This article uses the case of Sudan to show how authoritarian regimes benefit from embracing international arbitration, allowing them to maintain domestic control and attract foreign investment. International arbitration ensures that foreign‐investment disputes are resolved outside of domestic purview, obviating the need for nondemocratic states to create independent courts. Research on judicial politics in authoritarian regimes has largely overlooked those private and extra‐judicial pathways—international arbitration tribunals—that illiberal regimes have been taking. Similarly, research in international commercial law has neglected domestic politics, overlooking arbitration's consequences for domestic stakeholders. Promoting international arbitration without paying heed to its side effects can unwittingly help illiberal regimes, particularly in weak states, to continue to repress their judiciaries and curtail the development of domestic legal institutions and the rule of law.

How do youth experience and understand the law? How is law regarded and communicated? Youth's legal subjectivity has received limited attention in the sociological and legal literatures, especially as it relates to crime‐reporting behaviors. Drawing on legal socialization theory and procedural justice, I show how youth, as legal subjects, described the law and how those descriptions differed by social location. Using a diverse sample, I examined narratives produced during forensic interviews following reports of sexual victimization. Rather than passive victims, youth act on, and within, institutions. In their own words, youth describe experiences with state systems that animated their understandings of law and criminal justice processes. They reveal how shared frameworks of understanding affected legal subjectivity, shaped their evaluations of the law, and influenced participation in state systems so that perhaps those most in need of legal remedy are those most unlikely to seek it.

Most of the work of public interest law organizations does not make money. How do these organizations survive, given the economic realities of law practice? Drawing on survey data from a national random sample of public interest law firms, we investigate how funding models vary across public interest organizations and how funding sources affect these organizations’ activities. We find funding structures have, over time, shifted away from foundation support toward government grants. Compared to other organizations, however, conservative organizations draw significantly less of their budget from federal and state grants, and significantly more of their budget from private contributions. Conservative organizations are significantly less likely than other organizations to rely on funding that prohibits engaging in class actions, receiving attorney's fees, or lobbying. Respondents reported that funding restrictions hamper their ability to negotiate favorable settlements, bring about systemic change, and represent vulnerable client communities. We close with a comparative institutional analysis of different funding models.

How may professionals be made to contribute to legislative processes so that their expertise redounds to the public interest, despite the legislative product being likely to have a negative impact on their clients' wealth? Drawing on a case study of the legislative process that gave birth to Israel's recent (2002–2008) trusts taxation regime, based on five years of participant observation among the trust professional community, I find that to obtain the benefit of private‐sector professionals' expertise under such circumstances, government should have legislation drafted in a dispassionate, exclusive environment of experts rather than in the political arena; it should build professionals' trust in government by adopting an explicitly collegial approach; it should focus reform efforts on elements of the existing law so clearly inequitable as to make a refusal to contribute difficult to justify; and take care that the new regime creates a compliance practice lucrative enough to compensate for any loss to professionals consequent on its enactment. Once professionals' interests are suitably safeguarded, their loyalty to clients appears surprisingly brittle and government can successfully combine with them in the public interest.

This article explores two propositions in the literature on rules of possession. The first is that rules of first possession may form the basis for “spontaneous order.” The article argues that this Hayekian proposition must take into account the relationship between property and authority, including the potential for social disorder when competition for possession combines with competition for public authority. The second is that simple rules of possession provide a baseline response to the problem of social order because of the information costs of property in a large audience context. The article argues that this proposition must take into account correlations between interpretive complexity in rules of possession and the reproduction of authority and social order in circumstances of threatened social disorder. The analysis highlights the significance of authority and enforcement for the design of rules of possession and their relationship with social order.

This article presents the composite social context surrounding the “experiments” that were used to prove witchcraft accusations in early modern England. It demonstrates that legal proof was not imposed by elite legislators and judges, or fashioned in accordance with the voice of scientific experts, but was shaped through complex social dynamics in which the middling sort and petty gentry fulfilled a crucial role. Through this process, popular beliefs percolated into judicial proceedings. Members of influential provincial families were the social agents who reconstructed old supernatural methods of proof into innovative rational experiments, often replicating public displays of proof that helped bolster the criminal charges and provided a competing arena of evidence. The article claims that the judges' cooperation with these “experiments” might have been an endeavor by the official legal system to circumvent the threat posed by a popular grassroots alternative to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court system.

