I introduce the three articles in the MOR Editor's Forum on Chinese Capitalism. I then ask whether China's recent economic growth has been driven by a vibrant capitalism or instead has become an end in itself, supported by government policies promoting high rates of fixed asset investment. There are two key observations. First, gross domestic product (GDP), measured and reported at four levels of government, has much greater salience than corporate profits, often undisclosed. Second, fixed asset investment accounted for more than 60 percent of China's 2009 GDP and nearly two-thirds of 2008-2009 GDP growth, levels unprecedented for a major economy. Rather than capitalism, I argue that institutionalized GDP growth today accounts for China's rapid economic development.

Over the past decade, the ownership and control of China's corporate sector has finally begun to depart fundamentally from patterns typical in the socialist past. Students of corporate governance have watched these changes with an intense curiosity about their impact on firm performance. Students of comparative economic institutions have examined them for hints of a new variety of Asian capitalism and have sought to anticipate China's international competitiveness and impact. But these changes potentially will create a new corporate elite with greater compensation, personal wealth, and independence from government agencies than ever before. This transformation of China's political economy may eventually alter the Chinese state itself, although the extent and nature of this change are still far from clear. The key questions of interest are the social origins of the new elite, the scale of the economic assets they control, and especially their continuing relationships with party and government agencies. The answers will vary decisively by sector, four of which are described here: a state-owned sector, a privatized sector, a transactional sector, and an entrepreneurial sector. The evolving mix of these sectors will determine the future contours of the Chinese corporate economy.

This article sets a new agenda for research on the trajectory of Chinese capitalism. We first critically review the conflicting views on the causes of China's economic development. Then we suggest that insights from the comparative capitalism and economic sociology literatures can provide theoretical tools to understand the critical features of Chinese capitalism in a more systematic manner. The comparative capitalism literature can help us understand how Chinese capitalism resembles or differs from other varieties of capitalism in terms of the relationships between government, firms, and workers. The literature on economic sociology provides insights about how particular markets have evolved and become stabilized. We use these perspectives to suggest a set of possible research agendas for studying Chinese capitalism.

While China continues to develop capitalistic capacities, the party-state has increasingly tightened control of the economy and synchronized political and economic stratification – a tendency towards a centrally managed capitalism. Under centrally managed capitalism, the party-state commands the economy by controlling personnel, organizations, and capital in both political and economic arenas. At the same time, it delegates fiscal and administrative authorities to multiple and diversely formed corporations to compete in the marketplace. I further speculate on future ideological alternatives: a western-style democracy, a mature-stage socialism, or an enlightened authoritarianism – Xiaokang (小康 moderate prosperity or well-off society). After eliminating or casting doubt on the former two, I argue that a two-step transformation towards Xiaokang is under way. In the first step, the party-state leadership gradually decouples its position from Marxist ideology of communism and socialism, and moves towards the maintenance of economic growth and social order. The second step then allows the legitimacy of party rule to be based on indigenous Confucian ideology that emphasizes enlightened leaders, moral institutions, and social relations (i.e., Xiaokang). Finally, I explore the feasibility and paths towards an indigenous ideology of democracy (Datong: 大同 – universal harmony).

This study identifies the societal institutional framework as the cause for the tie distribution issue — the sizes of ego-networks of social actors are unevenly distributed across social categories of these social actors. The analysis of 250 Chinese firms showed that managers employed by state-owned enterprises possess more governmental tie channels – conduits to get acquainted with government officials – than those employed by non-state-owned enterprises. Governmental tie channels completely mediated the relationship between ownership types and the number of government ties in the manager's social network.

Recent research suggests that employees perceive organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB) as costly while OCB in the aggregate benefits organizations. Employees thus face an OCB dilemma. This study adopts the social dilemma perspective, proposing that employee OCB varies with the three types of psychological contracts (e.g., relational, balanced, and transactional) due to different degrees of perceived social dilemma and explains why employees engage in OCB in the context of varying levels of social dilemmas. We used moderated structural equation modelling to test the mediating and moderating hypotheses using data from 485 supervisor-subordinate dyads from 58 companies in a variety of industries in Taiwan. As predicted, results suggest that employee OCB has the strongest relationship with balanced psychological contract. Results also confirm the mediating role of felt obligations in both relational and balanced psychological contracts and the moderating role of empathie concerns in transactional psychological contract. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these results.

This study contributes to strategic human resource management (HRM) research by offering a contextualized model of HRM effectiveness. Building on HR attribution theory, we propose that the high commitment work system will be more effective in a context when: (i) employees are conditioned to trust employers and (ii) regulatory institutions are less restrictive, giving management more autonomy in human resource decisions. In such contexts, we argue that employees are more inclined to view the high commitment work system as an expression of the employer's genuine concern for employees. Hence, employees are more likely to reciprocate with high commitment. We find our contextualized HRM effectiveness model particularly useful in understanding HRM – firm performance relations in China where business environments are currently under transformation on both trust and regulations.