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“Reasoning with Preferences?”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2017

John Broome
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Extract

Rationality requires certain things of you. It requires you not to have contradictory beliefs or intentions, not to intend something you believe to be impossible, to believe what obviously follows from something you believe, and so on. Its requirements can be expressed using schemata such as:

Modus ponens. Rationality requires of N that, if N believes p and N believe that if p then q, then N believes q.

Necessary means. Rationality requires of N that, if N intends that e, and if N believes that e will be so only if m is so, and if N believes m will be so only if she intends that m, then N intends that m.

Krasia. Rationality requires of N that, if N believes she ought to F, and if N believes she will F only if she intends to F, then N intends to F.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 59 , December 2006 , pp. 183 - 208
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2006

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