Experience is a major source of knowledge. Could institutions be improved by eliciting the additional knowledge held by experienced individuals? I show here that in several areas of the law experienced individuals are more critical of institutional quality than inexperienced individuals. Moreover, performance indexes built with experienced subsamples substantially alter country rankings. Assuming no unmeasured confounders, more knowledge arguably leads experienced individuals to revise the more benign view held by the general population, composed mostly of inexperienced individuals. Moreover, experience is a stronger driver than alternative sources of knowledge, including education, which might therefore be reinforcing milder and, arguably, incorrect assessments of institutional quality. After observing how this ‘experience effect’ varies systematically across countries, I conclude by proposing that evaluations of institutional quality pay greater attention to experienced individuals and cautioning against basing inferences on assessments made by the general population.

To explain the coexistence of economic freedom and big government, this paper distinguishes between big government in the fiscal sense of requiring high taxes, and big government in the Hayekian sense of requiring knowledge that is difficult to acquire from a central authority. The indicators of government size in measures of economic freedom capture the fiscal size but ignore the Hayekian knowledge problem. Thinking about government size in both the fiscal and Hayekian dimensions suggests the possibility of Hayekian welfare states where trust and state capacity facilitate experimentation and learning, resulting in a public sector that is big in a fiscal sense but not necessarily more vulnerable to the Hayekian knowledge problem. Pensions in Sweden are used as a case to illustrate the empirical relevance of the argument. The new pension system represents big government in a fiscal sense, but by relying on decentralized choice it requires relatively little central knowledge.

The purpose of this symposium is to shed light on the genealogy of the idea of a business corporation, an economic institution which has long been regarded with a mixture of awe and apprehension. Each of the four original contributions addresses the history of some of its key features. In the process, each contributor reveals some of the insights that history has to teach us regarding the central concepts that inform contemporary debates about the nature of the corporation, the contours of the corporation's purpose, the sources of corporate power, the functions of corporate law, the duties of directors, the status of shareholders, and the legitimacy of corporate rights.

This introduction to the special issue in honor of Professor Yoram Barzel provides an overview of his scholarship and a summary of the contributions to this special issue. Each contribution advances or elaborates upon major themes in Barzel's theoretical and applied work on property rights, transaction costs, and political economy. The contributions fall into three categories: an examination of the foundations and implications of the ‘Barzelian’ method for social scientific analysis; Barzel's economics of property rights and transaction costs to historical case studies; and advances to Barzel's theory of the state, which includes an analysis of the origins of democracy and the rule of law.

How can economists use qualitative evidence – such as archival materials, interviews, and ethnography – to study institutions? While applied economists typically rely on quantitative evidence and statistical estimation, many important aspects of institutions and institutional change appear in the form of qualitative evidence. This raises the question if, and how, social scientists trained in quantitative methods can exploit and analyze this evidence. This paper discusses two qualitative research methods that are both commonly used outside of economics: comparative case studies and process tracing. Drawing on existing research about crime and political revolutions, it discusses these two methods and how to implement them to improve institutional analysis.

This paper introduces the notion of ‘cognitive’ institution and discusses its relevance to institutional economics. Cognitive institutions are conceptually founded on the philosophy of mind notion of extended mind, broadened to also include the distinctly social, institutional, and normative dimensions. Cognitive institutions are defined as institutions that not just allow agents to perform certain cognitive processes in the social domain but, more importantly, without which some of the agents' cognitive processes would not exist or even be possible. The externalist point of view of the extended mind has already had some influence in institutional economics: Arthur Denzau and Douglass North first introduced the notion of institution understood in terms of ‘shared mental models’, and relatedly philosopher Andy Clark introduced the notion of ‘scaffolding institution’. We discuss shared mental models and scaffolding institutions and go a step further by showing that the notion of cognitive institution can capture more fundamental and salient aspects of economic institutions. In particular, we focus on the market as an economic cognitive institution.

