Greek colonization had a long and varied history; it had begun indeed had already accomplished its first great period of expansion before the first Greek historians wrote; it continued in different forms intermittently throughout the classical period, had a second great era under Alexander the Great and the early Hellenistic monarchies, and again persisted with modifications after Rome became mistress of the eastern Mediterranean. The result we all know: the Greek polis, that closely integrated self-governing community of citizens, became the dominant political unit and political ideal of the Mediterranean world, and left its indelible imprint, for good or ill, on the Western World.

During the seventeenth century the Dutch had possessions in almost every continent, but their main interest was and continued to be the Malay Archipelago, now known as Indonesia. The search for these islands, known to be the source of spices, had launched die Age of Discovery with the explosive effect of opening the whole world to the countries of Western Europe. The Portuguese and Spanish had divided the world between themselves by the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). Their aim was twofold: exploitation of newly discovered lands and a crusade to spread the Christian faith. England and the Dutch Republic, both Protestant, refused to abide by this arbitrary division, which had been sanctioned by die Pope. Both countries defended the principle that “the sea was as free as the air.”

Most historical generalizations must be approached with a wary eye; Kliuchevskii's dictum that “the history of Russia is the history of a country in the process of colonization” is no exception. Taken unjudiciously this dictum grievously compresses time, focuses attention on only a single historical dynamic, lends to the historical process a pre-ordained character which is indeed usually absent. The historian's critical apparatus is dulled, and the delicate nuance and important variant are neglected. Moscow, it has been argued, was a chosen town to lead the southward and eastward expansion of the Great Russian people because of her physical location on the edge of the Valdai hills giving her control of the crucial waterways of European Russia. (Why not, for the same reasons, Vladimir or Rostov, Suzdal or even Uglich?) Muscovite expansion forms the central thread of Russian history, determining the economic and political structure of the state. It was the expansion which fixed and defined the necessity of the “service state,” which in turn subjugated all classes and groups to the all powerful tsardom. (Why not the reverse—the “service state” defining the expansion—and why did not an independent merchant class come to control the expansion, and the towns and politics of Muscovy?) To pursue the argument to a logical conclusion, die modern audioritarian state in Russia (bodi Soviet and Tsarist) is essentially a continuation of old Muscovy. As the latter expanded and colonized, so must the former. (The role of the Party and the Marxist dialectic, by this line of argument, has no fundamental historical significance.)

A meeting of historians on “Colonialism and Colonization” certainly raises a terminological problem. Colonization is a great and old subject of historical study. The word “colonialism,” on the contrary, seems to me to have come to us from the international rostrums where diplomats and propagandists wage the psychological wars of today; and to my taste it has that Basic English quality of an international vocabulary ready-made for simultaneous translation, where the suggestive power of words is in inverse relation to their accuracy. In its current use it seems to be a synonym of imperialism or, more generally, of domination of one country by another, or by the rulers of another country. But imperialism, at least, says what it means: the policy of building and holding together an empire, a unit of domination which transcends the national state. Foreign domination is a self-defining expression apt to describe all degrees of dependency, from straight political and military to economic or even cultural ones. What, then, is the use of forging yet another term?

One should distinguish from the start between the economic interpretation of imperialism and economic imperialism. The one is an explanation, an essentially monistic explanation, of an historical phenomenon. The latter is an aspect of the phenomenon itself: if imperialism is the dominion of one group over another, economic imperialism is the establishment or exploitation of such dominion for continuing material advantage. The definition assumes that economic imperialism is more than simple, once-for-all pillage; rather that it tries to cultivate relationships that yield a recurrent harvest of profit, as the ground its corn. Moreover, it makes no distinction between dominion established for economic motives and dominion that, for whatever reasons established, is maintained and exploited primarily for material ends. Finally, it does not confine imperialism to cases of formal rule or protectorate, but includes that “informal” dominion that is often far more effective and lucrative than direct administration.

