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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 June 2016
Among my dearest memories of John Jackson and his wife Joan are the four weeks spent in Ann Arbor as a guest lecturer at the Michigan Law School in the mid-nineties, briefly after the entry into force of the WTO package of agreements. It was great to be away for some weeks from the relentless pressure of work in the WTO group in the Legal Service of the European Commission, which I was heading at the time. I taught a seminar on EC external relations, but also sat in on John's lectures on international trade law and naturally our discussions centered on the WTO and how the new dispute settlement system was going to work.
1 467 US 837 (1984). The so-called deference doctrine advanced in this case finds more or less its equivalent in the so-called margin of appreciation in continental European administrative law and is applied at the international level by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights.
2 Croley, Steven P. and Jackson, John H., ‘WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments’, 90 American Journal of International Law (1996), 193–213 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 One thing that the article does not treat is that the US Chevron deference focuses on the interpretation of laws or regulatory texts leading to an administrative measure, whereas the UK Wednesbury unreasonableness and the continental European margin of appreciation focus rather on the administrative action itself. It would be much more logical to link the issue of deference to Article 11 of the DSU on the functions of panels than to interpretation, at least from a European perspective.
4 Croley and Jackson, ‘WTO Dispute Procedures’, fn. 37.