The Sa⊂ūdī Civil War, which developed after the death of the Imām Faiṣal at al-Riyāḍ in A.H. 1282/A.D. 1865, and which was largely responsible for the debilitation and ultimate demise of the Second Sa⊂ūdī State, has received relatively little attention from either Sa⊂ūdī or Western historians. In neglecting this period, modern Sa⊂ūdī scholars may have been influenced by the consideration which led Wahhābī chroniclers of an earlier generation to provide only cursory treatment of the Civil War in their accounts of Najdī history; the decade between the Imām Faiṣal's death and the resolution of the conflict in 1293/1876, characterised as it was by persistent fraternal rivalry and displays unprincipled political opportunism, does not represent a particularly creditable episode in the history of the āl Sa⊂ūd.

A number of writers on Egyptian Arab nationalism have maintained that this nationalism originated in religious motives, that it was initially exploited by the Palace and its allies and only then reluctantly adopted by the Wafd for primarily party purposes. In an essay entitled “Pan Arabism and British Policy” Kedourie links the initiation of an active pan-Arab policy to King Faruq and his “coadjutors and instruments” Ali Mahir and Abd al-Rahman Azzam, who in the late thirties “invented and propagated pan-Arabism as a policy for Egypt” and who “conceived the dream of an authoritarian Muslim state in Egypt embracing gradually all the Arabs and perhaps in the fullness of time all the Muslims.” He acknowledges that the Wafd and not the Palace entourage negotiated the Arab League but he attributes al-Nahhas's acquiesence to personal and party interests. “We do not yet know what convinced al-Nahhas that pan-Arabism was a paying policy,” he writes, “but no doubt the desire to please the King, to dish his opponents by adopting their policy, the dislike of Iraq's aggrandisement should Nuri al-Said's [Fertile Crescent unity] scheme be realized, the approval of the British, and visions of future grandeur had their part to play.” Egypt, he claims, had never manifested any interest in Arabism before the 1943–1945 negotiations leading to the Arab League.

Kedourie presents the fullest, most explicit, and baldest statement of this interpretation but it is found, or reflected, variously, in other well-known works, including Heyworth-Dunne's Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt in which it seems to have been first formulated, as well as Safran's Egypt in Search of Political Community and Mitchell's The Society of the Muslim Brothers

The purpose of this article is to present to a wide public the documents relating to the construction of Süleymaniye published by the late ömer Lutfi Barkan and his team of collaborators in Süleymaniye Camii ve Inşaati, Vols. I, II (Ankara 1972, 1979). They strikingly illustrate the ability of the Ottoman central administration to co-ordinate complex operations minutely from a distance; and nothing of such detail exists for any monument of Istanbul before the early seventeenth century, or for any other building in the Islamic world.

Some topics have already been considered in detail by Barkan, which explains the present choice of the sections of the accounts relating to furnishing and decorating Süleymaniye. They offer a mass of material of considerable intrinsic interest and of considerable value for the history of the luxury trades, both domestic and foreign, in sixteenth-century Ottoman Turkey. But simple translation is not enough: there are too many variant or dubious readings; the technical vocabulary is often recondite and the senses of certain terms must be a matter for conjecture; and the identification or designation of many of the materials is problematic.

In his recent book on Orientalism Edward Said made it clear that the German relationship to the Orient has been different from that of the British or French. In Germany there was no sustained national interest in the Orient; the relationship was not “actual,” for it was almost exclusively “scholarly.” Said also argues, however, that Germany did have in common with other European nations a “kind of intellectual authority over the Orient” and that it, too, contributed to the Western invention of the term “Orientalism,” itself an act of dominance and superiority. In this point it seems that Said is correct, for the act of labeling not only suggests expertise but also exercises expressibility as a means of intellectual and cultural control. Yet recognition of the linguistic basis of authority and the power to dominate another culture with that authority is not new. German writers during the eighteenth century also felt that British and French dominance interfered with the development of the arts and sciences in their country. Indeed, Goethe recognized at least two forms of authority which shaped Oriental literature: one was the political forces within the Orient itself and the second one, a more subtle form of authority extrinsic to the Orient, was the scientific philology of Western culture which fostered a particular image of the Orient. That is, Goethe suggests in his critical writings on Oriental literature a departure from the norms of Western science and at the same time champions the need to understand the sociocultural forces at work in the Orient itself. Thus Goethe's critical writings in many ways anticipate Said's view that “Above all, authority can, indeed must, be analyzed”.

By the 1880s, the growth of anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria as well as the avalanche of pogroms in Russia and East Europe convinced a considerable section of the Jewish intelligentsia that assimilation was no longer a desirable nor a possible solution to the “Jewish Question.” They came to realize that Jews were not only a religious group, but also a separate nation, bound by a common faith and sentiment rather than by land. According to these Jewish nationalists, the Jewish Question could only be solved if the Jews stood on a par with other nations, which could be attained by the collective return of Jews to the ranks of the nations as a people living in their homeland. This was why Dr. Theodor Herzl, as the founder of political Zionism, insisted that the Jews should be “granted sovereignty over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation.”

Mecca's existence depended primarily on its location near the most important trade route in western Arabia which linked the surplus-producing region of Yemen with Syria. The route branched near Ayla in the north to proceed to Gaza on the Mediterranean and also to Egypt. Another route branched near Mecca to proceed in a northeasterly direction toward al-Ubulla, Ḥīra, and eventually Sasanid Persia. The commercially advantageous location of Mecca was enhanced further by the Zamzam waterwell which made Mecca a convenient stop in the trade of antiquity. Also the concept of the ḥaram, the sacred area, and its center, the Ka⊂ba, made Mecca the object of pilgrimage during the sacred months, pilgrims/merchants traveled with security of life and property and went to Mecca to trade their commodities.

In the summer of 1976 Kuwait, after more than thirteen years of legislative experience, suspended its constitution, abolished the legislature, and embarked on what it called an “evaluation” of its democratic experience. After the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the downfall of the shah, Kuwait set up a special advisory committee to study, evaluate, and recommend the political system most appropriate for Kuwait. In 1980 the committee recommended a return to representative institutions. In March 1981, a legislative assembly was elected and was entrusted with the responsibility of drafting a new constitution and ratifying the basic statutes of the country.