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Hungary and the Munich Crisis: The Revisionist Dilemma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Thomas L. Sakmyster
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In the first days of 1938, Kalman Kanya, Hungary’s foreign minister, privately expressed the opinion that there was nowhere in Europe a “will to war” and that, barring accidents, peace seemed assured for at least a year. In a technical sense Kanya’s prediction was borne out by events, but he clearly did not foresee the Central European upheavals that were only months away. In the crisis over the Austrian Anschluss, Hungary was to remain a powerless bystander, unable, and to a certain extent unwilling, to raise a voice of protest. The Czechoslovak crisis was an entirely different matter. Virtually all politically conscious Hungarians believed that Prague’s time of troubles should be exploited to obtain territorial revision and strengthen Hungary’s position in East Central Europe. But, as previous historians of this subject have indicated, Hungary’s course in the unfolding Czechoslovak crisis was hesitant and indecisive.

Type
Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , December 1973 , pp. 725 - 740
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1973

References

1. Report of Sir Geoffrey Knox, British minister in Budapest, Jan. 13, 1938, Public Record Office, F0381, C636/23/22 (hereafter cited as PRO, followed by item number).

2. See in particular the incomparable work of Macartney, C. A., October Fifteenth : A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1961), 1 : 202–75Google Scholar. Other useful accounts are Dreisziger, Nandor A. F., Hungary's Way to World War II (Astor Park, Fla., and Toronto, 1968)Google Scholar, and Zsigmond, László, “Ungarn und das Münchener Abkommen,” Acta Historica, 6, no. 3-4 (1959) : 251–86Google Scholar. Less reliable is Jörg K. Hoensch, Der ungarische Revisionistnus und die Zerschlagung der Tschechoslowakei (Tübingen, 1967), pp. 48-106.

3. Information on Hitler's frank statements emerges from scattered later references, including Allians Hitler-Horthy-Mussolini : Dokumente sur ungarischen Anssenpolitik (1933-1944), ed. Lajos Kerekes et al. (Budapest, 1966), no. 28 (hereafter cited as Allians); Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 (Washington, D.C., 1949-66), series D, vol. 2, no. 114 (hereafter cited as DGFP); and Lászlö Zsigmond, ed., Diplomdciai iratok Magyarorssg külpolitikajához, 1936-1945, vol. 1 : Lajos, Kerekes, ed., A Berlin-Roma tengely kialakulsa es Ausstria annexiója, 1936-1938 (Budapest, 1962), no. 394 Google Scholar (hereafter cited as DIMK).

4. For Rátz's initiative see Péter Sipos, “Az Imrédy kormány megalakulásának történeterSl,” Századok, C, no. 1 (1966) : 69-70. Further details on Right Radical activity in 1937 can be found in Nicholas Nagy-Talavera, M., The Green Shirts and the Others : A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania (Stanford, 1970), p. 123–31.Google Scholar

5. For the development of the Gy8r program see Macartney, October Fifteenth, 1 : 212-15; and Sipos, “Az Imrédy kormany megalakulasanak torteneterfll,” p. 70.

6. Macartney, October Fifteenth, 1 : 107.

7. At about this time Kánya told Gusztav Gratz, a leading Hungarian political figure, that he intended “to preserve complete freedom of action” in his foreign policy. “He had therefore not tied himself to any side by any kind of military agreement; he was waiting rather to see which group of states would be stronger at the end of rearmament. Only then would he orient himself in a definite direction, and it would be the one where Hungarian interests would best be guaranteed.” Kanya's remarks are recorded in an Austrian document of the period, found among the papers of Theodor Hornbostel, head of the Political Section of the Austrian Foreign Ministry. German Foreign Ministry Records, National Archives Microcopy T120, 2935/568771. This group of Austrian documents, found among the records of the German Foreign Ministry after World War II, will hereafter be cited as AD.

8. DGFP D, vol. 5, no. 149.

9. For references to Hungarian impressions of the timing of a future crisis, see AD, 2935/568512-513, and the later remarks of General Ratz to General Keitel as recorded in an August 1938 memorandum of Rátz's. Collection of Hungarian Political and Military Records, National Archives, Microcopy T973 (Washington, D.C., 1966), roll 15, 345.

10. Some details of this plan, which was being developed with the cooperation of General Homlok of the General Staff, are found in the manuscript diary of Ferenc Szalasi (letter of Apr. 11, 1938). This manuscript, as well as other Hungarian documents and personal correspondence deposited by C. A. Macartney at St. Antony's College Library (Oxford, England), was used with the kind permission of Professor Macartney. This collection of documents will hereafter be cited as Macartney Archive.

11. Allianz, no. 48. DGFP D, vol. 2, nos. 65, 66; vol. 5, no. 180.

12. Pesti Napló, Aug. 20, 1937.

13. Marginal notes by Sir Andrew Nobles, a second secretary in the Foreign Office, on a dispatch of Sir Basil Newton, British minister in Prague, Apr. S, 1938, PRO, R3688/719/21. See also a Foreign Office minute of Mar. 22, PRO, R310S/626/21.

14. See, for example, the record of Imredy's conversation with Sir R. Glynn in August, PRO, R7505/1022/12.

15. Report of Knox, Apr. 9, 1936, PRO, R231S/84/21.

16. This was the conclusion of Sztojay, the Hungarian minister in Berlin, after conversations with many high German officials. His report is found in DIMK, vol. 2 : A miincheni egyesmeny litrejotte is Magyarorssag külpolitikája, 1936-1938, ed. Magda Adam (Budapest, 196S), nos. 142, 145.

