No me referiré a mis dos primeras salidas del Perú, al contar la forma como un escritor latinoamericano alcanza a defenderse de los duros embates de la fortuna, cuando su Fatum le asigna los penosos deberes de proscrito. Sin embargo, en la segunda de ellas, fui actor de ciertos pasajes nada despreciables para una novela picaresca. Con todo, a partir de la tercera salida, es que comenzaron para mí las mayores perplejidades y el ingenio se me afiló hasta el punto de convertirse en estilete, bisturí y aguja de marear, muy necesaria ésta cuando la vida nos obliga a perder toda noción del rumbo.

Conviene recordar que un escritor latinoamericano es una especie social distinta a la de los escritores europeos y norteamericanos, sobre todo en lo concerniente a su manera de trabajar y de ser retribuido. Mal que mal, estos últimos logran monetariamente algo que se acerca a lo adecuado, pero el latinoamericano, si no es periodista, está perdido.

Presentamos aquí un ligero resumen sobre nuestras investigaciones sobre la verdadera historia de los Incas, en cuanto a su primer origen. Estos párrafos constituyen nuestras conclusiones en una obra extensa, que hemos entregado al Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes de Bolivia para su publicación. El título que lleva esa obra es La Verdadera Historia de los Incas.

La obra más corriente y populaí de la historia incaica, la de Garcilaso de la Vega, en la cual se basan todas las historias corrientes sobre ese antiguo imperio indígena, está fundamentalmente alterada, incluso diremos falsificada, aunque en un noble deseo de ennoblecerla, toda la historia Incaica. Esto se advierte claramente comparando esa historia con las de los otros cronistas, que en su mayor parte son anteriores en sus escritos originales a la obra de Garcilaso, aunque en gran parte ellos se publicaron en épocas muy posteriores.

One of the special characteristics of naval warfare is its aggressive nature and the speed of its resolution. Unless combat is avoided, naval warfare is invariably swift and decisive. Armies may stand face-to-face for days or months, both up to their shoulders in mud. When warships meet on the high seas, usually one side will soon be celebrating a victory, It is not often that a nation's sea power comes to rest on a single warship, but in the contest between Chile and Peru (1879-1883) this was the case, because this war occurred during the change from wooden ships to ironclads.

Naval strength is customarily measured by counting guns and the weight of the metal they discharge, total tonnage of all combatant ships, thickness of armor plate, and the number of the crews. Before fighting commences this is the only convenient way to assess the strength of opposing forces. But hardware is only one factor of naval power. Once the cannons have been unlimbered an unmeasurable factor can change all calculations, a factor best expressed by the venerable naval maxim: “Men, not ships, win battles.”

Lord Acton's detachment, keen historical sense and vast knowledge reveal an insight applicable to recent Latin-American events. As Acton warned, “History must be our deliverer not only from the undue influence of other times, but from the undue influence of our own”.

John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton was born in Naples in 1834. His paternal grandfather had made his career in the service of the King of Naples whose Prime Minister he was during the period of the French Revolution and Napoleon. His maternal grandfather was a noble of the Holy Roman Empire who served Napoleon and sat as a peer of France and a colleague of Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna. His maternal great-uncle had been Archbishop Elector of Mainz, and his wife's family, the Arco Valleys, were active in French politics in the first half of the nineteenth century. Acton's step-father was Lord Granville, several times British Foreign Secretary.

The November 15, 1889, republican revolution in Brazil was led by a man who was a monarchist and an ardent admirer of the emperor whom he deprived of throne and country. This man, Deodoro da Fonseca, believed in constitutionalism and was forced by fate to become Brazil's first dictator. It is unfortunate that Marshal Deodoro's last few years of life made his name synonomous with the arbitrary use and abuse of power. This study seeks to explain fate's part in creating this dictator image and to modify and to mitigate that word when it is used to describe the man who became Brazil's first president.

The revolution which made Deodoro provisional president was engineered by republican agitators who manipulated the military leaders in such a manner that they administered the coup de grace to the magnanimous reign of Dom Pedro II. Military leaders had been convinced by a series of incidents dating back two decades that the políticos who controlled the government sought to restrict their prestige and authority. By 1889, these leaders were convinced that further concessions would lead to dishonor. Benjamin Constant and Aristides Lobo with difficulty convinced a reluctant Deodoro that he must act if the honor of the military class was to be saved.

This article is a report of a study begun in 1959 and completed in early 1962 at the State University of Iowa as a doctoral dissertation. A descriptive study, it attempted to draw in rather broad outlines the image of the United States and its people as presented in an important segment of the Mexican press1 and in opinions expressed by journalists in interviews and on questionnaires. More specifically, the study was made to determine and describe the volume and kinds of news, opinion, and pictorial material about the United States published over a randomlyselected period (January, 1960) in ten leading daily newspapers of Mexico.

