Since the first attempts by states to use law to regulate armed conflict, legal constraints have often failed to protect civilians from the adverse effects of war. Advances in military technology have usually not improved this situation and have instead made law even more distant and less relevant to the suffering of civilians in wartime.1 The massive, indiscriminate incendiary bombing campaigns against major urban areas in World War II spoke volumes about the irrelevance of fundamental legal principles and rules designed to protect civilian populations in wartime. Law and lawyers were in fact far removed, physically and operationally, from the cockpits of the United States bombers flying over Tokyo, whose aircrews were focused on surviving their missions. They struggled with limited information about their assigned targets and conducted their operations with rudimentary preflight instructions that directed them, for example, to avoid destroying the palace of the Japanese emperor but left them free to submerge entire residential areas of the city in a sea of flames.

Since the first attempts by states to use law to regulate armed conflict, legal constraints have often failed to protect civilians from the adverse effects of war. Advances in military technology have usually not improved this situation and have instead made law even more distant and less relevant to the suffering of civilians in wartime. The massive, indiscriminate incendiary bombing campaigns against major urban areas in World War II spoke volumes about the irrelevance of fundamental legal principles and rules designed to protect civilian populations in wartime. Law and lawyers were in fact far removed, physically and operationally, from the cockpits of the United States bombers flying over Tokyo, whose aircrews were focused on surviving their missions. They struggled with limited information about their assigned targets and conducted their operations with rudimentary preflight instructions that directed them, for example, to avoid destroying the palace of the Japanese emperor but left them free to submerge entire residential areas of the city in a sea of flames.

In September 2007, Buddhist monks, students, democracy campaigners, and ordinary men, women, and children took their lives into their hands in the streets of Yangon, Myanmar, to protest against the ruling military regime. The protests had begun a month earlier with peaceful calls by the monks for the ruling authorities to reinstate subsidies on fuel and oil and alleviate crippling commodity prices, but quickly snowballed into mass demonstrations for democratic and social reforms and the release of all political prisoners.

In September 2007, Buddhist monks, students, democracy campaigners, and ordinary men, women, and children took their lives into their hands in the streets of Yangon, Myanmar, to protest against the ruling military regime. The protests had begun a month earlier with peaceful calls by the monks for the ruling authorities to reinstate subsidies on fuel and oil and alleviate crippling commodity prices, but quickly snowballed into mass demonstrations for democratic and social reforms and the release of all political prisoners.

Thomas M. Franck was born in 1931 in Berlin, Germany. His family left only in 1938, securing entry to Vancouver, Canada. He arrived speaking German, but rapidly acquired proficiency in English and completed his schooling there.

The gravitational pull of environmental treaties is felt not only by states. Yet international lawyers almost exclusively focus on states to explain treaty compliance, measure treaty implementation, and assess treaty effectiveness. This essay draws attention to a phenomenon that falls outside traditional boundaries of treaty analysis: the efforts of private corporations that aim at complying with environmental treaties. Existing models of treaty implementation are inadequate to explain these direct interactions between corporations and treaties.1 The dominant grammar of treaty “compliance” equally fails to fit.2

The Board of Editors is pleased to announce that the Francis Deák Prize for 2009 was awarded to Nicholas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn for their article entitled Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, which appeared in the January 2008 issue.

The International Court of Justice issued three judgments in 2008: a final decision on the merits, of May 23, in Sovereignty overPedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore);1 a final decision on the merits, of June 4, in Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France);2 and a ruling, of November 18, on the respondent's preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia).3 In addition, the Court, on July 16, indicated provisional measures directed at the United States in Request for an Interpretation of the Judgment of31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States);4 and on October 15, acting on a request by Georgia for the indication of provisional measures in Application of the Racial Discrimination Convention (Georgia v. Russian Federation), 5 indicated provisional measures directed at both parties in the case. The Court also issued, on October 17, its order organizing the written proceedings in Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self Government of Kosovo (request for advisory opinion).6

International Court of Justice judgment on marine delimitation in the Black Sea

World Trade Organization panel report on China’s enforcement of intellectual property rights

European Court of Justice judgment on direct effect of law of the sea instruments in the European Community

Caribbean Court of Justice decision on jurisdiction to render interpretations of CARICOM treaty