Reasons to fight: motivations to mobilize in civil wars

Why do individuals join armed civil conflict abroad? Academic contention on the drivers of mobilization rests on two axes – the so-called ‘greed versus grievance’ debate (Regan and Norton, Reference Regan and Norton2005; Cederman et al., Reference Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug2013; Cederman and Vogt, Reference Cederman and Vogt2017). On the one hand, the Collier-Hoeffler Model emphasizes the role of ‘greed’; individuals are primarily motivated by potential rewards, joining conflicts when they perceive payoffs from enlisting exceed the risks (Collier and Hoeffler, Reference Collier and Hoeffler2004). In contrast, grievance and the related horizontal inequalities theory foregrounds identity-related factors such as ethnicity, religion, and ideology, arguing that these better explain why individuals join civil wars (Gurr, Reference Gurr1970; Cederman et al., Reference Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug2013). A third approach centers on the opportunities available for individuals to participate in armed conflict (Fearon and Laitin, Reference Fearon and Laitin2003). Bridging these axes of debate to some extent, Weinstein (Reference Weinstein2007) has argued that rebel groups offer individuals two types of rewards: social endowments and economic endowments. The former concerns non-material rewards and the latter material ones.

In a recent contribution, Costalli and Ruggeri claim that non-material factors are crucial in determining armed mobilization. The authors argue that ‘indignation is a powerful trigger of armed mobilization because it impinges on the links between individuals and the people around them, relying on a shared conception of what is right and what is wrong’ (Costalli and Ruggeri, Reference Costalli and Ruggeri2015: 120). Moreover, identifying ‘the links between individuals and their community’ (Costalli and Ruggeri, Reference Costalli and Ruggeri2015: 128) with a broader meaning, indignation (on behalf of others) can serve as a motivating factor for foreigners not directly affected by a conflict. Moreover, they foreground the role of radical ideologies in triggering individual armed mobilization ‘because of the specific content of their doctrines’ (Costalli and Ruggeri, Reference Costalli and Ruggeri2015: 120).

Debating the causes of terrorism, Crenshaw (Reference Crenshaw1981) differentiated between background conditions (preconditions) and trigger factors (precipitants). She defines the latter as factors ‘that set the stage for terrorism over the long run’ and further divides them into two categories: enabling factors and permissive factors. Further, she defines precipitants as ‘events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism’ (Reference Crenshaw1981: 381). This nomenclature allows for an analytical distinction between the ‘opportunities for terrorism to happen, and situations that directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns’ (Reference Crenshaw1981: 381).

These approaches to individual mobilization in armed conflict focus primarily on local mobilization in civil wars, and thus overlook foreigners joining the fight. However, as shown in Figure 1, foreign fighters are hardly a new phenomenon, and their presence in civil conflicts is growing.

Figure 1. Foreign fighters' participation in civil conflict since 1945 (Gleditsch et al., Reference Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand2002; Malet, Reference Malet2007; Pettersson et al., Reference Pettersson, Davies, Deniz, Engström, Hawach, Högbladh, Öberg and Sollenberg2021).

Several studies have investigated why individuals participate in civil conflicts abroad. Foreign citizens may be primed to join civil conflicts abroad if their own country is authoritarian (Krueger, Reference Krueger2006; Hewitt and Kelley-Moore, Reference Hewitt and Kelley-Moore2009), in better economic shape (Hewitt and Kelley-Moore, Reference Hewitt and Kelley-Moore2009; Mousseau, Reference Mousseau2011; Dawson et al., Reference Dawson, Amarasingam and Bain2016), or has a particularly young (Caruso and Gavrilova, Reference Caruso and Gavrilova2012), or Muslim population, given the persistent conflicts in the Muslim world (Hegghammer, Reference Hegghammer2010, Reference Hegghammer2016; Malet, Reference Malet2013; Mishali-Ram, Reference Mishali-Ram2018; Dell'Isola, Reference Dell'Isola2022). Finally, some studies have found that foreign fighters hail disproportionately from countries that have already experienced a civil conflict in the past (Vidino, Reference Vidino2006; Pokalova, Reference Pokalova2019).