We investigate Korean organizations' noncompliance with parental leave provisions. A survey of 1,750 organizations reveals that 19 percent are fully noncompliant (i.e., no policy in place) and 29 percent are partially noncompliant (i.e., acknowledged failure to implement policy). We examine whether organizational characteristics and conditions that predict responsiveness to US employment law are relevant in Korea and apply to a concrete parental leave requirement. Our results show that the predictors of full and partial noncompliance differ, suggesting different motives or processes among noncompliant organizations. Sector and size reduce the odds of full noncompliance but are unrelated to implementing parental leave policies. Having a human resources department predicts that only implementing adopted policies and gender traditionalism increase the likelihood of noncompliance. This is the first theoretically informed investigation of noncompliance with Korean parental leave laws and provides new evidence of the value of institutional perspectives on employment law beyond the US context.

This essay introduces a Law & Social Inquiry symposium on Kitty Calavita's book Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law (2010) that features comments on the law and society enterprise by Jeannine Bell, Austin Sarat, and Christopher Tomlins. It briefly discusses the commentators' views of this enterprise as revealed in their essays and challenges points made by each of them. It goes on to discuss the book's suitability as a student‐oriented introduction to the field of law and society, filling a gap the commentators left open.

One of the sharpest critiques of law and society scholarship in recent years has come from scholars who maintain that law and society scholarship fails to address the issue of race appropriately. This essay considers several critiques of law and society scholars' engagement with issues of race and uses them to evaluate Kitty Calavita's exploration of race in Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law (2010). The essay advocates the use of “race as process” as a mode of analysis that will allow for greater explanatory power to law and society scholarship when it touches on racial issues.

Kitty Calavita's Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law (2010) offers a broad and useful overview of the intellectual accomplishments of law and society scholars and a self‐confident assertion that they perform an invaluable service by focusing on “real law,” that is, law in action rather than law on the books. This essay argues that the field is more fragmented than Calavita notes and that law and society research is neither engaged with a common set of questions nor organized around a single central insight or an agreed‐upon paradigm. Moreover, this essay raises questions about Calavita's claims about “real” law and suggests that we complement law and society's traditional focus by examining the varied performances of law, whether in texts or in the world beyond those texts.

Intended as a short survey text, Kitty Calavita's Invitation to Law & Society expertly summarizes many of the central themes of law and society scholarship as they have developed over the past fifty years. It also clearly identifies the field's object of attention: “real” law. I use this commentary on the book as an opportunity to assess the field as it enters its sixth decade. How has the field changed? What are its defining characteristics? What is “real” law? Does law and society research have a future?

In this essay, I address some of the concerns raised by contributors to the Symposium on Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law. I argue that law and society scholarship focusing on race increasingly offers some of our field's best empirical analyses of the interpenetration of law and society; I emphasize the importance of the methodological and theoretical diversity that characterizes our fragmented field, arguing that our pluralism is one of our greatest strengths; I clarify my intended meaning of the term “real law” as I use it in the book's subtitle, as a way to underscore the socially constituted quality of all law; I attempt to rescue the reputation of dialectics from charges of “relativism”; and I reiterate my appreciation for our field's engagement with questions of social justice that has characterized it since its inception. In the second half of the essay, I briefly describe my current prison research and offer some thoughts for the future of our field.

This essay reviews three works addressing the famous case Lochner v. New York: David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Progressive Reform (2011); Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers (1992); and Victoria Nourse, “A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights” (2009). The author argues that a comparison of these three works raises historiographic issues relating to legal historians’ deployment of assumptions about the continuity of legal development, the role of key actors or social forces, and the autonomy of legal development in relation to other societal events. Further, the essay argues that there is a tendency toward “law school historiography,” referring to the selection of historiographic approach to suit a preconceived jurisprudential narrative that appears when the subject is the history of legal and, especially, constitutional doctrine.