a very long distance. Too rarely do statesmen and lawyers try to visualize changing industrial, economic, social, and governmental conditions, and to promote, in advance, needful corresponding changes in the law. Especially in connection with international law and international agreements is the gift of imagination lacking, the possession of which is necessary in order to attain preparedness in any field.

The draconic character of German National Socialist legislation on political crime has been brought forcibly to public attention by the recent activity of the People’s Court (Volksgericht), which was established last year for the purpose of assuring a more effective repression of treason and espionage. The subject is one of international concern, since the court has jurisdiction over aliens for acts committed abroad as well as upon German territory, and applies a law which is almost unparalleled at the present time in its severity and comprehensiveness. The safeguards commonly deemed essential to the protection of the accused are absent from the proceedings of the Volksgericht, which are secret as to indictment, investigation and trial.

The doctrine of the clausula rebus sic stantibus is the familiar rubric under which are classified various materials bearing on the revision or termination of treaties. Much that the phrase connotes proves on examination to be too mischievous or vague for serious consideration. Yet there remains “a legal residuum,” in Dr. Lauterpacht’s phrase, “which, although of a limited compass, is capable of application by a judicial tribunal.” English jurists have suggested, somewhat cautiously, that a discussion of the implied clause might be illuminated by an examination of the principle of frustration in the private law of contracts. And an analogy is also suggested between obsolescent treaties and restrictive covenants which, because of an essential change in circumstances, equity will no longer enforce. The matter is of such contemporary importance that international law cannot afford to leave unexamined any juristic material which promises to be suggestive. And if in the end the conclusion is reached that the principle of rebus sic stantibus can have only the most limited application to so-called obsolete treaties, this result will be none the less significant in clarifying the true nature of the problem.

It is now an established principle of modern international law, that there exists in every independent State but one body of law. This body of law is administered by all the courts alike over all persons and things within its territorial limits. These courts, within the limits of their respective jurisdictions, do not discriminate between the various inhabitants of the State. The origin, nationality or religion of the people who appear before the courts is not questioned, and is not of any importance.

The comprehensive revision of the nationality laws of the United States, now being formulated in pursuance of an Executive Order issued by President Roosevelt on April 25,1933, lends special interest and value at the present time to a comparative study of the laws of foreign states relating to nationality at birth and to the loss of nationality.