The Protocol on Economic Relations (hereinafter: Economic Protocol or Protocol), signed between Israel and the PLO, reflects the schizophrenia that afflicts the agreement as a whole. Is it an agreement to separate Israel from the Palestinians, politically and economically, or is it an agreement of cooperation that will bring about an integration of their economies? These questions can hardly be answered before the parties have reached a shared view of the final status. In the meanwhile, the economic interim solution may dictate the political result. The Protocol provisions are not conducive to economic cooperation. Furthermore, its implementation so far raises serious doubts regarding its viability.

The 1996 report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) concerning Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages constitutes a landmark decision on the matter of precedent in world trade dispute settlement. The Appellate Body operates within the framework of the world trade dispute settlement system, originally consisting of the customary practices pursuant to Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the field of dispute settlement and presently set forth in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlements of Disputes (DSU) administered by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. This system has evolved since the entry into force of the Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT on 1 January 1948. It is probable that the prospect of this system building up its own case law and the practical implication of that case law for the development of world trade law was not initially foreseen, yet it is not surprising that, just as the effects of the jurisprudence of the World Court on international law, the panel reports became part and parcel of the legal sense of the multilateral trade community. Even though previous panel reports do not legally bind subsequent panels, panel reports are replete of references to precedent, just as in the case of the standing international courts and tribunals. Panels rely on such precedents as authoritative expressions of their views on decided points of international trade law. Similarly, parties in world trade dispute cases are themselves guided by previous panel reports in framing and presenting their cases. In short, as Jackson has indicated, certain international law effects emanate from panel reports.

When the UN Security Council (the Council) authorises military action under Chapter VII of the Charter, question marks arise concerning the legality and purpose of such operations. The contents of Chapter VII of the Charter are not literally being complied with, and States contributing to the force can be accused of using force in pursuit of their own national interests as opposed to the collective interests of the UN. When a State, or a group of States is authorised to use force to combat aggression, as against North Korea and Iraq, or to deal with threats to the peace, as in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Zaire and Albania, there is also confusion as to whether the States in question are simply exercising their inherent rights of self-defence, or are operating under the cloak of the controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention with the encouragement of the Council, or whether these are UN military operations somehow distinct from the forces of blue helmets that the UN is more famous for. Such confusion is further compounded by the new functions of the military option in the post-Cold War era. The collective security system that has evolved in practice is inevitable in a world where powerful States jealously harbour their military strength, thereby only allowing its collective use within a system that respects their interests. However, despite clear deficiencies, it is the contention here that UN-authorised actions are collective enforcement operations with a sound constitutional basis in the UN Charter. Internal regulation of such operations is ensuring UN control and a system of accountability to the Council. Practice shows that States regard these operations as serving the UN's purposes and not simply promoting national interests. This can only prove to strengthen the decentralised system and legitimise military action.

Non-retroactivity of treaties is well-established in international law. Provisions of a treaty do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place, or any situation which ceased to exist before the treaty enters into force for that party. This principle precludes the possibility of litigation arising out of situations or facts dating from a period when a State could not have foreseen that the circumstances might give rise to legal proceedings.

a) On p. 250, third line: ‘De Nederlandse exterritorialiteit in Siam’.

b) The UN Convention of Vienna of 24 April 1963 on Consular Relations: Official Records of UN Conference on Consular Relations, vol. I (Summary Records of Plenary Meetings and of Meetings of First and Second Committees): A/CONF. 25/16; vol. II (Annexes, Final Act, Convention, Optional Protocols, Resolutions): A/CONF.25/16 Add. 1.

c) Case law, p. 253, to be added:

President of the District Court of The Hague, 19 February 1988, Kort Geding 1988 No. 123; NIPR 1988 No. 407:

The Republic of Zaire had been declared bankrupt. In summary proceedings, the State of the Netherlands requested some injunctions to be given to the ‘curator’ (the trustee in bankruptcy). President Wijnholt, when giving the judgment as requested, considered the following: It is presumed that the State, in being a participant to the diplomatic intercourse has an interest of its own that the requested measures be taken. This can be inferred from statutory provisions of Dutch National law, such as Article 479a of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 13, para. 4 of the Regulation for Bailiffs (deurwaarders).

d) See for consular marriages, among others, Kosters, J., Dubbink, C.W., Algemeen Deel van het Nederlandse Internationaal Privaatrecht, ch. XXV, pp. 874–895.

e) The present Supreme Court decision was published in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1997 No. 469, with a comment by Th.M. de Boer.

f) The Dutch Government filed a bill on 28 October 1997 (Parliamentary Documents No. 25703) in order to have the Act on the Conflict of Laws in the field of Marriage (Wet conflictenrecht huwelijk) modified. As from the date of entering into force of the proposed statutory provisions, a Dutch national, regardless of other nationalities which he or she may have, can enter into a contract of marriage in the Netherlands before the registrar only. This is in line with the policy the government adhered to before the Supreme Court's decision.