Among legal scholars, Anthony T. Kronman and David M. Trubek have provided the leading interpretations of Weber's theory of law. Kronman and Trubek agree on two important points: Weber's theory is fundamentally contradictory, and Weber's theory relates primarily to private law subjects such as contracts. This article contests both of these points. Building on a foundation of Weber's neo-Kantian metaphysics and his sociological categories of economic action, this article shows that Weber's theory of law is not fundamentally inconsistent; rather it explores the inconsistencies that are inherent within Western society itself, including its legal systems. Furthermore, Weber's insights can be applied to modern constitutional jurisprudence. Weberian theory reveals that modern constitutional law is riddled with irreconcilable tensions between process and substance—between formal and substantive rationality. In the context of racial discrimination cases involving equal protection and the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court's acceptance of John Hart Ely's theory of representation-reinforcement demonstrates the Court's resolute pursuit of formal rationality, which insures that the substantive values and needs of minorities will remain unsatisfied.

This article presents a “contextual” study of Britain's Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. The article addresses the ostensibly perplexing policy question of why Britain's homeless population has almost trebled in the 14 years since the homelessness legislation was introduced. The answer is found by subjecting the legislation to a very wide-ranging contextualization process. Rather than simply focusing on the administrative arena in which the act is implemented, the article seeks explanations for its apparent inefficacy in ideological considerations preceding its enactment, in the legislative process itself, in the (im)precise wording of the emergent statute, and in subsequent government policies in various relevant constitutional and social policy areas. The article concludes that a thorough understanding of the impact of this particular law requires it to be located in a series of interrelated contexts, a conclusion that might plausibly be extended to all studies of “law in society.”