The notion that business corporations should be managed for the exclusive benefit of shareholders has been widely challenged. In particular, critics have argued that directors are authorised to serve the interests of the corporation: a legal entity that is completely separate from its shareholders. However, the premise that shareholders have sole legitimate claim to ‘membership’ has rarely been questioned. This article explores medieval thought on ownership, authority and participation in guilds, churches, towns and universities, and shows that membership can be understood as participation in, and shared responsibility for, a group's distinct collaborative activity over time. Our theory suggests that ‘membership’ in the modern corporation extends to non-shareholding stakeholders, but with the implication that ownership and authority are vested in the members as a body and not in a separate entity.

Economic analysis is a theoretical approach, not an empirical one. It is a way of thinking, not a way of testing. An analysis that has an empirical component can be economic without being quantitative: economics is not statistics. An atheoretical analysis can never be economic, no matter how impressive its regressions: statistics is not economics.

The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination.. The challenge for elites is to simultaneously deter the state from abusing power while at the same time relying on it to discipline defectors in their midst..The basic insight holds that the credibility of the state's threats depends on the cost of carrying them out, which elites can control. The elites can coordinate by being compliant when the ruler's threats serve their collective interest, which by reducing the cost of carrying them out make them more credible. On the other hand, their coordinated non-compliance has the opposite effect...

Little has contributed more to the emergence of today's world of financial globalization than the setup of the international monetary system. In its current shape, it has a hierarchical structure with the US-Dollar (USD) at the top and various other monetary areas forming a multilayered periphery to it. A key feature of the system is the creation of USD offshore – a feature that in the 1950s and 60s developed in co-evolution with the Bretton Woods System and in the 1970s replaced it. Since the 2007–9 Financial Crisis, this ‘Offshore US-Dollar System’ has been backstopped by the Federal Reserve's network of swap lines which are extended to other key central banks. This systemic evolution may continue in the decades to come, but other systemic arrangements are possible as well and have historical precedents. This article discusses four trajectories that would lead to different setups of the international monetary system by 2040, taking into account how its hierarchical structure and the role of offshore credit money creation may evolve. In addition to a continuation of USD hegemony, we present the emergence of competing monetary blocs, the formation of an international monetary federation and the disintegration into an international monetary anarchy.

Yoram Barzel was always aware that competition is ubiquitous and takes many forms, and he was among the first to analyze settings where individuals compete on the basis of time, rather than price. This paper applies his insights to study the Oklahoma land rushes, where thousands of individuals raced to establish property rights to land. A simple modification of Barzel's analysis generates a model of rationing by racing, and we test its predictions using new data on the timing and location of over 73,000 homestead claims within the five distinct land rushes and one lottery. We find that increases in land quality or decreases in the cost of racing generate corresponding increases in the equilibrium speed, implying that potential rents are dissipated by investments in speed. The analysis highlights the lasting significance of Barzel's insights regarding non-price competition.

An increasing volume of literature has shown that human development is related to economic institutions. But previous literature has not considered that the effects of economic institutions on human development are contingent on culture. In this study, we contend that the effects of economic freedom (as an indicator of economic institutions) on human development are dependent on generalized trust (as an indicator of culture). Using panel analysis on a sample of 29 OECD countries during 1990–2015, we find that generalized trust positively moderates the relationship between economic freedom and human development. The policy implication is that free market institutions foster human development only in high trust societies, not in low trust countries.

While confidence in the business sector is crucial for well-functioning markets, there is surprisingly little empirical work on its sources. Available research recognizes generalized social trust and macroeconomic performance (especially unemployment and economic growth) as major forces explaining confidence in institutions and organizations in general. By assuming that confidence in companies hinges on rules, formal procedures, and practices that shape how organizations function, economic regulation is frequently advocated to foster confidence in companies, not least as it is supposed to reduce the scope for opportunistic behavior. Based on individual-level data from World Values Survey/European Values studies and economic regulation data from the Economic Freedom of the World project we investigate statistical associations of confidence in major companies with generalized social trust and macroeconomic performance as well as the intensity and quality of business regulation. From an economic policy perspective our findings suggest that confidence in the business sector can be facilitated by an implicit guarantee from governments of fair and impartial treatment.

