Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-jbqgn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-04T01:11:47.903Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Regression Discontinuity Design for Studying Divided Government

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Patricia A. Kirkland Open the ORCID record for Patricia A. Kirkland [Opens in a new window]  and
Justin H. Phillips
Patricia A. Kirkland*
Affiliation:
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
Justin H. Phillips
Affiliation:
Columbia University, New York City, NY, USA
*
Patricia A. Kirkland, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA. Email: p.kirkland@princeton.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The regression discontinuity design (RDD) is a valuable tool for identifying causal effects with observational data. However, applying the traditional electoral RDD to the study of divided government is challenging. Because assignment to treatment in this case is the result of elections to multiple institutions, there is no obvious single forcing variable. Here, we use simulations in which we apply shocks to real-world election results in order to generate two measures of the likelihood of divided government, both of which can be used for causal analysis. The first captures the electoral distance to divided government and can easily be utilized in conjunction with the standard sharp RDD toolkit. The second is a simulated probability of divided government. This measure does not easily fit into a sharp RDD framework, so we develop a probability restricted design (PRD) which relies upon the underlying logic of an RDD. This design incorporates common regression techniques but limits the sample to those observations for which assignment to treatment approaches “as-if random.” To illustrate both of our approaches, we reevaluate the link between divided government and the size of budget deficits.

Keywords

legislative politicslegislative/executive interactionbudgetingpublic policypolicy processsimulationsquantitative methodsmethodology
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2020 , pp. 356 - 389
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2019