In 1948, in an address before this association, the late J. B. Brebner spoke of laissez-faire as a “myth,” describing it as a battle cry of the middle classes in their struggle with the landed aristocracy, and noting particularly that the philosophic Radicals—the Benthamites—were proponents not of laissez-faire, as they had been represented to be, but of a new bureaucratic collectivism. It is becoming clear that the reputed mid-Victorian policy of “anti-colonialism” is likewise a myth, as two Cambridge dons argued in an article in 1953, for England continued to extend her empire—both “formal” and “informal”—during the middle years of the nineteenth century. Was the policy which led to the extension of the empire in direct contradiction to the ideas of the men who had revealed the absurdities of the “Old Colonial System” in the bright beam of the new science of political economy and had brought about the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and of the Navigation Acts in 1849? Or is the “anti-colonialism” of Radical doctrine also a myth? I hope to show that Benthamite Radicals, far from being ideological opponents of colonialism, as they are usually depicted, were advocates of positive programs of empire, and, grounding their argument upon the new economic science, constructed and maintained a set of doctrines of which the keystone was the necessity of empire to an industrial England.

Any discussion of the United States Congress and imperialism must admit at the outset a basic handicap—neither Congress nor imperialism lends itself to precise definition. As regards Congress, that part of it which between 1861 and 1897 was most influential in foreign affairs—the Senate—has been best defined by two solons who served there several decades apiece—John Sherman of Ohio and John Tyler Morgan of Alabama. They arrived at a bipartisan definition one warm afternoon of 1890, when Morgan was objecting because Sherman, as chairman of a conference committee, declined to divulge conferee secrets. Sherman, indifferent to the needs of future economists and historians, said it would be a “departure” from “gentlemanly propriety” to discuss private conversation indicating “the means by which we got together.” This aggravated Morgan, who tartly reminded Sherman, “Oh, Senators are not in that sense gentlemen in the conference-room. They are Senators.” Sherman insisted, “but they are expected to be gentlemen.”

The West India sugar crisis of 1830–1832 dealt a shattering blow to an economy that was already in the grip of secular decline. Contributing to die decline were certain changes of a structural nature. In its heyday in the mid-eighteenth century, the British Caribbean economy was an important part of an international economy organized on the basis of imperial complementarity; it consisted of a base—the sugar colonies themselves—which was supported by three legs—the North American trade, the African trade and the British Isles trade. The base expanded geographically, largely as a consequence of military conquest, until fourteen Caribbean sugar colonies or groups of colonies were possessed by Great Britain in 1815. Moreover, the slave-plantation regime spread from colony to colony under a system of near-monoculture in the production of cane sugar.

Ghana is very small, in size, population, and economic and strategic significance. In the history of colonialism the Gold Coast was never remarkable for violent conflict, for spectacular instances of exploitation, for conflict over land or labor, or even as the subject of acute controversy there, in Britain, or elsewhere. Its independence was achieved relatively early, peacefully, over no vigorous opposition. The independence movement was markedly free of violence, extremism, or even sharp ideological conflict. Economically the peoples of the Gold Coast had a higher real income than in comparable areas of the colonial and tropical world and a greater degree of economic security. There were no giant plantation or mining activities which elsewhere have served as a focus of infection for rebellion. Its lands were not alienated; its people were not violently disrupted (at least since the end of the slave trade); and its education and civil and social services were generally superior to those in other parts of Africa. There were problems of political unification facing the new independent government, but the transition to independence was, again in relative terms, orderly, smooth, and well-prepared. There was practically no specifically racial or religious animosity or conflict. The mass bases for radical political movements—an uprooted wage-earning proletariat and/or a land-hungry or rack-rented peasantry did not exist. There was no feudal aristocracy, warrior caste, compradore or white settler group. The Convention People's Party had no political obligations abroad. By African standards, forced labor, the pass system, the color bar, and arbitrary military rule were conspicuously absent.

