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EC – Bed: Linen European Communities – Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2015

Merit E. Janow  and
Robert W. Staiger
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As comprehensively argued elsewhere in this volume,1 the WTO's antidumping provisions reflect political compromises that mask an underlying lack of consensus on the value and purpose of an antidumping regime at the national level. This is an old story that has been long argued in academic and policy circles. What is noteworthy recently is the significant increase in the use of trade remedies, especially by developing economies. As a result, while the post-Uruguay Round period is generally marked by greater economic openness resulting from various forms of trade liberalization, the use of trade remedies is no longer primarily the province of OECD economies. Indeed, the introduction and use of trade remedies is proliferating around the world.2

Type
Research Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 2 , Special Issue S1: WTO Case Law of 2001 , 2003 , pp. 115 - 139
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

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