Other studies have focused more on qualitative aspects. Analyzing foreign jihadi fighters, Olivier Roy refers to the ‘Islamization of radicalism’, which assumes that foreign fighters ‘are radicals because they choose to be, because only radicalism appeals to them’ (Roy, Reference Roy2017: 42). Given the limited knowledge of Islam among foreign combatants joining ISIS (Byman, Reference Byman2013), Roy contends its attraction for younger cohorts is akin to that provided by far-left and far-right groups in Europe in the 1970s and the 1980s. Indeed, as Table 1 summarizes, most foreign jihadist fighters are young (Bakker and De Bont, Reference Bakker and De Bont2016; Fritz and Young, Reference Fritz and Young2017; Gustaffson and Ranstorp, Reference Gustaffson and Ranstorp2017; Reynolds and Hafez, Reference Reynolds and Hafez2017; Marone and Vidino, Reference Marone and Vidino2019). Given that most are second-generation migrants, they exhibit limited integration into European societies, and their grievances include poor economic prospects, a sense that the future is bleak, and general disillusion with life (Neumann, Reference Neumann2016). Moreover, radicalization correlates with criminality; most recruits have spent some time in prison (Neumann, Reference Neumann2010; De Kerchove et al., Reference De Kerchove, Bundsgaard, Stone and Levitt2015). Bakker and De Bont (Reference Bakker and De Bont2016) have found that 60% of the Belgian and Dutch jihadi foreign fighters had individual grievances, while many suffered economic deprivation and had a criminal past. Marone and Vidino (Reference Marone and Vidino2019) found that 79.2% of Italian jihadi foreign fighters were unemployed or blue-collar workers, while 44% had spent time in prison or had criminal records. Similarly, Reynolds and Hafez (Reference Reynolds and Hafez2017) observed that the unemployment rate among German jihadi foreign fighters is significantly higher than the national average and, notably, that of immigrant cohorts in the country.

Table 1. Comparative ages of jihadi and non-jihadi foreign fighters

* No data are available.

Neumann's (Reference Neumann2016) finding that most foreign fighters return home disillusioned or traumatized is also noteworthy, given that most have jihadi experience. He argues that such returnees constitute a significant security risk to Western societies. In contrast, Malet and Hayes (Reference Malet and Hayes2020) argue that the current threat is limited, given that returnees have not engaged extensively in domestic terrorism so far. However, as the authors note, this may be due to the high incarceration rates of recent returnees, with the prospect of future problems when detainees are eventually released from prison.

While most foreign fighters in Syria have joined jihadist groups, many have joined non-jihadi outfits, albeit on a smaller scale. Still, as Tuck et al. (Reference Tuck, Silverman and Smalley2016) note, the data on ISIS foreign recruits are much more robust, and we lack hard numbers on those joining other groups.

Against this background, we can distinguish two waves of foreign fighters joining non-jihadi groups in Syria. The first, at the outset of the conflict, saw foreigners with military experience joining anti-ISIS groups, mostly out of a desire to return to combat in some form. In Fritz and Young's (Reference Fritz and Young2017) dataset of anti-ISIS foreign fighters from the United States, 82% had military experience, having served tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, their average age (32.57 years) was higher than the norm for foreign anti-ISIS fighters (Fritz and Young, Reference Fritz and Young2017). Tuck et al. (Reference Tuck, Silverman and Smalley2016) stressed that the average age of an international sample of non-jihadi foreign fighters was 32.44, higher than the average age of foreign jihadi fighters.

