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National Grange Influence on the Supreme Court Confirmation of Stanley Matthews

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2016

Scott H. Ainsworth  and
John Anthony Maltese
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Extract

Studies of the Supreme Court confirmation process have traditionally concentrated on factors that lead to Senate defeat of nominees (e.g., Scigliano 1971; Songer 1979; Palmer 1983; Segal 1987; Cameron et al. 1990; Ruckman 1993; Van Winkle 1994). Thus, they look at such institutional and political variables as presidential strength, timing, the partisan composition of the Senate, and whether an appointment may alter partisan coalitions on the Court. More recently, a separate body of literature has begun to examine the effects of interest-group lobbying for and against Supreme Court nominees (e.g., Caldeira 1988-89; Caldeira and Wright 1990,1991; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994). For example, Austen-Smith and Wright characterize the allocation of lobbying resources across senators supporting, opposing, and indifferent to Robert Bork's 1987 nomination. Our study, which examines the lobbying against the 1881 nominations of Stanley Matthews, is part of this second wave of research on group lobbying and Supreme Court nominations. We argue that National Grange influence affected senators' votes on Matthews's nomination during a period not associated with interest-group activity.

Type
Articles
Information
Social Science History , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , Spring 1996 , pp. 41 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © Social Science History Association 1996 

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