We forward the hypothesis and empirically establish that variations in the strength of family ties are rooted in culture. In particular, we show that individualism is associated with looser family ties. We exploit the associations between contemporary individualism and historical climatic and disease environments to establish a causal relationship. At both the individual- and country-levels, we find strong support that individualism reduces family ties. The estimated effects are economically large and robust to a wide variety of potentially confounding variables.

This comment concurs with Skarbek's paper that much more room should be made for qualitative evidence in economics. However, it raises questions about the modalities through which case studies could carry general lessons when it comes to broad institutional issues. It also suggests the need to extend the set of qualitative evidence beyond case studies and to complement them with formal approaches as well as with quantitative analysis. Persuading economists to open windows to alternative methods is at stake

The rise of large business corporations in the late 19th century compelled many American observers to admit that the nature of the corporation had yet to be understood. Published in this context, Ernst Freund's little-known The Legal Nature of Corporations (1897) was an original attempt to come to terms with a new legal and economic reality. But it can also be described, to paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes, as the earliest example of the rational study of corporate law. The paper shows that Freund had the intuitions of an institutional economist, and engaged in what today would be called comparative institutional analysis. Remarkably, his argument that the corporate form secures property against insider defection and against outsiders anticipated recent work on entity shielding and capital lock-in, and can be read as an early contribution to what today would be called the theory of the firm.

Every economic explanation assumes maximization. How strange, then, that few economists accept one of maximization's most straightforward implications: every observed institution is efficient. My aim is to persuade economists of this fact and thus to dissuade them from making illogical claims about social welfare. To frame my argument, I consider the “property rights approach” to institutions developed by Yoram Barzel. I speculate that economists resist what maximization implies about institutional efficiency because they think that efficiency-always precludes them from improving the world, and hope of improving the world is what attracted them to economics in the first place. But, besides being inconsistent, resistance is unnecessary: efficiency-always does not preclude economists, or anyone else, from improving the world.

Part of the debate fueled by cryptocurrencies has revolved around the question of what we call money. This paper identifies two traditions in monetary theory that have tried to answer that question. On the one hand, the money or non-money view follows a strategy proposed by a version of philosophical essentialism, in which there is a set of defining characteristics of money that make it categorically different from other things used in transactions. On the other hand, the liquidity degree view emphasizes that the multiple objects that circulate as a means of payment differ in their degree of acceptability. Since there is no absolute standard of liquidity, a precise dividing line between money and non-money cannot be drawn. We challenge the money or non-money view, arguing that there is nothing in the nature of money that can be interpreted as a natural kind essence by which money can be categorically separated from non-money.

This introduction to the Kornai 90 Symposium briefly overviews János Kornai's rich scholarship with the aim of highlighting those features of Kornai's work that are of particular interest to institutional economists. Above all, the introduction browses through some of his main works, such as Overcentralization, Anti-Equilibrium, and Economics of Shortage, with a special emphasis on the soft budget constraint, The Socialist System, and Kornai's latest writings on Hungary's U-turn. We invoke the political contexts of these works to suggest their impact on Kornai's diverse questions, changing methods, and the constraint they put on his conclusions as well as on the reception of the research results. In the end, we underline that Kornai was an independent scholar with an interest in a variety of methods and approaches, who nevertheless, or maybe consequently, had a remarkable impact on the thinking of social scientists and practitioners alike. The four papers presented in the symposium are testimonies to the living impact of Kornai's oeuvre on institutionalist analysis today.

This paper examines two potential mechanisms – access to credit and reduction in relational risks – through which social trust can affect R&D investments. Social trust can increase R&D investments by expanding firms' access to external finance with which they can use to fund promising R&D projects. It can also increase R&D investments by reducing relational risks that expose firms to ex-ante and ex-post holdups or expropriation risks. Using industry-level data on R&D investment intensities in 20 OECD countries, I test these mechanisms by evaluating whether more external finance dependent and relational risk vulnerable industries exhibit disproportional higher R&D investment intensities in trust intensive countries. The results indicate that external finance dependent industries and relational risks vulnerable industries experience relatively higher R&D investment intensities in trust-intensive countries. Therefore, the results underline access to external finance and reduction in relational risks as causal pathways linking social trust and R&D investments.