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Rape Myths: What are They and What can We do About Them?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 May 2021

Katharine Jenkins
Katharine Jenkins*
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow
*
Katharine.Jenkins@glasgow.ac.uk
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Abstract

In this paper, I aim to shed some light on what rape myths are and what we can do about them. I start by giving a brief overview of some common rape myths. I then use two philosophical tools to offer a perspective on rape myths. First, I show that we can usefully see rape myths as an example of what Miranda Fricker has termed ‘epistemic injustice’, which is a type of wrong that concerns our role as knowers. Then, I show that it is important to recognise that rape myths are instances of misogyny. This word is of course a more familiar one, but I'll be drawing on a specific philosophical account of what misogyny is, developed by Kate Manne, that I think is useful here. Finally, I briefly consider some upshots of these claims.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 89: How Do We Know? The Social Dimension of Knowledge , May 2021 , pp. 37 - 49
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2021

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