In his analysis of American anti-ISIS fighters, Patin (Reference Patin2015) reports a range of motivations, including a sense of Christian mission to help protect co-religionists under attack in Syria, the desire for adventure and to rediscover camaraderie and the experience of combat lost after their discharge from the military and, finally, dissatisfaction with US policies against global jihadism.Footnote ³ While most American recruits joining Kurdish groups have been ex-military, there is evidence that some ideologically motivated individuals with no combat experience have volunteered.Footnote ⁴

Larsson's (Reference Larsson2021) recent qualitative study drawing on autobiographical material gleaned from Western volunteers returning from service in the YPG/YPJ is also highly relevant.Footnote ⁵ Despite the small sample (he studied just eight individuals) and the possible biases in collecting data from autobiographical sources (self-reporting bias, selective recall, and editorialization, among others), Larsson analyzed biographies from both co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic individuals. Larsson ascertained that personal reasons and a common hostility against Western policy toward the Syrian conflict, rather than ideological and religious motivations, were the most relevant themes.

In contrast, the second wave of foreign recruits in Syria has been mainly driven by ideology, and recruits report limited or no military experience (Koch, Reference Koch2019). The ideological spectrum of Western non-jihadi foreign fighters spans the left-right axis. Far-right individuals generally joined Christian militias, justifying their mobilization in terms of a mission to defend Europe and Christianity. In contrast, far-left individuals mainly joined the Kurdish YPG/YPJ, attracted by its solidaristic, democratic-socialist, and anti-fascist ideology (Koch, Reference Koch2019).

Using exclusive data collected by the Italian Ministry of Interior that are unavailable for replication, Marone and Vidino (Reference Marone and Vidino2019) offer a detailed overview of the transnational fighters connected with Italy who participated in the Syrian civil war alongside jihadist groups. In less structured research, Marone (Reference Marone2022) briefly investigated foreigners fighting in Ukraine, noting how even those joining the same group differed in terms of personal ideology.

To summarize, based on the existing literature, I should expect that Italian recruits in the YPG/YPJ bore individual grievances, economic deprivation, and criminal records (Bakker and De Bont, Reference Bakker and De Bont2016: Gustaffson and Ranstorp, Reference Gustaffson and Ranstorp2017; Reynolds and Hafez, Reference Reynolds and Hafez2017; Marone and Vidino, Reference Marone and Vidino2019), are older than foreign jihadi fighters (Tuck et al., Reference Tuck, Silverman and Smalley2016; Fritz and Young, Reference Fritz and Young2017) and joined the Kurds for military or ideological reasons (Koch, Reference Koch2019).

In the fight: a sketch of Italians in the People's protection units

Altogether, around 25 Italians have joined the YPG/YPJ militias. I ascertained this number with data traced in the semi-structured interviews I conducted with returnees to Italy and other primary and secondary sources. For example, following the death of an Italian fighter in Syria in January 2019, 19 companions claiming to have fought alongside him in Rojava put their names into an online eulogy.Footnote ⁶ In addition, some individuals had published memoires that served as a starting point for the snowball method I used to identify the broader sample. The sample analyzed in this study comprises 13 individuals. Among these, three have published memoires (Franceschi, Reference Franceschi2016, Reference Franceschi2018; Locatelli and Marzocchi, Reference Locatelli and Marzocchi2018; Orsetti, Reference Orsetti2020), and a further nine were interviewed personally between June–July 2020 and July–August 2021. Information regarding the last individual has been retrieved from online sources. Among the whole sample, two were killed in the Syrian war: Lorenzo Orsetti (nom de guerre Tekoşer Piling), who died during the Deir ez-Zor campaign, and Giovanni Francesco Asperti (nom de guerre Hiwa Bosco). Twelve of the surveyed fighters were male and one female, who fought with the Women's Protection Units (YPJ).

The average age of the Italians who joined the YPG/YPJ is 31. The youngest on the day of departure was 23, whereas the oldest was 53, as shown in Figure 2. The relationship between military skills and age among the Italian foreign fighters is noteworthy. Compulsory military service was suspended in Italy in 2005, and individuals born after 1 January 1986, are no longer subject to conscription (Di Pietro, Reference Di Pietro2013). Accordingly, only four of the surveyed fighters were old enough to be eligible for conscription. That said, none of the participants reported having served in the Italian armed forces.