Beyond this main descriptive phase, consisting of the analysis of the content of 300 separate newspaper issues, the study also had as a secondary objective the presentation of opinion about the United States given by journalists connected with the ten dailies and with a few other newspapers. This latter phase proved to be much the more interesting, and the more revealing, aspect of the study, and it is principally with this “opinion” aspect of the study that the present article deals.

En enero de 1961, un nuevo gobierno tomó posesión en Washington. Ese nuevo gobierno tenía que confrontar muchos problemas: una molesta recesión en la economía interna y un ominoso déficit en la balanza de pagos en su comercio exterior — para mencionar solamente dos de los más importantes y urgentes problemas económicos de ese momento. También había dificultades en el frente político internacional: en Laos, en Berlín, en el Congo, en Cuba, etc.

A medida que pasaban las semanas, los puntos difíciles del escenario mundial seguían en los titulares de los diarios. La Cuba de Fidel Castro, por su proximidad a Estados Unidos, constituía un caso especial de irritación. El régimen cubano adelantaba su revolución en casa, pero no paraba allí. Pues además de pinchar persistentemente a este país (EE. UU.), el régimen parecía decidido a llevar su mensaje a otras partes de la América Latina. Allí, en un ambiente de descontento con el status quo y verdaderas ansias por lograr “mejor suerte”, el ambiente se hallaba propicio, supuestamente, a escuchar el mensaje y quizás a actuar.

The United States occupation of Haiti — despite benevolent intentions — was a thinly-disguised military dictatorship. The official view of the Department of State that the numerous U. S. officials there were merely advisers to the legitimate Haitian government, acting in accordance with limitations prescribed by treaty, was a polite fiction. It deceived no one, particularly the large number of Haitians who resented foreign experiments in benevolent despotism in their land.

The real ruler of Haiti, as the system had evolved by the pivotal year of 1928 — the last “normal” year before the political crisis which precipitated withdrawal — was General John H. Russell, United States Marine Corps, the U. S. High Commissioner. The nominal ruler, President Louis Borno, generally relied upon his U. S. advisers. In Russell's own words “[Borno] has never taken a step without first consulting me.” When differences arose, usually as a result of pressures exerted on Borno by local politicians, General Russell was free to make appropriate concessions. But his will prevailed in any showdown conflict. The General was noted for his fairness, however, and his relations with Haitian officials were usually harmonious. Yet his military background, combined with his devotion to efficiency and economy, was not well-suited to preparing a dependent people for enlightened self-rule.

In 1824, José Cecilio del Valle presented to the Constituent Assembly of Central America a portrait of “Jorge Washington.” One of a number of such gestures, the presentation has no special significance. History would be no poorer if the record of the act had been lost forever. But if Valle could have chosen from his distinguished career a single moment to convey the image he wished to cast in the pages of history, he well might have selected the instant when the likeness of Washington passed from his hands to the waiting ones of the president of the Assembly. The scene would have been impressive on canvas. Stripped of flesh, his features showing signs of scholarship's discipline, Valle bends slightly from the waist, arms outstretched, offering the gift — his promise to dedicate himself to the success of the nation that Central Americans were trying to build.

But Valle had his own notions as to how Central America could succeed. Steeped in the history of the New World as well as of the Old, he thought the success of the Federation of Central America depended a great deal on the success of all new American nations. This is not to say, however, that he doubted that Central Americans could build a nation from their own resources.

In the 1760's, the commerce of the British West Indies followed four general channels: (1) the trade with the Mother Country; (2) the exchange of goods and money with continental sister colonies to the north; (3) the African slave trade; and (4) the illegal intercourse with Spain's New World possessions. So extensive was the last that Josiah Tucker referred to it as “that prodigious clandestine trade.” This paper will explore one facet of that traffic: its eclipse in Jamaica in the years immediately after the 1763 Peace of Paris.

Throughout most of the eighteenth century, only Bridgetown in Barbados and Kingston in Jamaica were markets of “conspicuous size and wide commercial connections.” The unloading of only a few cargoes would glut the capital towns of the lesser islands. Notwithstanding this fact, these islands held a coveted position in the Empire. London's high esteem for these possessions rested on their agricultural value, their importance in the crucial bullion exchange, and their utility as naval bases.

Emerging from the voting pattern of the Brazilian congressional elections of October 7, 1962, is a reassuring pattern of political growth and responsible participation by the Brazilian electorate.

Congressional elections demand a regional approach. North Americans perhaps understand this better than most people. A great deal of caution is used before establishing a national trend of events in the United States by using, for example, the Arkansas returns. Similarly, to claim that New York speaks for the nation is dangerous.

The same caution should also be used in Brazil. The tight race for the governorship of Pernambuco tells the story of almost equally-balanced forces in that state. The Sao Paulo returns may provide some positive indicators of the 1965 presidential race. Rio Grande do Sul demonstrated the basically-conservative nature of the electorate in that area. In contrast, the state returns in Guanabara seem to present an example of complete political irresponsibility and immaturity.