Elsewhere I have argued that measures of U.S. state legislative professionalization assess individual and organizational capacity to generate and evaluate information in the policymaking process. In this article, I adapt my measure of state legislative professionalization to state courts of last resort, attempting to assess the informational capacity of those bodies in making legal decisions. Specifically, I examine judicial salaries, a court's level of control over its docket, and the number of law clerks employed by the justices. After presenting four variants of the court professionalization measure and investigating their validity, I examine explanations for their observed variance across the states. I conclude by comparing my indices with existing indices and speculating about the utility of such measures.

Scholars have long been interested in the politics of taxation in the U.S. states. Research in this area has not, however, sufficiently explored the impact of fiscal federalism on state-level taxing decisions. Drawing on theoretical models of fiscal choice, this study develops the expectation that, under certain conditions, federal grants-in-aid exert significant downward pressure on state-level tax effort. I test that assertion in an analysis of tax effort in the U.S. states between 1971 and 1996.

Can voters stop state governments from spending at high rates through the enactment of tax and expenditure limits (TELs), or do these laws become dead letters? We draw upon the principal-agent literature to theorize that TELs—one of the most frequent uses of the initiative process across the country—might be circumvented by the sorts of elected officials who would inspire their passage. We test for the effectiveness of TELs across states using a differences-in-differences model. Second, we decompose our treatment variable using different legal provisions of the limits to test whether there is a uniform effect across different types of TELs. Finally, we compare state fiscal patterns before and after adoption on a state-by-state basis. Using these approaches and other methods, we show that TELs are largely ineffective and that state officials can circumvent them by raising money through fees. Our finding is consistent with recent studies showing that policies passed through direct democracy can often be thwarted by the politicians charged with implementing them.

What effect does the initiative process have on the volatility of interest group populations? Theoretical results suggest that interest group communities in initiative states should be characterized by greater rates of entry and exit since the presence of the initiative process increases mobilizations by potentially less stable groups, particularly broad-based citizen groups. I test this prediction using data on state interest group lobby registrations in 1990 and 1997. Tabular and regression analysis of exit and entry rates for all groups as well as separate analyses for different kinds of groups, including citizen, economic, membership, institutions, and associations, are consistent with the prediction, with the effect strongest and most consistent for citizen and membership groups.

By placing lawmaking power directly in the hands of citizens, Progressive movement reformers hoped to undercut the ability of political parties to pursue their policy objectives. This article tests the expectations of reformers by examining whether direct democracy alters the ability of partisan legislative majorities and governors to shape the size of the U.S. state public sector. Using a large dataset, I estimate the determinants of state tax effort and compare across jurisdictions the effects of variables that measure the partisan control of government. The results demonstrate that while the partisanship of elected officials is an important predictor of tax effort in pure representative jurisdictions, the relationship between party and policy disappears among initiative states. This analysis not only adds to our understanding of U.S. state budgeting, but also suggests the widespread adoption of direct democracy as a possible explanation for the weak party effects observed in studies of state fiscal policy.

We examine whether the geographic distribution of a political party's electoral support affects the divisiveness of statewide primaries. In spite of V.O. Key, Jr.'s (1956) original insight that geography might be a relevant predictor of contested statewide primaries, this hypothesis has received little attention from political scientists. We test Key's hypothesis using data on gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections to identify the effects of electoral geography on the structure of competition in primary elections. We contend that dispersed bases of electoral support greatly increase the costs associated with maintaining party cohesion. Our findings support the theory that a geographically dispersed electorate heightens the potential for intraparty factionalism. These results are robust across several measures of the dependent variable.

Recent studies have documented that parties influence legislative behavior. But such studies have been unable to distinguish between party voting stemming from ideological agreement and true party influence, as most lack independent measures of legislator ideology and have not been tested at the U.S. state level. Using survey data to control for legislator ideology, this analysis looks at how and under what conditions parties influence voting in three sessions of five state legislatures. The results suggest party influence on voting in the states is partly due to the fact that legislators have similar beliefs and represent similar people. Nonetheless, parties exert an independent influence on roll call voting due to state legislators' desire for party resources and their desire to create a positive brand name for the party. Furthermore, there are numerous circumstances under which parties exert this influence.