Figure 2. Age of Italian fighters joining the YPG/YPJ.

Most of them were educated entirely in Italy. Two dropped out after middle school, while four completed the full compulsory educational cycle. Moreover, three had completed bachelor's degrees at university, and a further two had earned a PhD. Education data regarding two individuals are missing.

Regarding ideology, Italian recruits identify with anti-capitalist and left-wing views, such as communism and anarchism. These ideologies, along with far-right wing ideologies, have been the core of the 1960s–1990s domestic terrorism in Europe (Rapoport, Reference Rapoport, Cronin and Ludes2004; Rasler and Thompson, Reference Rasler and Thompson2009; Malkki, Reference Malkki and Silke2018). According to the memoires (Franceschi, Reference Franceschi2016, Reference Franceschi2018; Locatelli and Marzocchi, Reference Locatelli and Marzocchi2018; Orsetti, Reference Orsetti2020) and interviews, three self-identified explicitly as anarchists, and two as communists, while the other seven expressed more general leftist sentiments that were not particularly precise. Therefore, I used a general ‘left-wing’ category to code these individuals, sharing a general anti-capitalist vision of the world. However, the full sample of individuals belongs to the so-called extra-parliamentary left-wing groups. Often, they are squatters or part of social movements such as the centri sociali.Footnote ⁷ As it appears, common participation in similar (or the same) social and political movements might be explanatory in joining the fight. As a result, prior knowledge of the Kurdish question was significant in some cases, and all had at least some background understanding.

The literature differentiates among push factors (i.e., socio-economic conditions) driving an individual's decision to join a conflict, pull factors (i.e., factors drawing them in), and trigger factors, proximate considerations arising at the moment a decision is made to join a conflict (Bakker and De Bont, Reference Bakker and De Bont2016), which Crenshaw (Reference Crenshaw1981) calls precipitant causes. None of the interviewees reported push factors, while all agreed ideology was the main factor pulling them toward the Syrian conflict. Five individuals reported interest in the Kurdish political platform as a critical factor, and only one reported the siege in KobanîFootnote ⁸ as important. Three of them declared that the suffering of Kurdish people, a group grievance, was among these factors, while only two stated international terrorism as one of the most important factors. One individual declared he was there for personal reasons and realized only later why he was really there. Data regarding one individual (Hiwa Bosco) are missing.

Figure 3 details the backgrounds of the Italian volunteers joining the Kurds.

Figure 3. Personal background of the Italian foreign fighters with YPG/YPJ. *Means they do not identify themselves with anarchism or communism, but more generally with the extra-parliamentary radical left.

Regarding the return to Italy, Figure 4 shows the most common reasons cited by the recruits. Most decided to return because of their personal affections or mental or physical exhaustion from the conflict. One whom I categorized under ‘individual reasons’ decided to leave Syria after the liberation of Raqqa, only making the decision to leave once he had had ‘his dear wish’ fulfilled – namely, to see Raqqa liberated from ISIS. However, none declared disillusionment with what they had experienced, and many expressed ongoing support for the Kurdish cause through other means (e.g., organizing conferences, debates, publishing).

Figure 4. Reasons given for the decision to return.

This preliminary survey offers a broad biographical sketch of the Italian contingent in the YPG/YPJ. They were primarily young men from the political left, with prior knowledge of the Kurdish question, and motivated mainly by ideology, a non-material factor. Below, I will provide more details about their experiences, analyzing their motivations to join the fight in Syria, their experiences, and their reasons for returning to Italy.

