In Kantian Consequentialism, David Cummiskey argues that the central ideas of Kant's moral philosophy provide claims about value which, if applied consistently, lead to consequentialist normative principles. While Kant himself was not a consequentialist, Cummiskey thinks he should have been, given his fundamental positions in ethics. I argue that Cummiskey is mistaken. Cummiskey's argument relies on a non-Kantian idea about value, namely that value can be defined, and objects with value identified, conceptually prior to and independent of the choices that a rational agent would make. The contrasting Kantian concept of value is that to possess value is to be the object of (one sort or other) of rational choice. Inasmuch as Cummiskey gives no reason to reject the Kantian account of value in favour of his own (consequentialist) account, his argument does not establish that Kant's ethics inevitably leads to normative consequentialism.