1 (Moscow, 1958), p. 528.

2 (Moscow, 1958), p. 75.

3 (Moscow, 1959), p. 11.

4 (Moscow, 1959), p. 34.

5 That is, regional committee.

6 , May 17, 1960, p. 6.

7 , Sept. 19, 1962, p. 3.

8 See Barrington, Moore, Terror and Progress USSR (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 184–91.Google Scholar

9 See Paul H., Avrich, “The Bolshevik Revolution and Workers’ Control in Russian Industry, “ Slavic Review, XXII, No. 1 (March 1963), 47–63.Google Scholar

10 (4th ed.; Moscow), XXVII (1950), 238-39.

11 (Moscow, 1962), p. 194.

12 This rule was formalized in the first comprehensive Party decision on the Party-state relationship, which was taken at the Eighth Party Congress in 1919: “The Party should carry out its decisions through the Soviet organs…. The Party tries to lead the activity of the Soviets but not to supplant (podmeniaf) them.” (Moscow, 1959), p. 429. The injunction against supplanting the Soviets was, as we shall discuss later, merely to ensure that the proper procedures for implementation were followed and that Party organs should not take upon themselves the resolution of detailed administrative questions.

13 (Moscow, 1958), p. 49.

14 , p. 144.

15 The debate centered on two questions: Should the administrative authority itself be single or multiple? What should be the role of the trade-unions (and the workers) in administration? See Carr, E. H., The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 (New York), II (1952), esp. 187 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16 The exceptions are invariably attempts by primary Party organizations (or their commissions) to obligate administrators in cases in which they have authority only to recommend. This matter will be discussed in the next section.

17 , p. 142. A rural raion is roughly equivalent to an American county, an urban raion to a borough.

18 , Dec. 6, 1964, p. 4; Ibid., Feb. 24, 1965, p. 2.

19 Ibid, Dec. 6, 1964, p. 4. See also , No. 1 (Jan.), 1959, p. 11.

20 , March 28, 1951, p . 2. Similarly, the official Party handbook states: “The right of checking the activity of the administration is granted to the primary Party organization of the production type in order to improve the administration of the economy and consequently to strengthen edinonachalie.” (Moscow, 1959), p. 237.

21 , pp. 261-68.

22 Ibid., pp. 230-40.

23 Thus, the Party organization o£ a higher educational institution is “responsible for everything that is done within the institution, ” and it is called upon “to raise new questions in a daring manner” and “to strengthen Party influence on all phases of work.” Ibid., p. 274. In the preceding pages of this handbook it is indicated that such a Party organization should deal with the students’ world view, the nature of faculty research, the amount of homework, pedantry in lectures, and the improvement of correspondence courses.

24 Speech by Andrei Zhdanov (explaining the meaning of pravo kontrolia at the time the concept was introduced into the Party Rules), in XVIII (Moscow, 1939), p. 533.

25 CCCP, 1956-1960 (Moscow, 1961), p. 143.

26 , p. 332, for a similar statement concerning a decision of the Party bureau.

27 , p. 194.

28 (Moscow, 1955), p . 48.

29 , No. 23 (Dec), 1963, p. 49.

30 in theory the secretary is merely the elected executive arm of the organization; in reality, particularly in the larger organizations, he is often a man who has been selected by higher-level Party organs and is their agent. In (1959), pp. S56-58, there is a separate section entitled “The Role of the District Committee in the Selection of Secretaries [of the Primary Party Organization].“

31 Derek J. R. Scott has stated, “No clear distinction of meaning can be made between [kontrol’] and the word reviziia…. Kontrol’ is particularly associated with the checking on the fulfillment of instructions … and is synonymous with verification of performance.“ Russian Political Institutions (New York, 1957), p. 150, n. 2.

32 The interviews were with a wide variety of officials, many of them plant managers and chief engineers.

33 This is especially true of decisions involving concrete economic and technical matters. It may not be true of decisions involving intra-Party matters or perhaps even “socialist obligations.“

34 For example, a press report mentioning both the administrator and the Party secretary always lists the administrator first. Even within the Party the manager of an enterprise or farm is far more likely to receive the honor of election to the republic Central Committee, oblast Party committee, etc., than is the unit's Party secretary.

35 This was explicitly stated to be the case in , April 25, 1957, p 2.

36 in 13 of the 14 military districts about which the author was able to collect information the commander had a higher rank than the head of the political administration, while the two men had equal rank in only one case. (In nine cases the commander held a rank two levels above that of the political officer.)

37 This statement is true only for the precise positions named. In industry Party secretaries frequently are engineers with lower managerial experience (e.g., as shop head), while plant directors are often named secretaries of the local Party committees. Both these career patterns, however, only confirm the general point made here.

38 , N O . 12 (June), 1963, p . 42.

39 Ibid., No. 13 (July), 1959, pp. 23-27. Party members may also be drawn into other forms of “public kontrol'” such as the production conference or the newly created groups of assistance to the Party-state control system. T o the astonishment of at least one primary Party organization secretary, Partiinaia zhizri has emphatically denounced the idea of amalgamating the various “public” commissions and groups (No. 8 [April], 1963, pp. 57-58). I n all but the smallest Party organizations a special deputy secretary is named to “coordinate and direct the work of all forms of public control.” Ibid., No. 22 (Nov.), 1964, p. 7.