Experiencing the fight: evidence from the Italian contingent

As previously mentioned, the sample includes 13 individuals out of the 22 identified. Among the 13 individuals, I have conducted semi-structured interviews with nine former combatants. Karim Franceschi, nom de guerre ‘Marcello’ in the YPG, was the founder of and the commander of the Anti-fascist Internationalist Tabûr (AIT),Footnote ⁹ also known as ‘YPG International’. After his tours in Syria, he published two memoires, ‘Il combattente: Storia dell'italiano che ha difeso Kobane dall'Isis' (The Fighter: The Story of the Italian Who Defended Kobanî from Isis) in 2016 and ‘Non morirò stanotte: Un comandante, la sua squadra e la caduta dell'Isis (‘I Will Not Die Tonight’: A Commander, His Team, and the Fall of Isis), published in 2018, in which he detailed why he signed up for the YPG and his experiences in Syria. He crossed over through Turkey during the siege of Kobanî when foreign volunteers were still a rarity.

Franceschi described himself as a highly committed individual, motivated by ideology:

Franceschi believed in the Kurdish ideals of democratic confederalism, as he underlined various times in the first book. He argued he was fighting ‘where they are trying to build a society based on principles such as direct democracy, gender equality, and sustainability – all ideals in which I believe too’ (Franceschi, Reference Franceschi2016: 10). Still, Franceschi was new to the ideological developments in Rojava, noting, for example, that he had never read Öcalan's writing (Franceschi, Reference Franceschi2016: 57).

As underlined in his second book, Franceschi drew on a commitment to communist ideas (Franceschi, Reference Franceschi2018: 67), revealed in his discussions, recounted in the book, with a YPJ fighter:

After three months in Rojava, Franceschi returned to Italy. He gives no reason in the book to save his wish to prevent his Turkish tourist visa from expiring. Although one can read hints of disputes he had with the YPG, his stated reason was to avoid any possible legal problems of overstaying his Turkish visa. He underscored why he was ‘called’ to Kobanî by comparing himself to the proverbial ISIS fighter:

He briefly returned to Syria after six months in Italy. He later made a third tour in Syria, founding the AIT with other foreign fighters inside the YPG.

In his second book, he wrote more regarding combat operations and the AIT, composed of international fighters (of whom a large share were Italians), but he also underlined the reasons why he left Syria. The first time, he was worried about his visa; the last time, he left more for his personal affections.

Claudio Locatelli, nom de guerre ‘Ulisse’, was a member of AIT, and he published a biography titled ‘Nessuna resa. Storia del combattente italiano che ha liberato Raqqa dall'Isis' (‘No surrender’: The History of the Italian Fighter Who Freed Raqqa From Isis). His interest in the Kurdish question first came while visiting the Diyarbakir refugee camp, where he met displaced people from Kobanî and Yazidi people. In February 2017, Locatelli entered Iraq legally, intending to cross illegally into Syria and join the YPG, which he did on 1 March. As he wrote, ‘I have been convinced by the genocide of Yazidi in Sinjar; terrorist attacks in Europe – in Bataclan, Zaventem and the underground station at Maelbeek – the terrorist attacks at the Promenade des Anglais and in the Christmas market in Berlin. I had to leave. I had to do something’ (Locatelli and Marzocchi, Reference Locatelli and Marzocchi2018: 37). In a letter dated 7 April 2017, immediately following a terrorist attack in Westminster in London, Locatelli recounted

Despite formally joining the YPG as a freelance journalist, his real reason was to fight. Locatelli wrote a letter on the last day of his month-long compulsory training with the YPG, which indicated his intention to fight all along. He soon joined the AIT, adding to its Italian numbers, explaining his reasons as follows: ‘I joined the Rojava army in the fight against the Islamic State and everything it stands for’ (Locatelli and Marzocchi, Reference Locatelli and Marzocchi2018: 72). Locatelli decided to return to Italy on the night of 19–20 September 2017, when the reconquest of Raqqa by the YPG was imminent. He had wished to remain to mark that symbolic event.

