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²⁴ Sachs, “Why Russia Has Failed to Stabilize,” in Aslund (fn.10), 55.

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³⁴ Ekspert, June 3,1996,14–15.

³⁵ The deputy prime minister for agriculture, Aleksandr Zaveryukha, lobbied openly for aid to the farming sector, announcing once with no apparent sense of irony that “the country must feed its peasants” (Segodnya, March 28,1995).

³⁶ Izvestia, December 6,1994.

³⁷ Segpdnya, July 20, 1995, 3.

³⁸ Fyodorov in March 1995 delivered a caustic assessment of this economic lineup: “What more can be done under Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin], who every day issues some sort of decision about spending money on the devil knows what? Or under Viktor Stepanovich [Chernomyrdin], who, together with Zaveryukha, will lie low and then—bang!—will blurt out something that costs 10 trillion Yes, this is incompetence, no matter how much you explain it to Chernomyrdin on graphs. They sat there tnd tried: Here's your multiplier, here's the money supply, a three-month lag, and still he doesn't believe it… he thinks they're making a fool of him. The result is plain to see” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 17, 1995, 1, 3).

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⁵⁵ Finansovie Izvestia, July 12–18,1993,1.

⁵⁶ Kommersant’, July 12–18,1993,5.

⁵⁷ Sachs, Jeffrey and Lipton, David, “Remaining Steps to a Market-Based Monetary System in Russia,” in Åslund, Anders and Layard, Richard, eds., Changing the Economic System in Russia (London: Pinter, 1993), 138Google Scholar. Since Sberbank occupied such a large share of the market and competition in most regions was sparse, its deposit rates acted as a focal point for collusion by potential competitors.

⁵⁸ Easterly and Vieira da Cunha (fh. 48); Layard and Richter (fn. 49).

⁵⁹ Author's observation, May 13,1992. The central bank representative was Sergei Ignatiev.

⁶⁰ Moskovskie Novosti, May 31,1992,14. Besides criticizing high interest rates and reserve requirements, the bankers also accused the central bank of inefficiency in its clearing system and of overzealous regulation.

⁶¹ Commersant, February 16,1993,4.

⁶² Treisman, Daniel, “Contemplating a Postelection Financial Crisis,” Transition 20, October 4, 1996, 30–33Google Scholar.

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⁶⁴ Kommtrsant; April 5,1994,52.

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⁷⁰ For a discussion of the details, see Hellman (fn. 31).

⁷¹ Omri Daily Digest, February 27,1995. Zhirinovsky's LDP also voted overwhelmingly for the government's proposal.

⁷² For comparison, the 1995 budget included planned total spending of 40.5 trillion rubles (about $7.9 billion) on industry, energy, construction, agriculture, and fishing; see Kirkow (fn. 44).

⁷³ Delovie Lyudi, May 1996,146–48. The oil company Yukos was being paid for only 60 percent of its deliveries in early 1995; Segodnya, March 21,1995,3.

⁷⁴ OMRI Daily Report, May 30,1996.

⁷⁵ Ekspert, October 24,1995,32.

⁷⁶ Ekspert, June 3,1996,16–19.

⁷⁷ Peter Rutland, “Russia's Energy Empire under Strain,” Transition, May 3,1996, 6–11.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ekspert, March 4,1996,31.

⁸⁰ Segodnya, March 13,1996,1.