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What Enterprise? Whose Bargain? Politicians Face Their Principals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2023

Glyn Davis  and
Margaret Gardner
Margaret Gardner
Affiliation:
Griffith University
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Abstract

The introduction of enterprise bargaining poses a fascinating dilemma: with whom should politicians negotiate about their wages and conditions? The question has different implications for Labor and the Coalition. The form of enterprise bargaining proposed by the Government can accommodate current arrangements for MP salaries, though not without some special pleading. The more radical proposals of the Coalition, which emphasise a principal—agent relationship between employer and employee, pose greater challenges. This paper explores the dilemma of salaries for MPs under enterprise bargaining, and suggests a policy solution which ensures that politicians are subject to the rules they propose for others.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Economic and Labour Relations Review , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , December 1993 , pp. 279 - 298
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 1993

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