Lorenzo Orsetti, nom de guerre ‘Tekoşer Piling’, is one of the two Italian volunteers who have fallen fighting ISIS. According to the YPG website,Footnote ¹⁰ he served in the TKP/ML-TİKKO International Unit, a military unit formed by the Turkish Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist. In his book, published posthumously, he hints at the reasons behind his decision to join the YPG and writes of daily life in Syria. On 12 December 2017, he wrote

Orsetti decided to join the YPG due to his strong commitment to the cause. He defined himself as an anarchist (Orsetti, Reference Orsetti2020: 158), and in an interview with the Italian journalist Fausto Biloslavo he recalled the key ideological reasons driving his departure:

Joining Syria was the right thing to do, according to his ideals and in view of what ISIS was reportedly doing to civilians. He contrasted ISIS atrocities with what the YPG was attempting in Syria. To Orsetti, the war was not about being ideologically right- or left-wing but about defeating a common enemy of humanity (Orsetti, Reference Orsetti2020: 155). He participated in various military campaigns in frontline battles in Afrin, Deir ez-Zor, Hajin, and Al-Baghuz Fawqani, where he was killed by IS militants.

The following quotations come directly from the semi-structured interviews. I interviewed the first ex-fighter on 3 June 2020, which began the snowball technique I used to find new contacts. He arrived in Syria in 2016 and was one of the first confirmed Italian recruits in the YPG. He described himself as an intensely committed person who had been involved in militant extra-parliamentary politics during his youth and adult life, albeit with no military background:

The decision to join the YPG was triggered by ideology. He described the terrorist attacks in Europe as the main trigger but later qualified this:

He left the YPG after five months, during which he fought in the battle of Manbij, and he gave several reasons for his decision to leave. First, he noted how hard going to Syria had been on his family and personal affections. He did not lie to his family about where he was, ‘since in case I would die, I did not want my family to discover I had lied’ (Anonymous interviewee #1). In addition, ‘at the end of the summer, I was psychologically exhausted. […] I was also traumatized by those events […]. War was totally alien to me, and I did not feel well during the war’ (Anonymous interviewee #1). While reflecting on his decision to return to Italy, he stressed that his military contribution ‘was extremely limited, something of which I am fully aware’ (Anonymous interviewee #1).

I interviewed the second participant on 24 June 2020. He traveled to Syria three times, first as a civilian and the subsequent two times as a YPG fighter. He described himself as being ideologically committed. As a teenager, he left home,

In 2014, he made his first trip to the Middle East, visiting Palestine, ‘since it was my dream if we can call it a dream’ (Anonymous interviewee #2). This was when ISIS sway in Syria was peaking, and he discovered what was happening there. He returned to Italy that same month with the idea of going to Turkey.

Until 2014, he had never heard about the Kurdish question. He learned quickly:

Since his visa to travel to Iraq was set to expire in a month, he used this time to observe as a civilian. Later, he joined a Kurdish combat unit but struggled with the language, and his military contribution was minimal. He could not speak English, much less Kurdish, so after two months in the Kurdish unit, he returned to the training center for internationals. Finally, he joined the newly formed AIT, where he met some Italian fighters, but his contribution remained limited. He left Syria for two reasons. First, he was drained, worn out by daily life, bored by the lull in fighting, and taxed by the summer temperatures. Second, he had some legal problems to sort out in Italy.

The third individual was interviewed on 25 June 2020. In 2017, after obtaining his bachelor's degree, he decided to move to Syria. He recalled leaving ‘with a basic ideological interest [in Rojava], and an ideological grounding that started with anarchism and proceeded to Leninism and Marxism’ (Anonymous interviewee #3). However, he later specified that ideology was not the main trigger. Unlike other fighters, such as Franceschi and Orsetti, he had no militant political background. In 2015, while in Croatia, he met some Kurdish men. At that time, as he stressed in the interview, he was unaware of the Kurdish question, and he ‘did not even know where it [Kurdistan] was’ (Anonymous interviewee #3). After spending time and sharing experiences with the Kurdish group, he was moved. He noted in particular how

After this experience, he set out to learn more about the Kurdish question – ‘to deepen the story’ (Anonymous interviewee # 3), as he put it – and two years later, he made the decision to go and join the YPG in Syria. He participated in the military campaign in Deir ez-Zor in a sniper unit and the Afrin military campaign.