40 The second secretary of the Astrakhan City Party Committee retorted to a critical Soviet correspondent: “You try to lead such a [large] enterprise. How can you possibly get along without law violations?” , April 8, 1960, p . 2.

41 Granick, Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR (New York, 1954), p . 285.

42 , April 8, 1960, p. 2. The quotation is from a secretary of the Astrakhan Obkom.

43 , (1959), pp. 231, 237-88.

44 , No. 12 (June), 1963, p. 42.

45 The word politicheskii, like its counterparts in French and German, has a much wider meaning than the English “political.” Included in it is the conception not only of “politics“ but also of “policy.“

46 (1959), p. 237.

47 See David, Granick, The Red Executive (Garden City, 1960), pp. 88–39 Google Scholar; and Berliner, Joseph S., Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge, 1957), p. 267.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

48 , Oct. 12, 1962, p. 3.

49 We have not undertaken a controlled statistical study from our card file on factory officials, but we find few secretaries at important plants who hold their post for more than three or four years, and we estimate that their average tenure has been around two and a half years. It is difficult to make a useful estimate of the average tenure for plant directors because the time range is much larger. However, the vast majority of important plants have each had, sometime in the last two decades, a director who held his post for five to ten years or even longer.

50 The one exception has been the Party committee of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz territorial production administration during 1962-64. The secretary of that committee had a role in relation to the head of the administration, at least on production questions, similar to that enjoyed by the secretary of the primary Party organization.

51 , Feb. 26, 1953, p. 1.

52 Ibid., Dec. 8, 1940, p. 1.

53 Party Rules, Statute 19. The Party Rules can be found in , Nov. 3, 1961.

54 See above, p. 216, for examples.

55 , Aug. 18, 1959, p. 2. Latvia is a small republic with no regions (oblasti) and with only one sovnarkhoz. The central committees in such republics “enjoy the rights of Party obkomy.” p. 10.

56 No. 22 (Nov.), 1964, pp. 22-24.

57 , Oct. 29, 1964, p. 2.

58 , No. 22 (Nov.), 1964, pp. 22-24.

59 (Moscow, 1959), p. 33.

60 , Nov. 2, 1960, p. 4. Between 1962 and 1964, of course, the rural raikom secretary did not occupy this role. In fact, for a large part of this period there was no raikom secretary. However, since the reunification of the Party, the raikom has been reestablished as the dominant institution in the rural raion. See, for example, Feb. 17, 1965, p. 1.

61 Statute 42.

62 , Dec. 23, 1964, p. 1.

63 Ibid., July 17, 1960, p. 3.

64 p. 68.

65 , Nov. 30, 1957, p. 2.

66 This man, S. A. Stepanov, became a full member of the Central Committee at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, at which time he was still sovnarkhoz chairman at Sverdlovsk. For his biography see , March 16, 1962, p. 5.

67 Fainsod, , Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, 1958)Google Scholar, particularly p. 72.

68 Stalin, J. V., Works (Moscow, 1953), V, 219.Google Scholar

69 Fainsod, p. 76. The first secretary wrote, “We are a flax oblast, and the Central Committee completely correctly will make demands and evaluate our work precisely on the basis of the sucčessful fulfillment of this work…. Everything will be canceled out if there is a failure in the flax sector.“

70 (Moscow, 1962), p. 469.

71 See , July 2, 1959, p. 2.

72 See n. 50 above.

73 (Moscow, 1936), p. 136.

74 Stalin, V, 219.

75 See, for example, Simon, Herbert A., Administrative Behavior (2d ed.; New York, 1961), pp. xxiv–xxvii Google Scholar; and Dodds, Harold W., The Academic President—Educator or Caretaker? (New York, 1962), p. 90–95.Google Scholar

76 See, for example, Blau, Peter M., The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago, 1955).Google Scholar

77 This theme has been widely discussed by Western economists. A useful general summary can be found in Alec, Nove, “The Problem of ‘Sucčess Indicators’ in Soviet Industry, “ Economics New Series, XXV, No. 97 (Feb. 1958), 1–13.Google Scholar

78 Discussions of this point can be found in Drucker, Peter F., Concept of the Corporation (New York, 1946), pp. 85, 88, and 90Google Scholar; and Barnard, Chester I., Organization and Management (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), p. 88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

79 Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1959), p. 534–35.Google Scholar

80 Dodds, pp. 90-95.

81 Macmahon, Arthur W., Millet, John D., and Ogden, Gladys, The Administration of Federal Work Relief (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941, pp. 230–36.Google Scholar

82 Consider the following typical example. In a small, outlying town in Bashkiria the officials of a construction trust and a heating shop were arguing as to whether heat should be supplied to a new building's heating system even though the connecting pipes were not fully insulated. The heating officials argued that it was dangerous and against regulations; the builders said that it must be done to prevent the freezing of the building's heating system. To refer such problems (and they must be innumerable) to the sovnarkhoz would be irrational. In practice, this particular question was taken to the head of the industrialtransportation department of the local raikom, and he made a final decision. (The heat was turned on, and “nothing terrible happened.“) , March 13, 1960.

83 James W. Fesler, Area and Administration (University, Alabama, 1949), particularly Chapter 4.

84 Stalin, V, 219.

85 Hannah, Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (2d ed.; New York, 1958), p. 409.Google Scholar