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Partisan Foreign Policy: Britain in the Suez Crisis*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Leon D. Epstein
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin
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Extract

Often as foreign policy may be the subject of partisan discussion in modern democracies, important international commitments are usually made only with support, or the expectation of support, from the great bulk of the political community. This has surely been the ordinary American and British pattern, labeled bi-partisan, non-partisan, or extra-partisan. We assume that political support extending well beyond the ranks of the party in office is essential for a successful foreign policy, and especially for a substantial military venture. Even the American decision to defend South Korea, while it was necessarily made by the Democratic administration before any apparent political consensus and while it eventually involved the United States in an unpopular war, was never in itself a partisan policy which Republicans as a group refused to support. The one outstanding recent instance of a truly partisan foreign policy is Britain's Suez action of 1956. As the significant deviant case, it provides useful insights into the process by which an alternative to the usual bi-partisan arrangement is developed and conducted. Specific questions concern the making of the Suez intervention decision, the nature of parliamentary support for this decision, the role of party loyalty in maintaining such support, and the significance of partisan opposition.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1960

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References

1 An account of this and subsequent events, together with the important documents concerning Middle Eastern affairs, is in the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, London, 1959, pp. 73354.Google Scholar

2 557 H.C. Deb. 919 (July 30, 1956) and 1603 (August 2, 1956).

3 558 H.C. Deb. 11 (Sept. 12, 1956).

4 Ibid., cols. 307–8 (Sept. 13, 1956).

5 Ibid., cols. 182–87, 235–36, 273–75 (Sept. 13, 1956).

6 557 H.C. Deb. 779 (July 27, 1956).

7 76th Annual Report of the Conservative Conference (1956), p. 22. The resolution contrasted sharply with Labour's insistence, at its October conference, on a peaceful settlement. 55th Annual Report of the Labour Conference (1956), p. 70.

8 76th Annual Report, op.cit., pp. 33–34. The dissenter was William Yates, MP.

9 Ibid., pp. 34–37. Filling in for the government was the comparatively junior Anthony Nutting, a minister of state for foreign affairs who was later to resign in protest against Eden's Suez action.

10 557 H.C. Deb. 1616–17 (August 2, 1956).

11 Ibid., cols. 1658–59, 1666, 1671–72, 1713–14 (August 2, 1956).

12 558 H.C. Deb., 18–20 (Sept. 12, 1956).

13 Ibid., col. 16 (Sept. 12, 1956).

14 Ibid., col. 139 (Sept. 12, 1956).

15 Nor at this stage did military measures against Egypt have the support of a broad public. Only about one-third of the interviewees in a Gallup poll of late August favored military action if Egypt rejected the men current proposals for international control of the canal. (This poll result and other Gallup data subsequently cited in Table I are from me files of the British Institute of Public Opinion.)

16 This report of the government's communication wim die opposition was accepted by both parties. 558 H.C. Deb. 1351, 1373 (Oct. 30, 1956); 570 H.C. Deb. 533 (May 15, 1957).

17 558 H.C. Deb. 1283 (Oct. 30, 1956).

18 Ibid., cols. 1344–51.

19 Gaitskell, repeated this version, 602Google ScholarH.C. Deb. 56–57 (March 16, 1959).

20 Prime Minister Macmillan, ibid., col. 153; 570 H.C. Deb. 425 (May 15, 1957).

21 Butler, R. A., 561 H.C. Deb. 1575 (Dec. 6, 1956).Google Scholar

22 558 H.C. Deb. 1462 (Oct. 31, 1956).

23 560 H.C. Deb. 36 (Nov. 6, 1956).

24 As explained by Jennings, W. Ivor, Parliament, Cambridge, Eng., 1957, pp. 179–80.Google Scholar

25 558 H.C. Deb. 1562 (Oct. 31, 1956) and 1905 (Nov. 3, 1956); 560 H.C. Deb. 1370 (Nov. 19, 1956); 562 H.C. Deb. 1254 (Dec. 19, 1956).

26 558 H.C. Deb. 1697–98 (Nov. 1, 1956); 560 H.C. Deb. 362 (Nov. 8, 1956).

27 As by Macmillan, , 561 H.C, Deb. 1471 (Dec. 6, 1956).Google Scholar

28 558 H.C. Deb. 1653 (Nov. 1, 1956).

29 560 H.C. Deb. 279 (Nov. 8, 1956).

