Rural state and tribal court judges in the upper US Midwest offer an embodied alternative to prevailing understandings of “access to justice.” Owing to the high density of social acquaintanceship, coupled with the rise in unrepresented litigants and the impossibility of most proposed state access to justice initiatives, what ultimately makes a rural courtroom accessible to parties without counsel is the judge. I draw on over four years of ethnographic fieldwork and an interdisciplinary theoretical framework to illuminate the lived consequences and global implications of judges' responses, which can be read as grassroots-level creativity, as resistance, or simply as “getting by.”

Civil protection orders are one of the most widely used legal interventions for intimate partner violence. Every American state has legislation that allows victims to seek legal remedies through protection orders such as preventing abusers from contacting them, requiring perpetrators to stay away from specific locations, and ordering removal of firearms. However, judges do not grant every petition for a protection order. This study analyzed over 1000 civil protection order cases from Nebraska to identify how factors not prescribed in the legal statute contribute to a determination of whether victims receive protection. The results suggest that victims' gender and the counties in which they file influence victims' chances of obtaining a protection order. Male victims, victims with children with their abuser, and married victims are significantly less likely to receive protection orders, even after controlling for the severity, recency, and type of abuse. Both male and female victims who file their cases in metropolitan counties are more likely to receive protection orders than their nonmetropolitan counterparts.

In spite of long-term declines in the violent victimization of U.S. police officers, the danger of police work continues to structure police socialization, culture, and behavior. Existing research, though attentive to police behavior and deviance that negatively affects the public, analytically ignores how the danger of policing engenders officer behavior that harms police themselves. Drawing on ethnographic observations and interviews in three U.S. police departments, this article describes how police are informally and formally socialized into the danger imperative—a cultural frame that emphasizes violence and the need for officer safety—and its effect on officer behavior. As a result of perception mediated through the danger imperative, officers engage in policy-compliant and policy-deviant behaviors to protect themselves from violence. Unfortunately, policy-deviant behaviors such as unauthorized highspeed driving and not wearing a seatbelt, though justified in the name of safety, lead to catastrophic car accidents that injure and kill both police and members of the public. This article concludes with discussion of how seemingly mundane policy deviant behaviors are a reflection of assumptions within police culture that undergird police practices that damage public wellbeing and perpetuate broader inequalities in U.S. policing.

While procedural justice has been regarded as a distinct and essential factor shaping litigants' views on civil justice, few studies have focused on China, a country with a unique legal tradition and frequent legal reforms. Drawing on surveys and interviews with litigants in a basic-level court in Southern China, this study examines attitudes toward the civil justice system. Echoing several existing studies from China, our mixed methods analysis confirms that their views are dominated by outcomes—litigants with favorable outcomes are more likely to be satisfied, while those with unfavorable outcomes are more likely to be dissatisfied. Their unfamiliarity with the operation of the system constitutes a major reason for the dominance of substantive outcomes in their evaluations of the system. Many cannot distinguish between process and outcomes, nor do they feel control over the process. Moreover, they are dissatisfied with the process because it fails to meet their often-erroneous expectations. Our results do not necessarily challenge the importance of procedural justice, but they do suggest that China may be different. Litigants' perceptions of justice and fairness are situated and shaped by specific contexts.

Under what conditions will individuals mobilize law to resist states that operate above the law? In authoritarian countries, particularly in the Middle East, law is a weapon the state wields for social control, centralizing power, and legitimation. Authoritarian legal codes are overwhelmingly more deferential to state authority than protective of citizens' rights. Nevertheless, people throughout the Arab world deploy law to contest a broad array of state abuses: land expropriations, unlawful arrests, denials of jobs and welfare, and so on. Using detailed interviews in Jordan and Palestine, I outline a theory of law as a tool for resisting authoritarian state actors. Integrating qualitative insights with survey experiments fielded in Egypt and Jordan, I test this theory and show that aggrieved individuals mobilize law when they expect courts are powerful and attainable allies in contentious politics. My results further demonstrate that judicial independence does not uniformly increase authoritarian publics' willingness to access courts.

The major aim of this article is to examine how migrations affect private governance, taking as a case study the Prud'homie de pêche, a private order that has governed the fishery of Marseille for the past six centuries. Scholarship generally argues that social norms guarantee the efficiency of private orders and their ability to resist the arrival of newcomers. My data suggest that the Prud'homie has failed to accommodate social changes prompted by migratory flows, not despite but because of its social norms. This paper suggests that social norms are not only powerful tools of governance for private orders, but also forces of inertia that can prevent these orders from accommodating social changes.