This paper suggests, on the basis of the New Keynesian model, a measure of the degree of conservatism of the European Central Banker. At first, we notice that the appointment of the President of the European Central Bank was made after substantive disagreements about the degree of conservatism (institutional and personal) of the candidates. Secondly, we apply this measure to the change of presidency (from Duisenberg to Trichet) in order to explore the possibility of a step change in the conduct of the ECB's monetary policy. Finally, our results show that once appointed, the two Central Bankers adapted to the institutional framework in which they made decisions.

The duality between measures of economic and technical efficiency has been extensively studied in the productive efficiency analysis. This duality ensures a meaningful interpretation of technical efficiency as economic efficiency evaluated at the most favorable shadow prices. This paper concentrates on economic efficiency as short run profit efficiency. We first argue that a modified version of Varian's goodness-of-fit measure provides an appropriate economic efficiency measure in that context. Next, we show that a variant of the McFadden gauge function provides a natural dual efficiency measure for this short run profit efficiency measure. In particular, we establish two attractive properties of that technical efficiency measure: (i) it can be interpreted as Varian's profit efficiency measure evaluated at shadow prices; (ii) it provides an upper bound for profit efficiency

This paper introduces two equilibrium concepts which extend the notion of Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmarks of Cournot-Walras economies and of strategic market games, the introduction of an active leader modifies the working of market power and the configuration of strategic interactions. In the context of a simple pure exchange economy, asymptotic identification and welfare results are thus obtained, about Stackelberg general equilibria, compared to Cournot general equilibria and to the competitive equilibrium.

Les anticipations de taux d'intérêt révélées par les enquêtes de Consensus Economies auprès d'experts sur le marché de l'Eurofranc ne vérifient pas l'hypothèse de rationalité. Elles résultent d'un processus mixte fondé sur une complémentarité entre les modèles anticipatifs traditionnels adaptatif, régressif et extrapolatif augmentés d'effets macroéconomiques (prix, revenu, monnaie). En utilisant une représentation espace-état dans le but de rendre compte de la part inobservable de l'actif long dans le portefeuille composé d'un actif long et d'un actif court, on montre que ces anticipations vérifient la relation de structure par terme de taux fondée sur un modèle de choix de portefeuille. Conformément aux prédictions du modèle, la prime de risque dépend de la variance conditionnelle attendue du taux court et de la cova-riance conditionnelle attendue entre ce dernier et l'inflation, avec une valeur estimée du coefficient d'aversion relative au risque économiquement acceptable. Dans l'ensemble, ces résultats montrent qu'il y a compatibilité entre le modèle de structure de taux et les anticipations des experts.