In the half-century before 1914 international capital movements Played a significant role in the development of the world economy. This paper—which is a prelude to a more comprehensive study—focuses upon the British experience. We will first present new annual series on British foreign capital issues for the period 1865–1894. Our analysis of their behavior is centered about the following questions. First, how did the volume of British foreign investment fluctuate during the latter part of the nineteenth century? Were there long swings in these capital movements? Second, how did the geographic distribution of British foreign investment change over time? Was there an increasing tendency to invest within the British Empire? How was the total volume of investment apportioned between the tropics and the temperate regions of recent settlement? Third, how was British foreign investment allocated among economic sectors? Did the industrial composition vary significantly among countries, continents, and climatic-ethnic regions? Finally, what types of enterprises were nourished by British capital? How did the shares vary among government, private and mixed—government and private—undertakings? We believe that our time series provide more reliable answers to these questions than do previously available data.

I can best summarize the content of this paper by exhibiting four quotations:

A trading community like early Victorian England, which can still profitably employ all its capital in its mills and ships, becomes indifferent to the acquisition of territory, and even tends to regard the colonies previously acquired as a useless encumbrance. That was the normal state of mind of our commercial classes during the middle years of last century. They dealt in goods, and in order to sell goods abroad, it was not necessary either to colonise or to conquer. To this phase belongs the typical foreign policy of Liberalism, with its watchwords of peace, non-intervention, and free trade. The third phase, the modern phase, begins when capital has accumulated in large fortunes, when the rate of interest at home begins to fall, and the discovery is made that investments abroad in unsettled countries with populations more easily exploited than our own, offer swifter and bigger returns. It is the epoch of concession hunting, of coolie labour, of chartered companies, of railway construction, of loans to semi-civilised Powers, of the “opening up” of “dying empires.” At this phase the export of capital has become to the ruling class more important and more attractive than the export of goods. The Manchester School disappears, and even the Liberals accept Imperialism. It is, however, no longer the simple and barbaric Imperialism of the agricultural stage. Its prime motive is not to acquire land, though in the end it often lapses into this elementary form of conquest. It aims rather at pegging out spheres of influence and at that sort of stealthy conquest which is called “pacific penetration.” The old Imperialism levied tribute; the new Imperialism lends money at interest.

The era of modern colonialism has also been the period of rapid and accelerating population increase throughout most of the world. The beginning of this trend was in Europe, and along with the expansion of European-originating influences, shock waves of demographic change seized larger and larger parts of mankind. The culmination of this trend may not yet be in sight; the lack of economic balance which it has brought to many countries belongs to the legacy of the colonial era and constitutes one of the principal socio-economic problems of the present and the immediate future. Its probable continuation cannot be ignored here; forecasts of population growth made by the United Nations or found in other recent literature will therefore be discussed along with the historical data on population change. The latter as well as the former must perforce be presented in rather broad terms, as magnitudes rather than as precise data.

One of the first problems confronting a colonial power after establishing de facto or de jure sovereignty over a new territory is to set up procedures for settling disputes arising within the dominated society, and to establish a whole range of rights in relation to property and obligations of individuals and groups to one another and to the state.

If “colonial politics” denotes the objectives of a metropolitan power vis-à-vis its colony, then, for purposes of this paper, we may define “colonial psychology” as the frame of reference that determines the attitudes of “metropolitans” vis-à-vis the “colonial problem.” By “metropolitans” we mean the inhabitants of those Western societies that are linked to part of the non-West by the historical, political, economic and psychological ties that have always accentuated the dominance of the West. By “colony” we shall here mean only the areas with a multiracial population of which a white element considers itself so integrally a part that it feels itself more strongly associated with its own “colonial” society than with the metropolitan country of its origins.

We have had a little over forty years of experience of countries we conventionally dub “satellites.” In looking at this slice of recent history two questions come to mind. Can one fit the type of relationships he finds within the Sino-Soviet bloc into the perspectives which economic history has developed in the debate on colonialism and imperialism? Has Nature made a leap and produced a new historical type, or do we have merely a new subtle change in form?