In 1969, the language philosopher John R. Searle published his book “Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language,” wherein he developed the theory of speech acts of John L. Austin into a more normative direction. Though the philosophy of language is not the main issue of this article, Searle spoke out, for the first time, on a fundamental distinction between two different kinds of rules, namely constitutive and regulative rules. Actually, since that time the distinction between these two different types of rules has become fairly common in legal theory, but not in criminal procedure law or in the theory of procedure law. Only sporadically have German legal scholars gone into this distinction. This is astonishing with regard to criminal procedure law in particular because, even before 1969, some scholars had construed procedural rules as rules of a game. In doing so, they addressed an important characteristic of constitutive rules, namely the expression of the conditions of a certain result. However, the construction of procedural norms as rules of a game is imprecise because not all procedural norms actually work in this way. This becomes clear when one transfers Searle's distinction to criminal procedure law.

Online dispute resolution (“ODR”) can be conceived as a means to achieve some of the most powerful legal ideals of the Western legal tradition. Among these are:

(1) Legal Certainty: In making individual plans, decisions, and choices everyone is entitled to know what the law is in advance. Therefore, laws shall be public, written in everyday language, and shall not be changed too often. The application of laws shall be a simple operation (legal syllogism) so that citizens do not need attorneys, and judges are just la bouche de la loi (Montesquieu).

This essay describes an emergent scheme for modernizing the study of law in German universities, creating a structure that is better equipped to address twentyfirst century socio-legal issues and bring legal scholarship to bear on relevant research problems in the social sciences—and vice versa. It is a by-product of efforts by University of Bremen professors and administrators to foster their university's coming of age as a mature, internationally recognized research university and to compete for new funds that the German government is making available to select universities. As such, it provides a rare example of the integration of legal studies into a large interdisciplinary research program, and of law professors rising to the challenges of contemporary funding demands, joining forces with political scientists, sociologists, economists, and philosophers.

Like many of the provisions of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law – GG) the constitutional protection of German citizenship enshrined in Article 16.1 GG is a reaction to the atrocities committed by Nazi-Germany. From early on, the Nazis had abused nationality law not only as a sanctioning device to discipline Germans living abroad but also to ostracize unwanted citizens and confiscate their property, i.e., as a means of large scale political and racial discrimination. This inhuman denaturalization practice culminated in the 11. Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz (11th ordinance of 25 November 1941, issued by virtue of the Reich's Citizenship Law), which stripped Jewish citizens living abroad of their German nationality, aiming inter alia at Jews deported to concentration camps in Eastern Europe. To prevent any kind of political abuse of denaturalization measures in the future, Article 16.1 sent. 1 GG guarantees that no German may be deprived of his nationality. There is a long-standing debate about the precise meaning of this strict ban on any “deprivation” of nationality, because at the same time Article 16.1 sent. 2 GG allows for the loss of German nationality against the will of the person affected if this loss has a statutory basis and the person does not become stateless as a result. Thus, it is unclear whether the constitution permits a revocation of German citizenship, and if so under what conditions. Further, this debate broaches the questions of whether there are, in fact, exceptions to the constitutional protection against statelessness, e.g., in cases of fraud.

On March 5, 2003, the Council of the European Union (hereafter the ‘Council’) submitted a request for an opinion to the European Court of Justice pursuant to Article 300 (6) EC. This request was intended to clarify whether the Community had an exclusive or shared competence to conclude a new convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters intended to replace the existing Lugano Convention (hereafter the ‘new Lugano Convention’ or the ‘envisaged agreement’).

At a stage of life when German law students habitually prepare to finish their studies by intravenously absorbing law at commercial preparation courses, American law student Duncan Kennedy had a somewhat different notion. In a law review article he virtually pulled to pieces what he had experienced as Ivy League education at Yale Law School. In 1983, meanwhile a member of an Ivy League law school faculty, Kennedy resumed his critique in a self-published pamphlet widely known as the Little Red Book. Although being available only at the Harvard bookstore or via mail order from the author, Kennedy's statement has gained quite remarkable fame. It has been reviewed by the most esteemed law reviews, and has been quoted and widely discussed among legal scholars. Now the Little Red Book has even formally arrived in the ivory tower of legal academia: handsomely published, equipped with a fore- and afterword by the author, encompassed by thoughtful essays and, yes, gold letters engraved on the spine. The typescript of the original book however, once consciously produced in a semi-professional manner with a circulation of around 3000 copies, has been preserved. Thus readers do hold the original text in their hands, despite gold gravure.