In this article, we analyze a unique set of state-level monthly survey data covering the eighteen months preceding the 2006 election to estimate (1) the relative effects of national and local conditions on the strength of challenges to incumbent senators and governors and (2) the effects of these challenges on incumbent popularity and, ultimately, vote shares. The analysis confirms several of the basic components of the theory that the strategic behavior of candidates and campaign contributors amplifies the effects of local and national conditions on election results, thereby enhancing electoral accountability. But it also uncovers a striking difference between the two offices. Even taking the strongly pro-Democratic national climate into account, the election context had a strong tendency to reduce the approval ratings of Senators, while it had an equally strong tendency to increase the approval ratings of governors. We speculate as to what might account for this difference.

Does complete public financing of campaigns enhance electoral competition? Arizona and Maine implemented similar clean elections programs for state-level races in 2000, providing an opportunity to examine the consequences of public financing. Employing two measures of competitiveness, I find that clean elections programs in both states significantly increased competition in districts where challengers accepted public funding. These findings suggest that public monies do not simply attract low-quality challengers and that access to campaign funds is an important determinant of competitiveness. As a result, while public financing programs are not panaceas for uncompetitive elections, such programs can enhance competition in races where money is accepted.

The term limits movement of the 1990s was largely driven by Republican-led groups as part of a larger strategy to unseat entrenched Democratic incumbents in Congress and state legislatures. Likewise, many political scientists predicted that, as the traditional minority party, Republicans would benefit from term limits by eliminating the Democrats' incumbency advantage. However, other studies provided reasons to be skeptical of these predicted gains. No empirical study has yet examined the accuracy of these predictions. This study seeks to fill this void by utilizing multivariate data analysis to study the impact of term limits on the partisan composition of state legislatures from 1990 to 2004. The findings suggest that, holding other factors constant, Republicans have not gained representation at the state legislative level under term limits as was predicted.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that U.S. state politicians manipulate rainy day funds for political purposes, but such claims remain untested in the literature. This article finds that lawmakers withdraw nearly three times more funds in response to a deficit shock of a given size if it occurs in an election year rather than in a non-election year; this occurs despite the fact that the magnitude of shocks does not vary over the electoral cycle. This effect is stronger when incumbents are eligible for re-election than when they are term-limited. When it comes to preventing political manipulation of funds, rainy day fund rules that increase the number of veto players who must approve of withdrawals seem to be more effective than rules that specify the economic conditions under which funds may be withdrawn.

As more children of undocumented workers graduate from U.S. high schools, many states are considering laws to grant these students in-state tuition status. Kansas, which adopted such a law in 2004, was an unlikely venue for this kind of policy, considering the negative attitudes toward illegal immigrants among the state's residents as well as its relatively small share of Hispanic residents. We argue that the passage of Kansas's in-state tuition bill occurred in large measure due to the skill of its proponents in framing the issue as one of access to public education. We use a mix of qualitative and quantitative data to show how proponents of the in-state tuition bill were able to direct attention toward public education—an issue more electorally palatable to legislators and their constituents—and redirect attention away from immigration policy. The success of the bill in Kansas has some applicability for similar legislation under consideration in other states; however, as immigration policy has become more politically charged, proponents of in-state tuition for undocumented students will face renewed challenges in the legislative arena, as Kansas also demonstrates.

During the 2004 and 2006 general elections, a number of states considered different moral policy ballot measures, including marriage definition, abortion bans, and stem cell research. Although more moral policy measures were voted on in the last two general elections, this is certainly not the first time that moral issues have been placed on the ballot. Some political pundits, during these elections, suggested that increased voter turnout in some states was due to these ballot measures. This research examines whether or not the presence of a moral policy measure on a given state's ballot generates higher voter turnout. I find that moral policy ballot measures generate higher turnout in midterm elections but not in presidential elections.

