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“No Bodies to Kick or Souls to Damn”: The Political Origins of Corporate Criminal Liability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2020

Anthony Grasso Open the ORCID record for Anthony Grasso [Opens in a new window]
Anthony Grasso*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Rutgers University
*
E-mail: agrasso@camden.rutgers.edu
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Abstract

Research on corporate criminal law has grown since the Great Recession, but corporate criminal liability, the principle charging corporations for crimes, remains understudied. Literature points to a 1909 Supreme Court decision as its basis, but historical analysis of the doctrine's deeper political roots reveal that its development was contingent on the convergence of several unique factors driving turn of the century American politics. First, corporate criminal liability would not have emerged had it not been for shifts in jurisprudential theory reconceptualizing the corporate form as an independent entity. Second, middle managers of railroads emerged as powerful political players during this period who capitalized on this discursive shift to advocate for corporate criminal liability as an alternative to individual liability rules directed against them. Third, the Supreme Court upheld corporate criminal lability in 1909 because it was constructed by the era's Republican majority to protect the party's economic preferences, and corporate criminal liability was viewed as consistent with their conservative agenda. These factors were each necessary, but alone insufficient, in paving the way for the Court to validate the principle in 1909. How they fit together sequentially illuminates how the doctrine's construction was contingent on specific political and historical circumstances.

Type
Research Article
Information
Studies in American Political Development , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , April 2021 , pp. 57 - 75
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

The author would like to thank Bill Laufer and the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at the University of Pennsylvania for providing feedback and financial support during the development of this project.

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