Despite his plan to stay much longer, he had to return to Italy due to health problems. It is important to note that he remained fully convinced of what he was doing, but external factors intervened, prompting him to return home. He was, in some sense, ideologically motivated, but the main trigger was more related to humanitarian reasons and even more so to an emotional awakening, as he recounted of his time with the Kurds in Croatia.

The fourth individual is the only female foreign fighter I was able to interview (on 6 July 2020). She joined the Women's Protection Unit (YPJ) and was the last participant I interviewed in the first wave (June–July 2020). During the interview, she stressed how ideology was a salient factor in her education, shaping her decisions and the very person she is:

After leaving her hometown to study in another city, she became involved in extra-parliamentary political campaigns, such as the above-mentioned No Tav movement; she was also part of a centro sociale. She first went to Syria in 2017 with the plan to stay a short while and chronicle events, but soon she elected to remain and enrolled in the YPJ and fought in the Afrin military campaign. As she described,

After one year, she decided to return home for two main reasons. First:

In the interview, she underlined how the Syrian experience aligned with her feminist approach to politics, particularly in describing the YPG's program after the liberation of Raqqa and, indeed, the entire political process in Rojava.

The following individuals were interviewed in the second wave of data collection (July–August 2021). One observation was particularly noteworthy:

In recounting this, he gave no hint of explicit ideological or material motivations, despite having a leftist political background. Instead, he underscored the moral dimension as follows:

As a younger man, he was a militant despite, as he stressed, not being so involved. He had been part of political groups, but ideology did not figure in his reasons to go:

Despite his ideological commitment and far-left background, ideology was not the driver. Instead, he was there because he felt the moral imperative.

He arrived in Syria in February 2015 and was the first Italian volunteer to reach the country. He returned at the end of August of the same year after he was wounded in Suluc, a small town close to the Turkish border. However, he did not have any military experience. As he said, ‘I went there when I was 23 years old, I had limited theoretical knowledge, I mean I knew what a rifle looked like, but I knew nothing about other aspects […]. Our impact in the YPG was extremely limited’ (Anonymous interviewee #5).

I interviewed the sixth individual on 16 June 2021. He described himself as being highly committed to the Kurdish question. He became interested in politics at around 18 years old and participated in various unions and extra-parliamentary political movements. He has been active in squatting movements, as well as in centri sociale. He did not describe himself as a communist, socialist, or anarchist but as part of ‘the larger radical movement which has as antifascism and anticapitalism as founding ideas’ (Anonymous interviewee #6). Despite his political activism, he knew nothing about the Kurdish question. His interest was piqued in 2014 after a demonstration in Milan sponsored by the Kurdish diaspora to bring attention to ISIS atrocities and campaigns against the Kurds. After about a year of research into the issue and reading books and articles, he decided to move to Syria:

He joined YPG in the autumn of 2017 with zero military experience: ‘I learned everything I know after I got there and enrolled in the YPG’ (Anonymous interviewee #6). Despite his lack of military experience, he joined a mixed Arab-international sniper tabûr operating alongside infantry units in the Deir ez-Zor region. He stayed in Syria for six months, returning to Italy in the spring of 2018. He left Rojava because he had personal plans in Europe and after the Turkish military campaigns in Afrin, there was nothing to do on the military side. After two years in Europe,