Past research has shown that elected officials are generally responsive to the public's attitudes on policy, particularly in domains such as morality policy. But will this responsiveness survive an externally imposed, non-incremental policy “shock”? The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade represents such a shock regarding abortion policy. We examine the responsiveness of state lawmakers to mass abortion attitudes in the post-Roe period through a longitudinal analysis of state abortion policies. We find that the connection between mass abortion attitudes and abortion policies has grown stronger over time, and that mass preferences have become the primary determinant of such policies. Mass abortion attitudes are now a stronger predictor of abortion policies than elite abortion attitudes, and certain elite abortion attitudes that once moderated the link between mass abortion attitudes and policy no longer do so. These findings suggest that lawmakers will attempt to respond to public preferences about contentious morality policies despite the imposition of an external policy constraint.

The subject of judicial elections has garnered an increasing amount of attention by scholars over the past decade. Campaign spending in judicial elections has occupied a central focus of this research, but most of this scholarship has examined campaign finance at the state supreme court level. Our study departs from that tradition by examining what factors predict campaign expenditures in 172 contested state intermediate appellate court (IAC) races from 2000–06. The results indicate that the characteristics of the race, institutional factors, and the context of the campaign all influence how much money is spent in IAC elections. Although similar in some respects to state legislative and supreme court elections, notable differences exist as well.

Voters in nearly half the states adopted term limits between 1990 and 2000, and recent efforts to repeal or extend these caps generally have suffered sound defeats. Past research demonstrates that while robust majorities approved of limiting the terms of elected officials, support was strongest among government cynics and minority-party identifiers. Here, we investigate the impact of trust and partisanship on attitudes toward a 2004 Arkansas proposal to extend term limits; we further test our findings using survey data on a related 2002 measure in California. Relying on statewide samples of likely voters, we find that Democrats and those with more trust in government demonstrate greater support for such measures than Republicans and cynics, controlling for other factors. Trust exerts the strongest substantive effect.

More than 15 years—nine election cycles—have passed since a comprehensive set of state legislative election data was compiled and made available to researchers and practitioners: the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research's (ICPSR) State Legislative Election Returns in the United States dataset (Study #8907) collected by Malcolm Jewell (Jewell 1991) and containing observations from 1967 to 1988. With this hiatus in mind, we set out at various times initially—in three independent efforts (Berry and Carsey; Niemi, and Powell; Snyder)—to gather legislative election data for all states and elections since 1988. In addition, Berry and Carsey (2005) cleaned the original dataset to make it more accurate and usable; their corrections led to the release of a revised ICPSR dataset (Study #3938). The culmination of these efforts is a dataset containing information about general elections for state legislative seats from 1967 to 2003, now available through ICPSR (Study 21480).

The prospect of a full complement of regularly-conducted, publicly-released state-level polls has both excited and eluded scholars of state politics and public opinion for decades. Here, we examine the current status of state-level polling in the U.S. Specifically, we rely on interviews with 51 state poll directors to investigate the location, frequency, scope, budget, purpose, content, and perceived policy impact of such projects. We also explore the still challenging prospect of greater state-to-state collaboration. We conclude that while current state polling is a robust industry, calls for greater collaboration remain unheeded largely because of limited resources and the incompatible reward structures of project directors. Still, improved data-archiving together with regional polling projects on hot-button topics would serve to diminish such challenges.

While Lowi (1964) claims that policies can be classified as one of three types, distributive, redistributive, or regulatory, his work has been criticized as incomplete. Policies are frequently multidimensional, and his categories are neither comprehensive nor mutually exclusive. A fourth policy type, morality policy, has now been well-established as distinct from the other three types (e.g., Meier 1994; Mooney 2001). Evidence suggests that some policies can be framed as multidimensional policy types. Abortion funding is one such policy issue that has aspects of both morality policy and redistributive policy in its politics. In this study, we develop models of government abortion funding based on abortion as a morality and a redistributive policy. We estimate these models using weighted least squares to explain the voting outcomes of county-level votes in six state referenda elections for government funding of abortions. Then, we test a combined model and find clear evidence that the combined model, and variables from both perspectives, provide a stronger case than a single policy typology model alone. A practical implication is that policy advocates may purposely emphasize different values and results of the policies. Thus, testing policy theories may need to include more complex views of policies based on policy types.