In [3], Takeuti developed the theory of ordinal numbers (ON) and constructed a model of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF), using the primitive recursive relation ∈ of ordinal numbers. He proved:

(1) If A is a ZF-provable formula, then its interpretation A0 in ON is ON-provable;

(2) Let B be a sentence of ordinal number theory. Then B is a theorem of ON if and only if the natural translation B* of B in set theory is a theorem of ZF;

(3) (V = L)° holds in ON.

In §1 is given a characterization of strongly hypersimple sets in terms of weak arrays which is in appearance more restrictive than the original definition. §1 also includes a new characterization of hyperhypersimple sets. This one is interesting because in §2 a characterization of dense simple sets is shown which is identical in all but the use of strong arrays instead of weak arrays. Another characterization of hyperhypersimple sets, in terms of descending sequences of sets, is given in §3. Also a theorem showing strongly contrasting behavior for simple sets is presented. In §4 a r-maximal set which is not contained in any maximal set is constructed.

In this paper it will be shown that the ordering of the recursively enumerable (r.e.) sets under inclusion modulo finite differences (m.f.d.), the ordering of the II111 sets under inclusion m.f.d., and the ordering of the metarecursively enumerable (meta-r.e.) sets under inclusion m.f.d. are all distinct. In fact, it will be shown that the three orderings are pairwise elementarily inequivalent when interpreted in the obvious way in a first order language with one binary relation “≥.” Our result answers a question of Hartley Rogers, Jr. [3, p. 203]. All necessary background material may be found in [2] and [4].

In this paper we study some of the consequences of adding as new axioms to consistent re (recursively enumerable) extensions T of Peano arithmetic P sentences undecidable in T of the Π10 variety, as are those one naturally comes upon. The question arises: how much can two extensions “differ” when each is obtained by adding just once distinct Π10 sentences undecidable in T? We shall show that if T is as stated above, we can find extensions T1 and T2, constructed very simply from T, having the property that if (A, B) is any pair of re sets with recursive intersection, there can be found a Π10 formula of P which represents A in T1 and B in T2.

It is well known that the familiar Sheffer stroke function of the 2-valued propositional calculus is functionally complete (i.e., for any m, all 22m truth functions of m variables can be defined1 in terms of the stroke function). Indeed, it is not difficult to show that of the 16 2-valued functions of two variables, exactly two of them are functionally complete.

The law of infinite conjunction (Quine's name, see Methods of logic, rev. ed., Holt & Co., New York, p. 254) says that a set of truthfunctional formulas is satisfiable provided every finite subset is. We give a proof of the law which uses some properties of the perfect disjunctive normal form.

Any satisfiable formula can be written as a disjunction of conjunctions of literals (a literal is a statement-letter or the negation of one) in which a statement-letter which occurs in any conjunction occurs exactly once in each; a literal by itself counts as a conjunction and a conjunction by itself as a disjunction.

T0 will denote Gödel's theory T[3] of functionals of finite type (f.t.) with intuitionistic quantification over each f.t. added. T1 will denote T0 together with definition by bar recursion of type o, the axiom schema of bar induction, and the schema

of choice. Precise descriptions of these systems are given below in §4. The main results of this paper are interpretations of T0 in intuitionistic arithmetic U0 and of T1 in intuitionistic analysis is U1. U1 is U0 with quantification over functionals of type (0,0) and the axiom schemata AC00 and of bar induction.

The notion of strong reduction is introduced in Curry and Feys' book Combinatory logic [1] as an analogue, in the theory of combinatore, to reduction (more exactly, βη-reduction) in the theory of λ-conversion. The existence of an analogue and its possible importance are suggested by an equivalence between the theory of combinatore and λ-conversion, and the Church-Rosser theorem in λ-conversion. This theorem implies that if a formula X is convertible to a formula X* which cannot be further reduced—is irreducible, or in normal form—then X is convertible to X* by a reduction alone. Moreover, the reduction may be performed in a certain prescribed order.

In combinatory logic there is a system of objects which intuitively represent functions, and a binary relation between these objects, which represents the process of evaluating the result of applying a function to an argument. (This is explained fully in [1].) From this relation called weak reduction, “≥,” an equivalence relation is defined by saying that X is weakly equivalent to Y if and only if there exist n (with 0 ≤ n) and X0,…,Xη such that

It turns out that equivalent objects represent the same function, but two objects representing the same function need not be equivalent.

In his paper [3] Hindley shows that strong reduction in combinatory logic (see [1] for the basic discussion of this notion) cannot be axiomatized with a finite number of axiom schemes, and then he presents an infinite system of axiom schemes for strong reduction. Hindley lists one axiom and six axiom schemes, together with a method (clause (viii) below) for generating further axiom schemes from these. The results of this note are that different applications of clause (viii) yield different axiom schemes, and that the property of being an axiom is decidable.