17. This conclusion was based in part on a report from Colonel Andorka, head of Hungarian Military Intelligence, who received a confidential briefing from General Keitel in April. See Knox's report of Apr. 23, 1938, PRO, C3591/1941/18; and the marginal comments (presumably Kanya's) on DIMK, vol. 2, no. 186.

18. Knox told Kanya that his government had intervened in Berlin to urge cooperation in a peaceful settlement. Germany could not count on England's standing aside in case of a conflagration brought on by her rash actions. DIMK, vol. 2, no. 215.

19. This was done in part to satisfy the British government, which in April had formally urged Hungary and her neighbors to make a special effort to reach a settlement of their differences at an early date. PRO, R3691/R4309/178/21; DIMK, vol. 2, no. 161.

20. Report of John F. Montgomery, American ambassador in Budapest, June 2, Foreign Relations of the United States : Diplomatic Papers, 1938, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C., 1955), pp. 55-56; and Knox's report, June 26, PRO, R5926/626/21.

21. Wolfgang Foerster, Ein General katnpft gegen den Krieg : Aus nachgelassenen Papieren des Generalstabschefs Ludwig Beck (Munich, 1949), pp. 88-90; DGFP D, vol. 7, appendix 3(v).

22. For a more detailed examination of Hitler's conception of Hungary's role in his plans see this author's “The Hungarian State Visit to Germany of August, 1938 : Some New Evidence on Hungary in Hitler's Pre-Munich Policy,” Canadian Slavic Studies, 3, no. 4 (Winter 1969) : 683-84.

23. Allianz, no. 48.

24. Letter of A. D. Gascoigne, secretary in the British Legation in Budapest, to the Foreign Office, PRO, C8473/1941/18.

25. Helmuth, Groscurth, Tagebticher eines Abivehroffiziers, 1938-1940, ed. Krausnick, Helmut and Deutsch, Harold C. (Stuttgart, 1970), p. 102 Google Scholar; DIMK, vol. 2, no. 292.

26. The argument that Hungary was militarily unprepared was certainly a cogent one. A quick inquiry by Horthy into the progress of rearmament revealed that the army was still in a very low state of readiness. Conditions were not suitable for either an offensive or a defensive war. See The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy, ed. Miklos Szinai and Leszle Szucs (Budapest, 1965), p. 131 (hereafter cited as Horthy Papers). See also Janos Csima, “Adatekok a horthysta vezerkarnak az ellenforradalmi rendszer haboriis politikajaban betoltott szereperfil,” Hadtortinelmi Koslemenyek, 15, no. 3 (1968) : 495.

27. Horthy Papers, p. 89.

28. The following paragraph is based on Sakmyster, “Hungarian State Visit,” pp. 677-91.

29. András Hory, A kulisszk mögབtt : A msodik vildghaború elSsminyei ami is ahogy avalüsgban törtint (Vienna, 1965), p. 33.

30. Reports of Knox and Gascoigne, Aug. 31, Sept. 2, PRO, R7339/719/21 and C9178/1841/18; DIMK, vol. 2, no. 305; and German Foreign Ministry Records, National Archives Microcopy T120, Translated Czech Documents, 1809/412367-368.

31. Lorant, Tilkovszky, Revisid is netnzetisigpolitika Magyarorssigon, 1938-1941 (Budapest, 1967), p. 27 Google Scholar. For Homlok's plan see Groscurth, Tagebiicher, pp. 108-9.

32. DIMK, vol. 2, no. 363; Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, ed. E. L. Woodward et al., series 3, vol. 3 (London, 1951), no. 7 (hereafter cited as DBFP).

33. PRO, C11417/2319/12.

34. See Chamberlain's comments during the cabinet meeting of Sept. 14, PRO, Cabinet Minutes, 23-95.

35. Ibid.

36. No direct German record exists, but see DGFP D, vol. 2, no. 554, as well as DIMK, vol. 2, no. 413. This account is based in part on a copy of Imredy's personal record, which is found in the Macartney Archive (see note 10).

37. DGFP D, vol. 5, no. 272; Macartney, October Fifteenth, 1 : 263.

38. Such a possibility was by no means remote. In January 1938 a representative of the officer corps had urged Regent Horthy to abolish Parliament and establish an autocratic government resting for its support on the army and right-wing parties. Horthy refused to cooperate, but the officers remained restless. See Macartney, October Fifteenth, pp. 212-14.

39. DIMK, vol. 2, no. 365. No record of Chamberlain's message could be traced in the PRO files.

40. DIMK, vol. 2, p. 392; DBFP, vol. 3, no. 44.

41. See Kanya's remark to Knox on September 26, DBFP, vol. 3, nos. 51, 52.

42. DIMK, vol. 2, nos. 397, 411. A later Hungarian memorandum (Allianz, no. 48) alleges that Szt6jay told Ribbentrop that Hungary would march with Germany, but this appears to be a misrepresentation

43. DIMK, vol. 2, no. 423.

44. Parts of Imredy's speech appear in English translation in Documents on International Affairs, 1938, ed. Monica Curtis, 2 vols. (London, 1942-43), 2 : 345-46.