Un problème est dit ici «mouvoir» la recherche, quand c'est sur lui que se concentre l'énergie du chercheur et que c'est son traitement qui fait «avancer» la recherche.

Une entreprise de recherche, une « e-r »,commej'écrirai souvent, est considérée ici comme une unité individuée et je postule qu'il y a toujours au moins un « niveau » où l'on peut se placer pour qu'il soit légitime de considérer une e-r comme une unité individuée.

Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is here criticized from the perspective of a more naturalistic and less compromising form of materialism. Parallels are explored between the problem of cognitive activity and the somewhat more settled problem of vital activity. The lessons drawn suggest that functionalism in the philosophy of mind may be both counterproductive as a research strategy, and false as a substantive position.

Patricia Kitcher has argued that there is an anomaly in our thought about ourselves. Her thesis turns on a claim concerning our attitude toward an imagined case, and on an argument that the attitude is irrational.

The example, E, is as follows. Suppose you are told today that tomorrow you will lose those capacities, whatever they may be, in virtue of which you are a person. After this happens, the body which is now yours will be tortured. Pain will be felt.

Dans la partie de la philosophic que l'on appelle habituellement philosophie du langage, la vieille opposition entre le réalisme et le nominalisme est toujours actuelle. D'un côté, les thèses nominalistes trouvent de nouveaux défenseurs qui apportent quelquefois des arguments originaux ou qui reprennent d'anciennes argumentations. D'un autre côté le réalisme est violemment attaqué sur tous ses flancs.

Rolf Gruner (1977) has argued that natural selection plus time does not entail, and hence does not explain, evolution. This according to Gruner is the result of the undeniable fact that evolution involves an increase in the complexity of organisms:

Since increase in complexity is part of the concept of evolution, evolution is not explained by the theory of natural selection. The Darwinian or Neo-Darwinian affirms the reality of evolution and seems to believe that it can be accounted for in terms of natural selection. But it could be accounted for in this way only if the assumption were justified that generally the more complex organism is better adapted to its environment, and thus stands a better chance to survive and breed, than the less complex organism. And this assumption is not justified. “The more complex, the better adapted” will not do even as a rule of thumb, as most biologists today will be prepared to admit (711).

Josiah Royce relates the following story concerning the writing and publication of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's first major work, the Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation.

Fichte … called upon Kant at Königsberg, in July, 1791. The aged, prudent, and … highly economical philosopher regarded this reverent, fiery, but obviously impecunious young disciple with a certain suspicion, and received his confidences coolly. The rebuff only heated Fichte the more. He tarried in Königsberg two months, in order … to write, for presentation to Kant, a work on religious philosophy, which, once finished, proved to be so thoroughly in Kant's spirit that, when in the spring of the next year the book was published anonymously, it was very generally hailed by Kant's admirers as a new production of the master's own genius. Kant himself had to correct this misapprehension, and in doing so named, and now with warm praise, the real author.

Les travaux de Jean Piaget sur le développement cognitif ont largement mis en relief ce que comporte de génétique toute acquisition de connaissance sensible ou intellectuelle. Bien plus: le pere de la psychologie dite justement genetique voit dans la genése, entendue au sens de processus selon lequel le sujet connaissant construit l'objet, ce qui definit essentiellement toute connaissance. On sait que cette these piagetienne s'oppose á l'enseignement d'Aristote, qui conçoit la connaissance comme adaptation sui generis d'une faculte a un objet donne independamment du sujet et voit l'essence du connaitre dans une simple copie des choses, dans un acte ou l'intelligence devient l'objet. Ne serait-ce qu'en raison de cette opposition, on n'aura pas tort de qualifier d'anti-genetique la psychologie de la connaissance d'Aristote. D'autant plus que la psychologie aristotelicienne n'est pas une psychologie scientifique au sens moderne du terme, de sorte qu'on y chercherait en vain des concepts a caractere operationnel tel le concept piagetien de genese. Pourtant, comme cet article tachera de le mettre en evidence, Aristote est loin d'avoir neglige l'aspect genese (sinon au sens piagétien, du moins au sens qui releve de l'experience commune et de la reflexion philosophique) que comporte la connaissance sensible et intellectuelle. Conjointement a ses prises de position sur la nature de la connaissance, on trouve chez Aristote une description des activites sensibles et intellectuelles qui laisse au sujet bien plus d'initiative et s'avere bien plus « genetique » qu'on ne le suppose habituellement.

Robert Nozick's adherence to Locke's puzzling doctrine about punishment can seem strange. Why does Nozick follow Locke in claiming that individuals in a state of nature have a right to punish any wrongdoer?

Here reflection on this question proceeds by stages to a conclusion that Nozick as well as any other state-of-nature theorist of similar stripe should find disturbing. For, as we shall see (in section 1), what Nozick describes as the general right of a minimal state to punish cannot arise within a state of nature from the more plausible right of individuals to punish only those who harm them.

In his book Engineered Death: Abortion, Suicide, Euthanasia and Senecide, John Woods uses an argument from analogy to establish the following conclusion: even if one grants that foetuses are not persons but only potential persons, killing foetuses is murder. Murder, according to Woods, is the defeasibly wrongful violation of the right to life ascribed to persons. If this argument is successful, it would of course have profound consequences for the ongoing philosophical debate over the morality of abortion. Whether or not they hold that foetuses are persons, philosophers would be forced to adopt the same moral attitude toward foeticide as they would adopt toward the killing of persons. That is, the killing of foetuses and the killing of persons would be defeasibly wrong in the same way; their wrongfulness could be defeated only in special and limited circumstances, perhaps like those suggested by Judith Thomson in her “Defense of Abortion”.

L'anthropologie en l'absence de l'homme: le dernier ouvrage de Fer-nand Dumont nous apporte la réflexion d'un praticien des sciénces de l'homme, et notamment de la sociologie, autour de ce que l'auteur appelle, en un sens d'ailleurs trés large, l'anthropologie.

C'est dire tout de suite qu'il s'agit essentiellement ici d'une pensée portée au second degré sur un premier « discours », ou un savoir déjà constitué: celui que pratique, ou auquel prétend l'anthropologue luimême. Critique d'une exploration qui, en un autre sens il est vrai, se veut elle-même critique, l'entreprise de Fernand Dumont se meut ainsi en général dans une atmosphère plutôt raréfiée.

In a recent article in this journal, Bernard Carnois has given us a valuable comparative study of desire in the Stoa and in Spinoza (‘Le desir selon les Stoïciens et selon Spinoza’, Dialogue 19 [1980], 255–277). I am in no position to judge what he says about Spinoza, but his generally accurate account of ⋯ρμή in Stoic doctrine is marred by one or two misconceptions which ought to be set right. These criticisms do not, it should be said, detract from the value of the overall comparison he wishes to make.