The seventh interview took place on 21 June 2021. This interviewee described political activism dating back to his teenage years: ‘I have always been connected with territorial political struggles, in particular regarding environmental devastation […] and I became aware of the Kurdish question when Öcalan was in Italy in 1998’ (Anonymous interviewee #7). As part of a political union, he gained knowledge and interest in various international struggles, including Zapatism, Basque independence, Palestine, and the Kurds. He later decided to deepen his knowledge of the Kurdish issue by reading Öcalan's theoretical works. At the end of July 2017, he joined YPG:

After a few weeks in the Makhmur refugee camp in Iraqi Kurdistan, he decided to relocate to Rojava, crossing the Syrian border and joining the YPG when the opportunity arose. After the standard political and military training, he joined a mixed Arab-Kurd tabûr on the outskirts of Raqqa at the end of the military operation that liberated the city. After spending 10 days in Raqqa, he moved to Deir ez-Zor in an Arab-Kurd tabûr that included four other foreign fighters. He had no previous military experience, and in this regard, he stressed that ‘Kurds or Arabs did not need a few hundred international volunteers to free Rojava or Syria; they could handle it easily by themselves’ (Anonymous interviewee #7). In total, he spent six months in Rojava, returning due to health problems. While in Italy, he wanted to return to Syria during the Turkish military operations in Serê Kaniyê but decided not to.

I met the eighth individual on 29 June 2021. He is the oldest person I interviewed and one of the two with a PhD. During his university studies, he was part of extra-parliamentary anarchic unions, the squatter movement, and participated in the No Tav campaign. He became interested in the Kurdish question following the ISIS attacks in Rojava. In the summer of 2014, he hosted a radio show with other militants covering topics such as ISIS and the Syrian conflict. During this time, ‘between November and December, when ISIS attacked Kobanî, I went to Turkey with another militant to see and understand what was happening there’ (Anonymous interviewee #8). He later returned to Italy and established the ‘Rojava Calling’ caravan to bring humanitarian aid to the Kurds in Northern Syria. He traveled again to Turkey and spent a short time in Kobanî but did not join the YPG at that time. In 2016 he finally entered Syria and joined the YPG. His decision was triggered ‘during the first trip in Turkey, in the Bakur region, inside the refugee camps. After meeting people living there, seeing how they were living together, and their warmth, I asked myself if I could do something for them or help somehow’ (Anonymous interviewee #8). He decided to join the YPG despite having no military experience, noting that: ‘I could stand and hold a gun, and if they told me to shoot in that direction, I could do it more or less’ (Anonymous interviewee #8). He participated in several combat missions in Al-Bab, Al-Karamah, Tabqa, Al-Awi al-Katumyah, and finally in Raqqa. He moved between military units, including the AIT and mixed Arab-Kurd units. After one year in Syria, he decided to return to Italy:

The ninth and last individual was interviewed on 31 August 2021. He described himself as a leftist:

Joining the fight in Rojava was a natural extension of his ideology: ‘I was attracted by their ideological integrity and willingness to change; they subjected their socialist ideology to a rigorously honest critique; they were a Maoist organization, and now they are libertarian’ (Anonymous interviewee #9). He later described himself as an anarcho-communist, stressing that the YPG/YPJ ideology was crucial for him since ‘for a communist regime, I was not going to fight’ (Anonymous interviewee #9). He was not triggered by anything that happened in Europe, such as the terrorist attacks in France or the United Kingdom, as he emphasized:

He joined YPG in September 2016 and participated as part of the AIT in combat missions in Tabqa, Raqqa, Al-Karamah, and Afrin. However, he felt useless on the battlefield due to his poor combat skills. He remained in Syria for one and a half year, with a three-month break in Italy. He left Syria in March 2018 and explained it as follows:

All of the participants eventually left (or were killed), and none returned to Rojava after the Turkish military operations in Northern Syria began in 2018. Their time in Syria lasted from six months to a maximum of one year and a half, with an average stay of approximately ten months. The first joined the YPG in 2015, whereas the others joined between 2016 and 2017. As touched on, a few went to Syria multiple times.