Are laws that protect minority investors a necessary condition for the development of stock markets? This paper attempts to answer this question using data on the origins of the corporate sector in Chile to construct an empirical analysis of the contractual provisions included in charters of corporations in the 19th century. Our findings indicate that, even though corporate law at the time was silent with respect to governance rules and investor protection, a significant number of corporations were created and their shares traded. The empirical analysis of the corporate charters reveals that these contracts frequently included provisions favourable to outside investors and the use of these provisions is consistent with the predictions of a simple agency model.

This article estimates the social savings of the railroads in Peru in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The construction of railroads made it possible for Peruvians to substitute the traditional system of mules and llamas, although only for a few routes. Using primary and secondary sources, I estimate the social savings for 1890, 1904, 1914 and 1918. Social savings ranged between 0.3 per cent and 1.3 per cent of GDP in 1890, but then increased to a range between 3.6 per cent and 9.4 per cent of GDP in 1918. The social savings of railroads in Peru were comparable to those for the United States and Great Britain but were much lower than those for Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, largely because Peru had very few railroads.

This paper presents a multidimensional indicator of institutional quality in Argentina for the period 1862-2008. Initially, it describes a set of variables that aim to measure issues related to the legal framework prevailing in Argentina and its implementation, such as changes in the Constitution and the provincial Constitutions, declarations of state of siege and federal interventions, freedom of press, central bank independence. The indicator is then constructed through the principal component analysis.

The results suggest that periods of high institutional quality in Argentina coincided with the most expansion and relative progress. In other words, poor institutional quality would not only be reflected in lower growth rates but also compromises the ability to follow those countries with the best performace.

This paper presents the course taken by the Cuban economy from the early twentieth century until the outbreak of the Revolution, seen from the perspective of what happened in the stock market. I have therefore prepared an index of Havana Stock Exchange listings which shows strong dependence on what happened in the sugar market, particularly in sugar exports. However, my research highlights the weakness of this institution, conceived more as an instrument of speculative enrichment rather than one of financing, the evolution of which reveals the fragility of the Cuban economy and particularly the poor development of its capital markets.

For political reasons, the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco limited the number of civilian Spanish workers sent to Germany during the Second World War. Despite agreeing to send 100,000, the number of workers never exceeded 9,550. Their impact on the German war economy was small. This paper demonstrates that, in limiting worker transfers, Franco went against his own economic incentives, considering that the Spanish government was taking a commission from the workers’ remittances. By limiting the number of workers sent, Franco satisfied the Allies’ pressure to minimise cooperation with Germany. In support of this argument, this article offers updated estimates for the number of workers, their skill levels and remittances. It also provides the first estimates of Spanish costs and income from the programme.