The standard account of military dictatorship in Chile (1973–1990) portrays the case as a personalist regime, and uses the dynamics associated with this type of regime to explain General Pinochet's control of the presidency, the enactment of the 1980 Constitution, and the longevity of military rule. Drawing on records of the decisionmaking process within the military junta, this article presents evidence for a different characterization of the dictatorship. It shows that Pinochet never attained the supremacy commonly attributed to him, that the commanders of the other branches of the armed forces retained significant powers, and that the 1980 Constitution was not enacted to project Pinochet's personal power. More generally, this study suggests that personal power is not a necessary condition for regime longevity; collective systems can also produce cohesion and stability.

The reconfiguration of the global security order since the late 1980s has had a heavy impact on regional security in the Caribbean. Having lost strategic importance, the Caribbean states have been attempting to restructure their relationship with the United States. These small states are interested in building a regional security regime that is inclusive, transparent, and accountable. This analysis shows how the principle of subsidiarity may be employed to achieve that end.

In the 1990s, trade liberalization eroded the competitiveness of Caribbean economies as manufacturing export platforms. Proposed new economic strategies favored a shift from vertically integrated, transnationally based segment manufacturing to segments of knowledge-intensive industries and services. This strategy, however, reproduces the economic asymmetries associated with the core-periphery relation (low wages, value-added rates). Postindustrial technologies and economic strategies provide the opportunity to formulate alternative policies to overcome the shortcomings of peripheral postindustrialization and foster sustainable postindustrial development.

Fifty years after the creation of the OAS, political power is not centralized in that organization but variously diffused throughout the interamerican system. Meanwhile, the Summit of the Americas process has slowly acquired its own institutionality outside the OAS, and is sometimes perceived as challenging the primacy of the ideal of the OAS as the principal institution of interamerican relations. Even with its own weaknesses, the Summit of the Americas has become the most important force for reform of the OAS. As the hemisphere prepares for the third full summit in Quebec, this essay assesses the relationship of these two institutions and their future prospects.

This article examines the prospects for an interamerican “paradigm of democratic solidarity.” Although the region has seen genuine progress in the promotion and defense of democracy, a significant deficit in collective and national leadership hinders the consolidation of hemispheric prodemocracy activism. As illustrated by a number of recent cases, including the controversy over Peru's May 2000 election, these impediments are not only situational but structural. This article concludes with a discussion of ways to move beyond these problems and to buttress the democratic solidarity doctrine.