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alesina, Alberto, and Perotti, Roberto. 1994. “The Political Economy of Budget Deficits.” Working Paper No. 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alt, James E., and Lowry, Robert C.. 1994. “Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States.” American Political Science Review 88:811–828.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Angrist, Joshua D., and Pischke, Jorn-Steffen. 2008. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anzia, Sarah F., and Berry, Christopher R.. 2011. “The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?” American Journal of Political Science 55 (3): 478–493.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binder, Sarah A. 2003. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
Binder, Sarah A. 2015. “The Dysfunctional Congress.” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (7): 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binder, Sarah A., and Maltzman, Forrest. 2002. “Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947–1998.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (1): 190–199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowling, Cynthia J., and Ferguson, Margaret R.. 2001. “Divided Government, Interest Representation, and Policy Differences: Competing Explanations of Gridlock in the 50 States.” Journal of Politics 63 (1): 182–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broockman, David E. 2014. “Do Female Politicians Empower Women to Vote or Run for Office? A Regression Discontinuity Approach.” Electoral Studies 34:190–204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calonico, Sebastian, Cattaneo, Matias D., and Titiunik, Rocio. 2014. “Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs.” Econometrica 82 (6): 22952326.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cattaneo, Matias D., Idrobo, Nicolas, and Titiunik, Rocio. 2019. A Practical Introduction to Regression Discontinuity Designs: Foundations. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chiou, Fang-Yi, and Rothenberg, Lawrence S.. 2003. “When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics.” American Journal of Political Science 47 (3): 503–522.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coleman, John J. 1999. “Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness.” American Political Science Review 93 (4): 821–835.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Gary W., and McCubbins, Mathew D.. 1991. “Divided Control of Fiscal Policy.” In Parallel Politics: The Politics of Economic Policy in Japan and the United States, ed. Kernell, S.. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 155–175.Google Scholar
Dubin, Michael J. 2007. Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary, 1796-2006. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.Google Scholar
Erikson, Robert S., and Titiunik, Rocio. 2015. “Using Regression Discontinuity to Uncover the Personal Incumbency Advantage.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 10 (1): 101–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferreira, Fernando, and Gyourko, Joseph. 2014. “Does Gender Matter for Political Leadership? The Case of U.S. Mayors.” Journal of Public Economics 112:24–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fiva, Jon H., Folke, Olle, and Sorensen, Rune J.. 2013. “The Power of Parties: Evidence from Close Municipal Elections in Norway.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 120 (1): 3–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Folke, Olle. 2014. “Shades of Brown and Green: Party Effects in Proportional Election Systems. Journal of the European Economic Association 12 (5): 1361–1395.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gelman, Andrew, and Imbens, Guido. 2014. Why High-Order Polynomials Should Not Be Used in Regression Discontinuity Designs. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Hopkins, Daniel J.. 2011. “When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (2): 326–339.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gray, Virginia, and Lowery, David. 1995. “Interest Representation and Democratic Gridlock.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20 (4): 531–552.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gubernatorial General Elections, all states, 1968–2010 summary. 2003. CQ Voting and Elections Collection (Website). Washington, DC: CQ Press..Google Scholar
Hahm, Sung Deuk, Kamlet, Mark S., and Mowery, David C.. 1997. “PostWar Deficit Spending in the United States.” American Politics Quarterly 29:139–167.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hahn, Jinyong, Todd, Petra, and Van der Klaauw, Wilbert. 2001. “Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design.” Econometrica 69 (1): 201209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, Andrew B. 2015. “What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?” American Political Science Review 109 (1): 18–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hicks, William D. 2015. “Partisan Competition and the Efficiency of Lawmaking in American State Legislatures, 1991-2009.” American Politics Research 43 (5): 743–770.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hopkins, Daniel J., and McCabe, Katherine T.. 2012. “After It's Too Late: Estimating the Policy Impacts of Black Mayoralties in U.S. Cities.” American Politics Research 40 (4): 665–700.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howell, William G. 2003. Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Imbens, Guido W., and Kalyanaraman, Karthik. 2012. “Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression Discontinuity Estimator.” Review of Economic Studies 79 (3): 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Imbens, Guido W., and Lemieux, Thomas. 2008. “Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice.” Journal of Econometrics 142 (2): 615–635.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kirkland, Patricia A. 2017. “The Business of Being Mayor: Mayors and Fiscal Policy in U.S. Cities.” Unpublished manuscript, Colubmia University.Google Scholar
Kirkland, Patricia A., and Phillips, Justin H.. 2018. “Is Divided Government a Cause of Legislative Delay?” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 13 (2): 173–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klarner, Carl. 2018. State Legislative Election Returns, 1967-2016. Harvard Dataverse, V3, UNF:6:pV4h1CP/B8pHthjjQThTTw==. doi:10.7910/DVN/3WZFK9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klarner, Carl, Berry, William, Carsey, Thomas, Jewell, Malcolm, Niemi, Richard, Powell, Lynda, and Snyder, James. 2013. State Legislative Election Returns (1967-2010) (ICPSR34297-v1). Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [Distributor]. doi:10.3886/ICPSR34297.v1.Google Scholar
Kousser, Thad, and Phillips, Justin H.. 2012. The Power of American Governors: Winning on Budgets and Losing on Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kriner, Douglas, and Schwartz, Liam. 2008. “Divided Government and Congressional Investigations.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 33 (2): 295–322.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krause, George A. 2000. “Partisan and Ideological Sources of Fiscal Deficits in the United States.” American Journal of Political Science 44 (3): 541–559.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, David S. 2008. “Randomized Experiments from Non-random Selection in US House Elections.” Journal of Econometrics 142 (2), 675–697.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, David S., and Lemieux, Thomas. 2010. “Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 48:281–355.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, David S., Moretti, Enrico, and Butler, Matthew J.. 2004. “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the US House.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (3): 807–859.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayhew, David R. 1991. Divided We Govern. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
McCrary, Justin. 2008. “Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design: A Density Test.” Journal of Econometrics 142 (2): 698–714.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCubbins, Mathew D. 1991. “Party Politics, Divided Government, and Budget Deficits.” In Parallel Politics: The Politics of Economic Policy in Japan and the United States, ed. Kernell, S.. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 83–122.Google Scholar
Moraski, Bryon J., and Shipan, Charles R.. 1999. “The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices.” American Journal of Political Science 43 (4): 1069–1095.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nicholson, Stephen P., Segura, Gary M., and Woods, Nathan D.. 2002. “Presidential Approval and the Mixed Blessings of Divided Government.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (1): 146–159.Google Scholar
Poterba, James. 1994. “State Response to Fiscal Crises: ‘Natural Experiments’ for Studying the Effects of Budgetary Institutions.” Journal of Political Economy 102:793–821.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rogers, James R. 2005. “The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production.” Public Choice 123 (April): 217–233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roubini, Nouriel, and Sachs, Jeffrey D.. 1989a. “Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Countries.” Economic Policy 8:99–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roubini, Nouriel, and Sachs, Jeffrey D.. 1989b. “Political and Economic Determinations of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies.” European Economic Review 33:903–933.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Squire, Peverill. 1998. “Membership Turnover and the Efficient Processing of Legislation.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 23 (1): 23–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van der Klaauw, Wilbert. 2002. “Estimating the Effect of Financial Aid Offers on College Enrollment: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach.” International Economic Review 43 (4): 1249–1287.CrossRefGoogle Scholar