30 The fullest accounts of the difficulties of the Jewish MP's are in the Jewish Chron micle (London), Nov. 9, 1956, pp. 5, 8, 16, 23, and Nov. 23, 1956, p. 1.

31 This lone Labour rebel abstained in the divisions of October 30 and November 1. Almost immediately his outraged constituency Labour party demanded and received his parliamentary resignation. Midland Advertiser & Wednesbury Borough News, Nov. 24, 1956, p. 1.

32 558 H.C. Deb. 1454 (Oct. 31, 1956). Less firmly united in opposition were the five Liberal MP's, some of whom voted with the government on October 30, though the mree Liberals actually voting on November I and all five on November 8 were in the opposition lobby.

33 560 H. C. Deb. 393 (Nov. 8, 1956).

34 558 H. C. Deb. 1625, 1745 (Nov. 1, 1956).

35 Daily Mirror, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 2.

36 Daily Telegraph, Nov. 7, 1956, p. 12.

37 561 H.C. Deb. 1569 (Dec. 6, 1956).

38 562 H. C. Deb. 1400 (Dec. 19, 1956).

39 602 H. C. Deb. 55 (March 16, 1959).

40 Jennings, W. Ivor, Cabinet Government, Cambridge, Eng., 1959, pp. 478–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

41 602 H.C. Deb. 58 (March 16, 1959).

42 This was again Yates, William, the government's most persistent Conservative critic. 558 H.C. Deb. 1716–17 (Nov. 1, 1956).Google Scholar

43 For these resignations, by Anthony Nutting and Sir Edward Boyle, see the Times (London), Nov. 5, 1956, p. 4, and Nov. 9, 1956, p. 10.

44 560 H.C. Deb. 322–24, 369–70 (Nov. 8, 1956).

45 The “Political Diary” of an anti-Suez paper commented: “The few who have already rebelled feel a good deal of bitterness towards those elder statesmen—those incorruptible ancients—who egged them on and then retired from the fray.

“‘My boy,’ they said in effect, ‘I wish I could accompany you on your great adventure, but the truth is I shall do much more for the cause by keeping a watch on things at home. So over the top and good luck to you.’ Then, with tears in their eyes— ‘Poor chap, I knew his father’ —they quietly disappeared from the scene.” Observer, Nov. 18, 1956, p. 9.

46 This is exactly what constituency associations did do in relation to the eight Conservative MP's who actually deviated. At least four lost their seats, either through immediate resignation under pressure or dirough subsequent association reactions flowing from the Suez crisis. I have tried to deal with the significance of all these rebel cases, including the one Labour instance, in a separate study.

47 The journalist account is by Merry, and Bromberger, Serge, Secrets of Suez (tr. from the French, by Cameron, James, London, 1957, p. 147)Google Scholar, where it is alleged that R. A. Buder led the rebellion by threatening to resign with seven other ministers unless hostilities were stopped. The Bromberger statement that 40 Conservative MP's were behind such a rebellion is given as a fact, with Secrets of Suez cited as authority, by Richards, Peter G., a British political scientist, in Honourable Members, London, 1959, p. 249.Google Scholar

48 561 H.C. Deb. 1302 (Dec. 5, 1956).

49 Teeling, William, quoted in Evening Argus (Brighton), Dec. 7, 1956, p. 7.Google Scholar

50 Times (London), May 14, 1957, p. 10, and May 16, 1957, p. 12.

51 570 H.C. Deb. 698 (May 16, 1957).

52 This summary of press opinion is drawn from a study of editorials appearing during the Suez crisis in all of the national daily and Sunday papers, in the important weeklies, and in provincial papers with circulations over 200,000, plus the few provincial quality papers with smaller circulations.

53 The high degree of coincidence between party voting and foreign policy views may be compared with American findings concerning this relationship. Belknap, George and Campbell, Angus, “Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy,” Public Opinion Quarterly, XV (Winter 19511952), pp. 601–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Miller, Warren E., ‘The Socio-Economic Analysis of Political Behavior,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, II (August 1958), pp. 239–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

54 News-Chronicle (London), Nov. 15, 1956, p. 4.

55 The Public Philosophy, Boston, 1955.

56 Times (London), May 9, 1940, p. 6, and May 10, 1940, p. 6; 360 H. C. Deb. 1361–66 (May 8, 1940).

57 This seems close to Max Beloff's view of the relative influence of the American legislature. Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process, Baltimore, Md., 1955.Google Scholar